logo Welcome, Guest. Please Login or Register.
2024-03-29 04:30:25 CoV Wiki
Learn more about the Church of Virus
Home Help Search Login Register
News: Donations now taken through PayPal

  Church of Virus BBS
  Mailing List
  Virus 2005

  Source Documents
« previous next »
Pages: [1] Notify of replies Send the topic Print 
   Author  Topic: Source Documents  (Read 1784 times)
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
Source Documents
« on: 2005-11-21 10:28:37 »

Replies to this thread will hold source documents.
Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Mermaid
Archon
****

Posts: 770
Reputation: 8.79
Rate Mermaid



Bite me!

View Profile
Re:Source Documents
« Reply #1 on: 2005-11-21 10:34:00 »

cant you just move your markers to the serious business section. afterall, many still get cov mailing list rather than checking the bbs. you can always link from there.
Report to moderator   Logged
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
Re:Source Documents
« Reply #2 on: 2005-11-21 10:49:39 »

Analysis and discussion will occur on other threads in order to prevent contamination from "discussion" and "assertion" on this thread. The volume will be low.
Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
The secret Downing Street memo
« Reply #3 on: 2005-11-21 11:23:43 »

[Hermit : Initially the UK government refused to comment on this memo, asserting that it contained, "nothing new." Bush and Blair as well as other senior officials have commented on the memo. Nobody has or is challenging either its authenticity or the accuracy of its contents. Investigation under the Official Secrets act further validates the authenticity of this material. The highlighting below is mine.]

Source: http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/memos.html


SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)


MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
« Last Edit: 2005-11-21 11:29:41 by Hermit » Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
DoD Statement on News Reports of Al Qaeda and Iraq Connections
« Reply #4 on: 2005-11-21 12:54:40 »

[Hermit : The highlighting below is mine.]

Source: http://www.dod.mil/releases/2003/nr20031115-0642.html


No. 851-03
IMMEDIATE RELEASE    November 15, 2003
DoD Statement on News Reports of Al Qaeda and Iraq Connections

News reports that the Defense Department recently confirmed new information with respect to contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq in a letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee are inaccurate.

A letter was sent to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Oct. 27, 2003, from Douglas J. Feith, under secretary of defense for policy, in response to follow-up questions from his July 10 testimony.  One of the questions posed by the committee asked the department to provide the reports from the intelligence community to which he referred in his testimony before the committee. These reports dealt with the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.

The letter to the committee included a classified annex containing a list and description of the requested reports, so that the committee could obtain the reports from the relevant members of the intelligence community.

The items listed in the classified annex were either raw reports or products of the CIA, the National Security Agency or, in one case, the Defense Intelligence Agency.  The provision of the classified annex to the Intelligence Committee was cleared by other agencies and done with the permission of the intelligence community.  The selection of the documents was made by DoD to respond to the committee’s question.  The classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, and it drew no conclusions.

Individuals who leak or purport to leak classified information are doing serious harm to national security; such activity is deplorable and may be illegal.
Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
Re:Source Documents
« Reply #5 on: 2005-11-22 14:18:32 »

[Hermit 2005] Fascinating: I posted this to the CoV in The ongoing disintegration of the Drooling Dees*** and rational thought in America on: 2003-09-02. So we had the "firm decision to go to war", which the White House and its minions are now attempting to deny or to spin out of existence, two years prior to the release of the Downing Street Memos. (highlighting added by me in this repost of an excerpt).

As an aside, the fact that this war, which Joe Dees is advocating in such torrential volumes of plagiarised material, is being instigated and promoted by the neo-conservative "Likud on the Potomac," we need look no further than the doyen of conservative (or at least, Republican) reporting, The Washington Post, which, in a remarkable article by Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Decision On Iraq Has Puzzling Past, Opponents of War Wonder When, How Policy Was Set" http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A43909-2003Jan11?language=printer said, in essence, that the war on Iraq was designed to leave Israel dominant and unchallenged in the Mideast, put an end to Palestinian resistance, exact revenge on Hizbullah, ensure that Arab regimes will be subservient to Israel and US. Control of Iraqi and Saudi oil by the US, Israel and Turkey might follow. More or less what Joe Dees virulently attacked "Alabaster" on our BBS for having suggested. The reason I raise this, is that the same article also described, accurately in my opinion, the quasi-religious fanaticism which appears to have overtaken CNN watchers - and possibly a few others. "I do believe certain people have grown theological about this," said another administration official who opposed focusing so intently on Iraq. "It's almost a religion -- that it will be the end of our society if we don't take action now."

