Since the old threads have all gone I thought that it would be good to re-start this topic afresh.
So what do people think of George W Bush' decision of sending 20.000 extra soldiers to Iraq? Do you agree with this or do you believe that it is time for a slow withdrawal? What is your opinion on the current situation and what do you believe should be done about it. If you have articles then please provide them.
I think the people of Iraq should decide. Or hey, better yet, the newly appointed Government we set up in Iraq. How come they don't get to decide what's going on. Unless someone has heard different, I've heard that the U.S. will maintain a small precense in Iraq through 2016, whilst having most if not all troops home by 2010.
That to me is rediculous to pre-maturely put a date on such a thing. I was for the war when it began back in 2001 in Afghanistan, however I was for the war for the wrong reasons. Like most Americans, it was in rage of Sept. 11 and revenge was on the mind of everyone.
Now? I realise that terrorism has been an act as old as the world itself, and there's no pure-cut method of disposing of it. At least not by invading any country we deem to be dangerous.
The US Government is spending almost $10 Billion a month on this war, with estimates to total up to or over $2 Trillion. That amount of money is fathomable for me to begin with, but when I think about places that money could have really been used I just get sick.
Over 3,000 US troops killed, 53,000 civilians, and god knows how many other deaths unaccounted for? $2 trillion? I'm not sure this is worth it... especially since the end result will not end terrorism. If anything it just increases the hostile attitute the rest of the world holds against America, which sadly enough is against the people as well as the Government.
What upsets me the most is when people speak of us being over there just to pillage and steal oil. That's a leftist comment which usually comes from those who are uneducated about the war in the first place, and want to just conjure up rediuclous ideas.
I have many friends in the military in Iraq, and I support their effort to serve our country, and I always will. I'm just not sure this was worth it all.
Iraq has landed in an inevitable civil war that was staved off by Saddam. What they need right now is policing; be that in the form of soldiers or Iraqis. It's not surprising that the Iraqi police force is tiny, and the men who do serve in it are corrupt; the state their country is in, they can hardly be blamed.
The place needs security. We started this; we can't just leave now. Iraq would be consumed by the war between the Sunnis and the Shias. Its own government won't do anything; their President declared last week that he hates his job and would leave it tomorrow if he could.
The place is a mess. I'm not saying we can sort it; having waged an illegal war and reduced Iraq to what it is now, it's sort of an obligation. Bush's new troops probably won't fix it, but they can't cause any more harm.
I never supported the war, and I lament all of the young American, European and Iraqi lives lost through it. Tony Blair and George W. Bush should be facing tribunal at the Hague, but they aren't. I don't hate them. But I think it's time we find someone who can balance out our relationships with the rest of the world. Bush has balls, I'll give him that and he isn't afraid to tell the rest of the world including the UN to go fuck themselves. But that doesn't help the US. We started it, and it's up to us to end it. We can't really do any more harm, can we?
I also not sold on the whole US oil conspiracy thing either... does anyone have any evidence to suggest either way?
Has Bush failed to give a valid American motive for Operation Iraqi Freedom? I believe so, and but I do not believe it was oil-driven whatsoever. As mediocre of a President as he has become, the American government is not interested in losing american soldiers, and trillions of dollars, over billions of dollars in oil. It wouldn't make sense. After production costs, plus the production time frame, and assuming we would be sharing it with the government since it would prove otherwise difficult to get out 250 billion barrels of reserve oil in Iraq without someone knowing, you'd be looking at a total profit range of about $50 Billion (assuming an avergae $1.50 cost of product per barrel which is high, and a starting value of about $3.1 Trillion.
Good evening. Tonight in Iraq, the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in a struggle that will determine the direction of the global war on terror – and our safety here at home. The new strategy I outline tonight will change America’s course in Iraq, and help us succeed in the fight against terror.
When I addressed you just over a year ago, nearly 12 million Iraqis had cast their ballots for a unified and democratic nation. The elections of 2005 were a stunning achievement. We thought that these elections would bring the Iraqis together – and that as we trained Iraqi security forces, we could accomplish our mission with fewer American troops.
But in 2006, the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq – particularly in Baghdad – overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that Iraq’s elections posed for their cause. And they responded with outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam – the Golden Mosque of Samarra – in a calculated effort to provoke Iraq’s Shia population to retaliate. Their strategy worked. Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people – and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me.