So, are those who voted that the US represents the greatest threat to world peace in 2003 correct? Are we going to have a war with Iraq? The last two paragraphs of the Washington Post article might provide a clue.  "Only later did it become clear that the president already had made up his mind. In July, the State Department's director of policy planning, Richard N. Haass, held a regular meeting with Rice and asked whether they should talk about the pros and cons of confronting Iraq. "Don't bother, Rice replied: The president has made a decision."
Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
Benon Sevan deconstructs Claudia Rosett
« Reply #6 on: 2005-11-25 11:01:29 »

http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/04/i_dl.01.html

DIPLOMATIC LICENSE

What Will Happen to Oil for Food Program?

Aired May 4, 2003 - 03:30:00  ET

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: We are told the people of Iraq are saying they receive nothing. It is the biggest (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I've ever heard in my life.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I don't see how the United Nations could be sidelined.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

MICHAEL OKWU, GUEST HOST: Accusations and anger, conflict and concessions. Iraqis return to the United Nations after the U.N. was sidelined by war. And we are back too after our own war hiatus. Hello and welcome to DIPLOMATIC LICENSE. I'm Michael Okwu, sitting in for Richard Roth.

Is diplomacy also back? Will nations be able to kiss and make up after the big split over Iraq? They would have to get along if they are going to work out the tangle of issues a post-war Iraq bring. Some of the toughest: Iraq's oil and what to do with the humanitarian "Oil for food" program.

The idea was simple: Allow Iraq to sell its oil, and the profits would feed its people. And by many accounts it's worked. Each week, Iraqis received a food basket containing key items, like dried milk, beans, soap. In fact, the program has been feeding 60 percent of Iraq's roughly 26 million people.

The Security Council established the program in 1995. Why? To blunt the effect of sanctions on the Iraqi people. Council members set up rules, procedures for approving contracts with a keen eye towards monitoring items that could be questionable. Billions of dollars were placed in a U.N. escrow account. That figure stands at 3.2 billion today, with roughly 10 billion worth of goods in the pipeline to Iraq.

The program technically expires on June 3. But already diplomatic lines are being drawn.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

JOHN NEGROPONTE, U.S. AMB TO U.N.: The Iraqi people should have access to their own resources and dispose of them as they see fit.

SERGEY LAVROV, RUSSIA AMB TO U.N.: The "Oil for Food" program could be further used, and in absence of the government, it should be, we believe, discussed whether to give the authority to the secretary-general.

JEAN-MARC LE LA SABLIERE, FRENCH AMB TO U.N.: So many people are depending on the "Oil for Food" program. So we have to go cautiously.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

OKWU: While the council debates the fate of "Oil for Food," a slew of attacks have resurfaced in the American media, accusing the program of being as one U.S. general put it "the oil for palace" program. One journalist called it "an invitation for kickbacks," political back scratching and smuggling.

Pretty strong words about "Oil for Food". We have that writer right here, Claudia Rossett, a freelance journalist and columnist for the opinion journal and Web site for the "Wall Street Journal". But no free ride for Ms. Rossett today. We also have in the studio the man at the held of "Oil for Food", Benon Sevan, executive director of the United Nations Office of the Iraq program.

Let me talk to one of your accusers. Claudia Rossett, you've used some very harsh language about this organization, about this particular program, a program that's provided over $27 billion for goods for Iraqi people. Tell me why.

CLAUDIA ROSSETT, FREELANCE JOURNALIST: Well, let's just quickly say the 27 billion that's been provided came from the oil money of Iraq. It did not come from the U.N.

But let's talk about full transparency for a minute. Because this is information, we are told, is provided to the Security Council members, but it is not provided to the public in any way that you or I can have access to.

And I have a question for Mr. Sevan, which is, somewhere between the beginning of this program with four billion a year envisioned in funding from Iraqi oil money and medicine and food for children, you were right at the point where last December you and the secretary-general were approving things like $20 million for an Olympic sport city, $50 million for the Ministry of Information. We know what that was in Iraq. Air conditioners for the Ministry of Justice. Was there justice in Iraq? And I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about where, in the course of the program, something crossed that line, that you were funding, we have to assume, without any further information, the things like the sports city were in the jurisdiction of Saddam Hussein's son.