It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq. So my national security team, military commanders, and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted Members of Congress from both parties, allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefited from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group – a bipartisan panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.
The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.
The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq’s sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis. Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people. And their government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it.
Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does. They also report that this plan can work.
Let me explain the main elements of this effort: The Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad’s nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to this effort – along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations – conducting patrols, setting up checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents.
This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence – and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I have committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them – five brigades – will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.
Many listening tonight will ask why this effort will succeed when previous operations to secure Baghdad did not. Here are the differences: In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents – but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we will have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared. In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter these neighborhoods – and Prime Minister Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated.
I have made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people – and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this. Here is what he told his people just last week: “The Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.”
This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering. Yet over time, we can expect to see Iraqi troops chasing down murderers, fewer brazen acts of terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad’s residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq’s Sunni and Shia want to live together in peace – and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible.
A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.
To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country’s economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend 10 billion dollars of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation’s political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws – and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq’s constitution.
America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government as it works to meet these benchmarks. In keeping with the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, we will increase the embedding of American advisers in Iraqi Army units – and partner a Coalition brigade with every Iraqi Army division. We will help the Iraqis build a larger and better-equipped Army – and we will accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq. We will give our commanders and civilians greater flexibility to spend funds for economic assistance. We will double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self reliance. And Secretary Rice will soon appoint a reconstruction coordinator in Baghdad to ensure better results for economic assistance being spent in Iraq.
As we make these changes, we will continue to pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda is still active in Iraq. Its home base is Anbar Province. Al Qaeda has helped make Anbar the most violent area of Iraq outside the capital. A captured al Qaeda document describes the terrorists’ plan to infiltrate and seize control of the province. This would bring al Qaeda closer to its goals of taking down Iraq’s democracy, building a radical Islamic empire, and launching new attacks on the United States at home and abroad.
Our military forces in Anbar are killing and capturing al Qaeda leaders – and protecting the local population. Recently, local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on al Qaeda. As a result, our commanders believe we have an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists. So I have given orders to increase American forces in Anbar Province by 4,000 troops. These troops will work with Iraqi and tribal forces to step up the pressure on the terrorists. America’s men and women in uniform took away al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan – and we will not allow them to re-establish it in Iraq.
Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity – and stabilizing the region in the face of the extremist challenge. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.
We are also taking other steps to bolster the security of Iraq and protect American interests in the Middle East. I recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region. We will expand intelligence sharing – and deploy Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies. We will work with the governments of Turkey and Iraq to help them resolve problems along their border. And we will work with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region.
We will use America’s full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf States need to understand that an American defeat in Iraq would create a new sanctuary for extremists – and a strategic threat to their survival. These nations have a stake in a successful Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors – and they must step up their support for Iraq’s unity government. We endorse the Iraqi government’s call to finalize an International Compact that will bring new economic assistance in exchange for greater economic reform. And on Friday, Secretary Rice will leave for the region – to build support for Iraq, and continue the urgent diplomacy required to help bring peace to the Middle East.
The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life. In the long run, the most realistic way to protect the American people is to provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful ideology of the enemy – by advancing liberty across a troubled region. It is in the interests of the United States to stand with the brave men and women who are risking their lives to claim their freedom – and help them as they work to raise up just and hopeful societies across the Middle East.
From Afghanistan to Lebanon to the Palestinian Territories, millions of ordinary people are sick of the violence, and want a future of peace and opportunity for their children. And they are looking at Iraq. They want to know: Will America withdraw and yield the future of that country to the extremists – or will we stand with the Iraqis who have made the choice for freedom?
The changes I have outlined tonight are aimed at ensuring the survival of a young democracy that is fighting for its life in a part of the world of enormous importance to American security. Let me be clear: The terrorists and insurgents in Iraq are without conscience, and they will make the year ahead bloody and violent. Even if our new strategy works exactly as planned, deadly acts of violence will continue – and we must expect more Iraqi and American casualties. The question is whether our new strategy will bring us closer to success. I believe that it will.