BENON SEVAN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE IRAQ PROGRAM: Well, the thing I wish you could have done before you made these accusations, which are totally unfounded, I'm sorry to say, Mr. Rossett, you should have done a little bit of research and read about the program. We have a fantastic Web site, by the way, we just opened. I think it's one of the best Web sites in terms (ph) of the world...

OKWU: What about your accusations?

(CROSSTALK)

OKWU: ... focus has shifted?

SEVAN: There is one thing. You talk about Olympics stadium. True, there was, as recommended, but what program (UNINTELLIGLBLE) we received the contract for $40.1 million, by the way, for the Olympic stadium, and not the single cent was approved. You know very well, the Security Council gave the authority to Iraqi government under the organization of the program to select its own contractors, to submit some proposals, but they were all subject to approval by the Security Council committee after full review and clearance by my office, plus UNMOVIC, plus IAEA. Therefore, not a single dollar was (UNINTELLIGIBLE).

OKWU: So where does your responsibility lie?

SEVAN: My responsibility lies the following: The government of Iraq was given authority to implement the program fully in the 15 governorates (ph) for which it was responsible. We, the United Nations, including nine specialized agencies in the program, were given the authority to implement the program, again, by the Security Council on behalf of the government of Iraq. It is not me who decided that arrangements.

At the same time, all concerns, all members of the Security Council reaffirm the territory integrity and the national sovereignty of the Iraqi. Therefore, I had to work within the confines and the parameters established by the Security Council.

OKWU: You are talking about the confines and parameters. You clearly have issues with the way this entire program is structured. Very briefly, if you can, what are those salient points, what are your problems with the structure?

ROSSETT: May I very quickly just address the point about the sport stadium? What probably cut that off was the war. Because that was approved in December...

SEVAN: It was not approved, Madam, I'm sorry, you are dead wrong.

ROSSETT: It's....

SEVAN: I have the facts here.

ROSSETT: Well...

SEVAN: I know what I'm talking about, but you don't know, unfortunately.

ROSSETT: I have spent a great deal of time on your Web site, which is extensive, but omits information about details and you cannot...

SEVAN: Like what, details like what? Because these are big words you are using, details. Please give me the details, I'm ready to provide you with all the details.

ROSSETT: We'll get to the structure in a minute. But for example, one of the things approved quite recently was the purchase of television equipment from Russia. There are three things that are vital in understanding any business contract and deciding whether or not it is a reasonable deal. The price, who it's being bought from and what precisely and in what quantities is being purchased.

I -- there is no public disclosure, and I had asked your press people and they have told me this is not publicly available. Can you tell us or provide details to the public of what were the names of the Russian companies, what exactly was approved to be shipped, and how much was paid? Because this question applies to every contract under the program, and there is no transparency on the answers.

SEVAN: Are you objecting because the company is Russian?

ROSSETT: I'm asking...

SEVAN: No, no, first I'd like to know, whether you are objecting because the company is a Russian company, or a French company, because unfortunately, you, along with your colleagues, who had been attacking the program on ideological grounds, by the way, I'm sorry to say, purely on ideological grounds, you are making the mistake of judging the genuineness of a contract, the needs for the items ordered, solely based on the nationality of contractors.

(CROSSTALK)

OKWU: Let's assume...

(CROSSTALK)

OKWU: I do have to cut you off, Mr. Sevan. Let's assume for a moment...

SEVAN: Please.

OKWU: ... that they are United States companies, or that she doesn't have a problem with the fact that they are Russian companies. Are you ready to name those companies and the amount and quantities that were -- that were secured?

SEVAN: All this information is provided to Security Council, (UNINTELLIGIBLE) Security Council established rules and regulations. I report to the secretary-general, to the Security Council, not to Ms. Rossett...

OKWU: That brings us to another question, which is, Ms. Rossett, to what extend is his agency accountable to anyone else beyond the Security Council? The Security Council in essence is his boss. Why should you see his books?

ROSSETT: This is a beautiful lead into the structure of the program. And the answer is, it's a very badly structured program. The incentives here are enormously perverse (ph).

(CROSSTALK)

OKWU: Let's go ahead and finish that. Let her finish for a moment.