Victory will not look like the ones our fathers and grandfathers achieved. There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship. But victory in Iraq will bring something new in the Arab world – a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people. A democratic Iraq will not be perfect. But it will be a country that fights terrorists instead of harboring them – and it will help bring a future of peace and security for our children and grandchildren.
Our new approach comes after consultations with Congress about the different courses we could take in Iraq. Many are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States – and therefore, our policy should focus on protecting Iraq’s borders and hunting down al Qaeda. Their solution is to scale back America’s efforts in Baghdad – or announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces. We carefully considered these proposals. And we concluded that to step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear that country apart, and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale. Such a scenario would result in our troops being forced to stay in Iraq even longer, and confront an enemy that is even more lethal. If we increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.
In the days ahead, my national security team will fully brief Congress on our new strategy. If Members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable people have different views, and they will voice their criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to scrutiny. And all involved have a responsibility to explain how the path they propose would be more likely to succeed.
Acting on the good advice of Senator Joe Lieberman and other key members of Congress, we will form a new, bipartisan working group that will help us come together across party lines to win the war on terror. This group will meet regularly with me and my Administration, and it will help strengthen our relationship with Congress. We can begin by working together to increase the size of the active Army and Marine Corps, so that America has the Armed Forces we need for the 21st century. We also need to examine ways to mobilize talented American civilians to deploy overseas – where they can help build democratic institutions in communities and nations recovering from war and tyranny.
In these dangerous times, the United States is blessed to have extraordinary and selfless men and women willing to step forward and defend us. These young Americans understand that our cause in Iraq is noble and necessary – and that the advance of freedom is the calling of our time. They serve far from their families, who make the quiet sacrifices of lonely holidays and empty chairs at the dinner table. They have watched their comrades give their lives to ensure our liberty. We mourn the loss of every fallen American – and we owe it to them to build a future worthy of their sacrifice.
Fellow citizens: The year ahead will demand more patience, sacrifice, and resolve. It can be tempting to think that America can put aside the burdens of freedom. Yet times of testing reveal the character of a Nation. And throughout our history, Americans have always defied the pessimists and seen our faith in freedom redeemed. Now America is engaged in a new struggle that will set the course for a new century. We can and we will prevail.
We go forward with trust that the Author of Liberty will guide us through these trying hours. Thank you and good night.
<snip> So what do people think of George W Bush' decision of sending 20.000 extra soldiers to Iraq? Do you agree with this or do you believe that it is time for a slow withdrawal? What is your opinion on the current situation and what do you believe should be done about it. If you have articles then please provide them.</snip>
[Blunderov] First let me say that one of the major reasons, if not the only one, for the Iraq war is oil. Everything in the Middle East that isn't about religion is about oil.
http://feeds.feedburner.com/FreakonomicsBlog?format=xml What Does Barack Obama Know About Behavioral Economics? 12 January 2007, 05:29:40 PM | Stephen J. Dubner Maybe a good bit. Here’s what Obama said yesterday during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s hearing with Condoleezza Rice about sending more U.S. soldiers to Iraq:
“And essentially the administration repeatedly has said: ‘We’re doubling down; we’re going to keep on going … because now we’ve got a lot in the pot and we can’t afford to lose what we put in the pot.”
That, friends, is what’s known as the sunk-cost fallacy. Here’s Wikipedia on the subject and here’s a definition from the Skeptic’s Dictionary:
When one makes a hopeless investment, one sometimes reasons: “I can’t stop now, otherwise what I’ve invested so far will be lost.” This is true, of course, but irrelevant to whether one should continue to invest in the project.
While it remains to be seen if Obama has the qualifications to run for national office, it does appear he’d at least be a pretty good gambler if he put his mind to it
http://sunk-cost.behaviouralfinance.net/ Sunk Cost The sunk cost fallacy is manifested when we have a greater tendency to continue an endeavour once an investment in money, effort or time has been made.