ROSSETT: Yes. I'm not questioning how well you carried out the mandate here. I'm questioning the actual structure of the program. And let's start with the fact that this is a very, very different from most relief programs, in that it is not funded by donations from U.N. members or individuals or -- it's funded by tapping directly into Iraq's oil funds (ph). And this gives a sort of steady and enormous source of income. We are talking about $64 billion worth of contracts in oil sales vetted by the U.N. That's tremendous clout.

And to be able to approve, reject, know what's going on in there and then buy the goods that come in, the 27 billion worth, or 10 billion (UNINTELLIGIBLE) contracted for. This is huge business. And the idea that the U.N. should simply -- that this program simply operates by taking in 2.2 percent of those oil funds, which has come to more than $1 billion. So....

SEVAN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE), $1 billion. And I'm not ashamed to say to you, and also from that we saved (UNINTELLIGIBLE) which are returned to the program for purchase of additional food -- additional food items and from the remaining (UNINTELLIGIBLE) $800 million. I'd like to challenge Madam to give me a single man since you've been working with "Wall Street Journal," to give you the name of a single American company or a private organization which works for less that 2 percent over its cost. What (UNINTELLIGIBLE) American company which are going down to Iraq total its cost?

ROSSETT: I wish...

SEVAN: Please, don't tell about -- we are talking about implementation of a program of $45 billion, by the way.

(CROSSTALK)

OKWU: The fact is, most companies operate with the budget of, say, 15, 20 percent for operating cost. What would you say to that? 2.2 billion - 2.2 percent - that's far less than the status quo.

SEVAN: We should not even use it.

ROSSETT: I was hoping this would come out, because it's a wonderful example...

(CROSSTALK)

ROSSETT: ... by the end (ph) of that (UNINTELLIGIBLE) business. You are not in the business of producing oil. This is 2.2 percent of the oil revenues. That's what that should reflect. You are...

SEVAN: No, no, no.

ROSSETT: ... in the business of administering...

SEVAN: No, no, no, I'm sorry. I were supposed to be administering the revenues provided by oil experts, which was done by Iraq and Iraqi government, not by the U.N.

ROSSETT: You are speaking as if you were the owner of an oil company.

SEVAN: No, no, no.

ROSSETT: ...which is precisely the problem.

(CROSSTALK)

SEVAN: It was the countries on the Security Council which -- they took the decision to (UNINTELLIGIBLE) structures. You ask your own government along other governments who are members of the Security Council. So therefore stop blaming the United Nations, because the problem with you and your kind of people is, whenever it suits you, you need the will (ph) of the United Nations, as an intergovernmental body, whenever it does not suit you, you accuse the (UNINTELLIGIBLE) There is -- there has to be a distinction made as an intergovernmental body, the United Nations, and the secretary.

OKWU: I know you are chomping at the bit, but I have to move this forward, we have very little time here. What is your feeling about what will happen after June 3? That's, of course, when the mandate runs out for this program. Very briefly. Less than 10 seconds.

ROSSETT: I know it will be a big fight. My hope is that the Iraqi people will end up administering their own oil and that this program, which creates huge incentives for the U.N. to keep its hand in this oil pot will be ended.

(CROSSTALK)

SEVAN: No, I'm very sorry, I reject totally, Mr. Okwu, this accusation. Clear cut, blunt accusation, which is totally false. We are not looking for jobs, I assure you. And if you think the U.N. is skimming, I'm very sorry. We spend about $800 million, we have over 900 staff numbers inside Iraq, with 3,500 national (ph) staff, crisscrossing the country for observations. We have done more than two million observations, monitoring reports from where supplies arrive under the program, monitoring the oil flow out of U.N. timeline (ph), monitoring also the lifting of oil, and you tell me we are skimming? Skimming what? What proof do you have we skim anything? I'm very sorry to say. This is very easy to talk la-la-la- la, you know.

OKWU: Mr. Sevan, I appreciate your joining us, I am going have to stop it there and get in the last word. Claudia Rossett, I appreciate your time as well.

ROSSETT: Thank you.

OKWU: Clearly, we are not going to reach reconciliation on this one, but the Security Council is going to have to in the future deal with this.

From "Oil for Food" to sanctions and nation building. At a recent meeting of the Security Council, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on members to put their divisions behind. The U.S. may want Annan to play some role helping to set up the future government of Iraq. In the council, Annan made it clear who should be in the driver seat on the road ahead in Iraq.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

KOFI ANNAN, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL: I would urge you to set aside past divisions and ask yourselves what would help the Iraqi people most.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP):

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: The word around the building is that this is essentially your last hurrah.

HANS BLIX, U.N. CHIEF WEAPONS INSPECTOR: Well, last, maybe, but not hurrah.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

OKWU: Yes, he is still around. That's Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, recently questioned by the head of the U.N. Correspondents Association, Tony Jenkins. Blix stays until June, but his portfolio of weapons of mass destruction will linger a lot longer. While we managed to convince a couple of those United Nations journalists to stick around for our own portfolio of issues, over at the CNN U.N. office.

Joining us from that office, Colum Lynch of the "Washington Post" and Philippe Bolopion of Radio France Internationale.

Colum, let's start with you. We are going to talk about the weapons of mass destruction issue and inspectors, but first, there's been talk about a U.S. resolution dealing with the postwar Iraq situation. It was first reported in your paper this week. Tell us about it. What have you learned?

COLUM LYNCH, WASHINGTON POST: Well, essentially, what's going on is that the Bush administration wants to sort of move onto the second phase of regime change. They've overthrown the government of Saddam Hussein, and now they want to get the Security Council out of the business of managing Iraq's affair, and they want to clear the deck. So basically what's going to happen next week -- they'll introduce a big, sort of sweeping resolution that would take oil, the control of oil revenues out of the hands of Security Council, return it over to some sort of -- either to the U.S. and their immediate future, and then hand it off to some sort of interim Iraqi authority.

So that's likely that happen in the next couple of days or so.

OKWU: Philippe, now, why would they do this, when some people on the council, and others at the U.N. are talking about the fact that the U.N. should be focusing on mending fences?

PHILIPPE BOLOPION, RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE: Well, I think they are doing that because they want to move very fast before it's too late for them. I think they are really trying to win the game, which (UNINTELLIGIBLE) is going to be the first one to present a resolution, and the first one to shoot is going to prevail in the council. I think that they felt threatened by the French proposal, made by last week, which was attempting (ph) to suspend for a while the sanctions while still trying to sort out...

(AUDIO/VIDEO GAP)

END
Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
Re:Source Documents
« Reply #7 on: 2005-12-02 07:45:54 »

What I Knew Before the Invasion

Source: Washington Post
Authors: Bob Graham, Former Democratic senator from Florida. Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at the start of the BushWar. He is currently a fellow at Harvard University's Institute of Politics
Dated: 2005-11-20

In the past week President Bush has twice attacked Democrats for being hypocrites on the Iraq war. "[M]ore than 100 Democrats in the House and Senate, who had access to the same intelligence, voted to support removing Saddam Hussein from power," he said.

The president's attacks are outrageous. Yes, more than 100 Democrats voted to authorize him to take the nation to war. Most of them, though, like their Republican colleagues, did so in the legitimate belief that the president and his administration were truthful in their statements that Saddam Hussein was a gathering menace -- that if Hussein was not disarmed, the smoking gun would become a mushroom cloud.

The president has undermined trust. No longer will the members of Congress be entitled to accept his veracity. Caveat emptor has become the word. Every member of Congress is on his or her own to determine the truth.

As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during the tragedy of Sept. 11, 2001, and the run-up to the Iraq war, I probably had as much access to the intelligence on which the war was predicated as any other member of Congress.

I, too, presumed the president was being truthful -- until a series of events undercut that confidence.

In February 2002, after a briefing on the status of the war in Afghanistan, the commanding officer, Gen. Tommy Franks, told me the war was being compromised as specialized personnel and equipment were being shifted from Afghanistan to prepare for the war in Iraq -- a war more than a year away. Even at this early date, the White House was signaling that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was of such urgency that it had priority over the crushing of al Qaeda.

In the early fall of 2002, a joint House-Senate intelligence inquiry committee, which I co-chaired, was in the final stages of its investigation of what happened before Sept. 11. As the unclassified final report of the inquiry documented, several failures of intelligence contributed to the tragedy. But as of October 2002, 13 months later, the administration was resisting initiating any substantial action to understand, much less fix, those problems.

At a meeting of the Senate intelligence committee on Sept. 5, 2002, CIA Director George Tenet was asked what the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) provided as the rationale for a preemptive war in Iraq. An NIE is the product of the entire intelligence community, and its most comprehensive assessment. I was stunned when Tenet said that no NIE had been requested by the White House and none had been prepared. Invoking our rarely used senatorial authority, I directed the completion of an NIE.