Top 10 Papers ARKES, Hal R. and Catherine BLUMER, 1985. The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Volume 35, Issue 1, February 1985, Pages 124-140. [Cited by 290] (13.57/year) Abstract: "The sunk cost effect is manifested in a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made. Evidence that the psychological justification for this behavior is predicated on the desire not to appear wasteful is presented. In a field study, customers who had initially paid more for a season subscription to a theater series attended more plays during the next 6 months, presumably because of their higher sunk cost in the season tickets. Several questionnaire studies corroborated and extended this finding. It is found that those who had incurred a sunk cost inflated their estimate of how likely a project was to succeed compared to the estimates of the same project by those who had not incurred a sunk cost. The basic sunk cost finding that people will throw good money after bad appears to be well described by prospect theory (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, 1979, Econometrica, 47, 263–291). Only moderate support for the contention that personal involvement increases the sunk cost effect is presented. The sunk cost effect was not lessened by having taken prior courses in economics. Finally, the sunk cost effect cannot be fully subsumed under any of several social psychological theories." ARKES, H.R. and P. AYTON, 1999. The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational Than Lower Animals?. Psychological Bulletin. [Cited by 55] (7.46/year) KANODIA, C., R. BUSHMAN and J. DICKHAUT, 1989. Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect: An Explanation Based on Reputation and Information …. Journal of Accounting Research. [Cited by 31] (1.78/year) ZEELENBERG, M. and E. VAN, 1997. A reverse sunk cost effect in risky decision making: Sometimes we have too much invested to gamble. Journal of Economic Psychology. [Cited by 15] (1.60/year) TAN, H.T. and J.F. YATES, 1995. Sunk Cost Effects: The Influences of Instruction and Future Return Estimates. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. [Cited by 14] (1.23/year) CHAVAS, J.P., 1994. Production and Investment Decisions under Sunk Cost and Temporal Uncertainty. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. [Cited by 21] (1.70/year) KAMIEN, M.I. and I. ZANG, 1990. The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. [Cited by 121] (7.39/year) MOON, H., 2001. Looking forward and looking back: integrating completion and sunk-cost effects within an escalation- …. J Appl Psychol. [Cited by 13] (2.42/year) LAUGHHUNN, D. and J.W. PAYNE, 1984. The impact of sunk cost on risky choice behaviour. INFOR (Canadian Journal of Operations Research and …. [Cited by 11] (0.49/year) ARKES, H. and L. HUTZEL, 2000. The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the Sunk Cost E? ect. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. [Cited by 10] (1.57/year) Links Wikipedia: Sunk cost InvestorWords.com: sunk cost Definition The Skeptic's Dictionary: sunk-cost fallacy Bibliography
[Blunderov] I mentioned some time back that I could see no reason why Gen. Powell's original estimate of 450,000 to 500,000 troops as the number required to pacify Iraq should not still be taken seriously. The appended piece seems to support this contention.
Under the circumstances the further difficulty of troop morale arises. They are not fools. They will know that they are being sold down the river to allow their fearless boy-general to sidle surreptitiously out the political back door. I suspect that many will be disinclined to lay down their lives in this cause. I suggest that a general mutiny is entirely justifiable given the presidents blatant disregard for the wishes of the republic he is sworn to serve. Alternatively, it is said that Canada is rather nice at this time of decade.
New US tactics face ultimate test in Baghdad 13/01/2007 09h55
Months after its last plan failed dismally to pacify Baghdad, the United States is pouring another 17,500 troops into the Iraqi capital to put new counter-insurgency tactics to the ultimate test.
Nicknamed "King David" by some within the US military, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, who led the 101st Airborne Division during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, will this year assume overall command of coalition troops in Iraq.
It will be a chance for him to put into practice a new US counter-insurgency manual, which the "warrior-scholar" co-wrote and published last month.
Drawing heavily on the lessons of nearly four deadly years in Iraq, the United States' biggest and deadliest war since Vietnam, the new doctrine challenges accepted practice and tactics long honed by the US military.
"Ultimate success in COIN (counter-insurgency) is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force," says the manual.
"If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared and cede the initiative to the insurgents."
Most American soldiers in Iraq are holed up in fortress garrisons from which they venture only in heavy armoured convoys that send civilian traffic scurrying to avoid getting hurt by US guns or anti-American attacks.
Petraeus criticised the use of indiscriminate force, warning that heavier fire is more prone to "collateral damage" and mistakes, and widens the scope for insurgent propaganda to portray the US military as brutal.
"The key for counter-insurgents is knowing when more force is needed and when it might be counter-productive," the manual says.
So scarred was the US military by defeat in Vietnam that it then steered clear of counter-insurgency operations, offering today's troops little practical experience or training before confronting the maelstrom of Iraq.