Tenet objected, saying that his people were too committed to other assignments to analyze Saddam Hussein's capabilities and will to use chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons. We insisted, and three weeks later the community produced a classified NIE.

There were troubling aspects to this 90-page document. While slanted toward the conclusion that Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction stored or produced at 550 sites, it contained vigorous dissents on key parts of the information, especially by the departments of State and Energy. Particular skepticism was raised about aluminum tubes that were offered as evidence Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program. As to Hussein's will to use whatever weapons he might have, the estimate indicated he would not do so unless he was first attacked.

Under questioning, Tenet added that the information in the NIE had not been independently verified by an operative responsible to the United States. In fact, no such person was inside Iraq. Most of the alleged intelligence came from Iraqi exiles or third countries, all of which had an interest in the United States' removing Hussein, by force if necessary.

The American people needed to know these reservations, and I requested that an unclassified, public version of the NIE be prepared. On Oct. 4, Tenet presented a 25-page document titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs." It represented an unqualified case that Hussein possessed them, avoided a discussion of whether he had the will to use them and omitted the dissenting opinions contained in the classified version. Its conclusions, such as "If Baghdad acquired sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could make a nuclear weapon within a year," underscored the White House's claim that exactly such material was being provided from Africa to Iraq.

[From my advantaged position, I had earlier concluded that a war with Iraq would be a distraction from the successful and expeditious completion of our aims in Afghanistan. Now I had come to question whether the White House was telling the truth -- or even had an interest in knowing the truth.

On Oct. 11, I voted no on the resolution to give the president authority to go to war against Iraq. I was able to apply caveat emptor. Most of my colleagues could not.
Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Hermit
Archon
*****

Posts: 4290
Reputation: 8.92
Rate Hermit



Prime example of a practically perfect person

View Profile WWW
It's Chalabi, Chalabi, Chalabi all the way to the bottom*.
« Reply #8 on: 2005-12-05 08:38:28 »

[Hermit] *Bertrand Russell gave a public lecture on astronomy. He was interrupted by a little old lady who said the Earth was not round and floating in space, but rather a flat tray resting on the back of a turtle. Betrand Russell made the mistake of asking the lady, "But what do you think the turtle is standing on?" "Another turtle." "And what is that turtle standing on?" To which the reply was, "Mr Russell, it's turtles, turtles, turtles all the way to the bottom."

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Is that true that no papers documenting the allegations that you've made today have been given to the United Nations?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No, that's true.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Right. Well, I want to get into that. Let me finish this and we'll get into that. And then you -- that the accounting firm KPMG was preparing a report the world body would receive. Now, that's true?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Yes.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. "In January an Iraqi newspaper published a list of 270 groups and individuals, many of them past and present government officials, charging they received vouchers for oil they can sell. Hankes-Drielsma calls the list only the tip of the iceberg." Is that true?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Correct.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. Is there anything -- and let me start from the back and go forward. Is there anything that you haven't testified so far today that would add to your comment that this is only the tip of the iceberg?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: So really most of what you've given us today is where you would stand, and you don't have any additional information that would help in the hard evidence to try to prove or disprove these allegations?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: At this stage we have to wait for the KPMG report.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: But the list is certainly only part of the problem. We 're talking about 10 percent added to invoices, so a complete list needs to be produced of all suppliers. KPMG are looking at all the illegal oil sales and what happened to that cash. KPMG have already secured a list of all the Iraqi accounts held in the name of individuals on behalf of Iraq. KPMG, with the Audit Bureau of Iraq, will be requesting the banks to provide five year records of all transactions on those accounts. So the work that needs to be done is very extensive and so that list that the media is focused on is only part of the big picture.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Who has retained KPMG or who is paying them right now?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Well, the appointment by KPMG being made by the Iraq Governing Council was done by the Finance Committee with the CPA present, but --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: And who's chairman of the Finance Committee?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Dr. Chalabi.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Is he in charge of that investigation on behalf of the Iraqi Governing Council now?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: He and his colleagues on the Finance Committee.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Yeah, but there's one chairman, just like we have a chairman here.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: So the chair --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: His duty is that he's in charge and he's the -- of conducting this investigation as it relates to what we've talked about here today, and right now the Iraqi Governing Council is paying KPMG to conduct this investigation?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No. First of all, as I testified earlier, the Governing Council unanimously endorsed the decision to appoint KPMG. But at this stage, although initial indications -- assurances were given by Ambassador Bremer that the Iraq Development Fund would pay for the work, this has not been reconfirmed by the CPA. The Governing Council certainly doesn't have at this stage any resources to pay KPMG, because all the Iraqi money is in the Iraq Development Fund, over which Ambassador Bremer has sole signing authority.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: But basically the Iraqi Governing Council retained or --

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Retains KPMG.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Retains KPMG to do the work they're doing to investigate the alleged corruption that has been put out here today?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Correct.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Now, the only issue now is that the Iraqi Governing Council through Chalabi is trying to get Bremer to be able to pay for this. Is that correct?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Correct.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: And Bremer is leaving now. Correct?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Ah --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: In two months.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: You will know more about that than --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Do you know who's taking his place?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I know who's going to be the ambassador.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Who is that?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I understand from the media that it's Ambassador Negroponte.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Yeah, but is Negroponte also on the investigation committee appointed by Annan, which is Volcker and Annan?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: No.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: He's not? Okay. And by the way, I want to say about the appointment of Volcker on that committee, I am very impressed with the credibility of Volcker. He's a tough individual who will get to the bottom if he's given the resources and the ability to get that facts and data that are needed. Do you agree with that?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I agree with that.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. So I think we've cleared up as far as where KPMG is supposed -- Bremer will pay them. What's going to happen then?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Well, if the CPA refuses to pay for this I think it will be a very sad day for the Iraqi people.

REP. SHAYS: I would agree.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Yeah, and I would agree too. Okay. The final issue, I just want to ask you the question. You talk about K -- and maybe --

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: (Cross talk) -- KPMG.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: KPMG.

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: KPMG.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: That's it. I've been doing KM, it's KPMG. Okay, that's taken care of.

REP. SHAYS: I'll write it out for him.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay, I've got it. One plus one is two. Now, the issue with respect to the information that KPMG have developed right now. I'm very much concerned that we're waiting -- that the United Nations is waiting for something when in fact there could be crimes and cover-ups going on at this point. This is going to have a tremendous impact, in my opinion, in world media and I think this is something that we have to deal with right away and move as quickly as we can. What is the hold up with respect to KPMG or you or any information the Iraqi Governing Council has, to getting it to the authorities immediately, right now? And why wait or hold back when you yourself said today you're concerned about shredding of documents?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Because an investigation needs to be thoroughly done. The documents -- there needs to be forensic work done on them. And the information -- some of the transactions need to be traced, ultimate beneficiaries need to be identified. And if you produce a document that is half baked, you will end up being criticized for precisely the reasons that we want to try and avoid. That this needs to be done professionally and properly.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: But my point is that Volcker is out there investigating, you're going to communicate with him. It seems to me that KPMG and any information that they have or you have should be brought to the table with Volcker and move as quickly as possible. Why isn't that being done?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Well, you're prejudging what might happen. We haven't had a discussion with Mr. Volcker. We suggested the meeting with Mr. Volcker. It was not at a request at this stage of Mr. Volcker, although the U.N. has suggested it -- internal -- the IOS has. We suggested it. The first opportunity for us -- and Mr. Bates is flying over specially tonight from the U.K. to actually be present at that meeting so we can discuss --

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: So when is that meeting?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: Tomorrow morning.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: That's very good. Tomorrow morning with Mr. Volcker and the other gentleman?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: I don't know who else Mr. Volcker will include.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Okay. And at that point you, representing the Iraqi Governing Council, are you willing to put forth any hard evidence, documents, whatever that you have, that will help Mr. Volcker in his investigation of this serious matter?

MR. HANKES-DRIELSMA: As a former letter from the Governing Council has already stated to Mr. Kofi Annan, that we will cooperate and Iraq will cooperate fully with the U.N. and we hope that the U.N. will also make all the information that the Governing Council and the information that they've requested as part of my evidence, is made available to the Iraqis so they can see for themselves.

REP. RUPPERSBERGER: Good. Thank you.
Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
Pages: [1] Notify of replies Send the topic Print 
Jump to:


Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Church of Virus BBS | Powered by YaBB SE
© 2001-2002, YaBB SE Dev Team. All Rights Reserved.

Please support the CoV.
Valid HTML 4.01! Valid CSS! RSS feed