Massive assaults such as the November 2004 bombardment of the rebellious Sunni town of Fallujah and massive assaults to retake a town fallen into enemy hands, as in Hue, Vietnam in 1968, are likely to be avoided.
But it is not clear whether Petraeus will have the tools necessary to enforce his own recommendations despite an extra 21,500 troops ordered to Iraq by US President George W. Bush on top of the 132,000 already in country.
Around 17,500 are being sent to Baghdad, hiking to more than 35,000 the number of US troops in the Iraqi capital, although the exact date of their deployment is being kept under wraps.
The manual says "20 counter-insurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations".
With the population of Baghdad at six million, then the capital would need 120,000 pairs of coalition boots on the streets.
The Americans have stressed that the new strategy relies on Iraqis to take responsibility, yet observers believe homegrown troops are too weak to fight alone and that the police are widely infiltrated by militiamen.
The last US security plan for Baghdad, Operation Together Forward, was launched in June, with more US military police embedded in Iraqi units and more US troops redeployed to Baghdad.
But the US military admitted in October that it had failed.
"Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have," Bush said last week.
American soldiers can clear a multi-storey house in minutes but they lack the manpower to stay behind afterwards to "hold" the property, making the reconstruction phase practically impossible.
"Too little, too late," was the verdict from the former commander of NATO forces in Kosovo, General Wesley Clark, about the planned US troop build-up.
"In Kosovo, we had 40,000 troops for a population of two million. For Iraq, that ratio would call for at least 500,000 troops, so adding 20,000 now is too little, too late," he wrote in Britain's Independent on Sunday newspaper.
Next: Rice starts Mideast tour 'without a peace plan' Back to Contents
So you think that sending more troops over is a bad idea Blunderov?
Or that it may have been a good idea, but now it is to little to late?
[Blunderov] If force is ever necessary I weyken that it should be overwhelming. War is not a business of maximising returns and minimising costs and to treat it as such is a hugely erroneous analogy. War is, in the words of Carl von Clausewitz, "no pastime; no mere passion for venturing and winning; no work of free enthusiasm; it is a serious means - for a serious subject".
I might add "for serious minds", a dearth of which is all too appallingly obvious in the current administration.
If this administration had heeded Gen Powell's original recommendation for 450,000 to 500,000 troops for the original campaign I have little doubt that the situation would be very different. It is far too late for this now. The resistance is now very well organised and the whole region is poised to be drawn in to the conflict.
Lieutenant General David Petraeus appears to have applied his mind to the problem of 4th Gen Warfare to good effect. Sadly these hard won insights do not seem to me likely to be very relevant in the sectarian inferno of Iraq and especially not with only this derisory number of reinforcements.
In a way the situation is quite funny if one enjoys, dare I say it, gallows humour. America, in the sacred name of democracy, has to support the very faction that it would least like to see gain the upper hand, the Shi'ites, who are an open proxy of the hated Iran. Efforts to get the Iraqi "government" to be even-handed in its actions against the militias is pure wishful thinking. The big winner is, or will be, Iran. Which makes the USA a very big loser indeed - unless Bush can precipitate a war with Iran as well which he seems hell bent on attempting to do.
I cant help but wonder though, what do you think would happen to the country if they did leave? What do you think the current radical-Islamic presence in Iraq would do to/with the country if we left?
If we left, how much better off would the country be?
Taking into account that the Government would not be in control of Iraq if we left and that the terrorists are more organized in that country than the newly appointed government is.
Of course the idea has to come from our commander in chief such as he is so I won't hold my breath. But I've had this discussion with several conservative republicans (there are plenty still in Texas) and I've been surprised to either hear them suggest it first, or to chime in quickly with a hearty agreement. Apparently the Kurds get along with us fine compared to the Sunnis and Shias, and so perhaps I can see the wisdom of not abandoning this group. Indeed I think it can make a sensible alternative to a flat out retreat. It would take fewer troops if we only committed to securing the Kurdish region and Bagdad, letting the warlords sort out the rest of the nation. It may not lead to a democratic Iraq, but if we insist on it we could sustain a democratic autonomous Kurdish-safe region within the framework of whatever solution emerges. I think its a reasonable face-saving way to scale down yet remain involved in the region.
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