An Anglosphere Primer
                  ©2001, 2002 by James C. Bennett
        Presented to the Foreign Policy Research Institute

Over the past several years, a new term, Anglosphere, has crept
into political and social discussion in the English-speaking world.
This term, which can be defined briefly as the set of English-
speaking, Common Law nations, implies far more than merely the
sum of all persons who employ English as a first or second
language. To be part of the Anglosphere requires adherence to the
fundamental customs and values that form the core of English-
speaking cultures. These include individualism, rule of law,
honoring contracts and covenants, and the elevation of freedom to
the first rank of political and cultural values.

Nations comprising the Anglosphere share a common historical
narrative in which the Magna Carta, the English and American
Bills of Rights, and such Common Law principles as trial by jury,
presumption of innocence, "a man's home is his castle", and "a
man's word is his bond" are taken for granted. Thus persons or
communities who happen to communicate or do business in
English are not necessarily part of the Anglosphere, unless their
cultural values have also been shaped by those values of the
historical English-speaking civilization.

The Anglosphere, as a network civilization without a
corresponding political form, has necessarily imprecise
boundaries. Geographically, the densest nodes of the Anglosphere
are found in the United States and the United Kingdom, while
Anglophone regions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland,
and South Africa are powerful and populous outliers. The
educated English-speaking populations of the Caribbean, Oceania,
Africa and India constitute the Anglosphere's frontiers.

What Anglosphere Theory Does And Does Not Hold

The Anglospherist school of thought asserts that the English-
speaking nations have not only formed a distinct branch of
Western civilization for most of history, they are now becoming a
distinct civilization in their own right. Western in origin but no
longer entirely Western in composition and nature, this
civilization is marked by a particularly strong civil society, which
is the source of its long record of successful constitutional
government and economic prosperity. The Anglosphere's
continuous leadership of the Scientific-Technological Revolution
from the seventeenth century to the twenty-first century stems
from these characteristics and is thus likely to continue for the
foreseeable future. Finally, beginning in World War I and
continuing into the post-Cold War world, Anglosphere nations
have developed mutual cooperative institutions. The Anglosphere
potential is to expand these close collaborations into deeper ties in
trade, defense, free movement of peoples, and scientific
cooperation, all bound together by our common language, culture,
and values.

Anglosphere theorists promote more and stronger cooperative
institutions, not to build some English-speaking superstate on the
model of the European Union, or to annex Britain, Canada, or
Australia to the United States, but rather to protect the English-
speaking nations' common values from external threats and
internal fantasies. Thus, Anglospherists call on all English-
speaking nations to abandon Haushoferian fantasies of
geographical blocs: on America to downgrade its hemispherist
ambitions, on Britain to rethink its Europeanist illusions, and on
Australia to reject its "Asian identity" fallacy. Far from a
centralizing federation, the best form of association is what I call
a "network commonwealth": a linked series of cooperative
institutions, evolved from existing structures like trade
agreements, defense alliances, and cooperative programs. Rather
than despising the variable geometry principle, it would embrace
it, forming coalitions of the willing to respond to emerging
situations. Anglosphere institutions would be open and
nonexclusive; Britain, America, Canada, Australia, and others
would be free to maintain other regional ties as they saw fit.

Anglospherism is assuredly not the racialist Anglo-Saxonism
dating from the era around 1900, nor the sentimental attachment
of the Anglo-American Special Relationship of the decades before
and after World War II. Any consideration of the Anglosphere
concept should indeed include examination of previous attempts
to create institutional frameworks for the English-speaking world.
However, any comparison of the ideas and times of such Anglo-
Saxonists as Sir Alfred Milner, George E.G. Catlin, Cecil Rhodes
and Theodore Roosevelt to those of contemporary Anglospherists
must also take into account the considerable increase in
understanding of the world that has come to pass over those years.
Contemporary Anglospherist thought bears roughly the same
relation to past Anglo-Saxonism as current evolutionary thought
bears to the simplistic Darwinism of Milner's contemporaries.

Anglo-Saxonism relied on underlying assumptions of an Anglo-
Saxon race, and sought to unite racial "cousins." It saw the British
Empire and the United States (and sometimes also the Germans)
as the building blocks of the Anglo-Saxon club, which in most
proposed versions was some species of framework for mediating
conflicts of interest between the building blocks. In short, it was a
formula by which London and New York might jointly manage
their chunks of the world without conflict. The movement was
undermined by the First World War and the Great Depression, as
well as the opposition to the formula that arose many of its would-
be participants. Dublin, Ottawa, and Canberra saw less and less
need to defer to London in matters of defense and foreign policy,
much less to allow their relationship with Washington to be run
through Whitehall. However, the Anglo-Saxonist sentiments and
institutions (such as the Rhodes Scholarships and the English-
Speaking Union) did prepare the way for the highly effective
collaboration of U.S., British, and Commonwealth forces in the
Second World War and the Cold War.

Anglospherism is based on the intellectual understanding of the
roots of both successful market economies and constitutional
democracies in strong civil society; in the understanding of the
multigenerational persistence of cultural factors in the success of
maintaining strong civil society; and in the awareness of the depth
of cooperation possible among such societies to a degree not
possible among weaker or nonexistent civil societies. Anglosphere
theory examines the reality that on almost any ranking of the
characteristics of successful civil societies -- prosperity, political
freedom, social trust, new company formation and innovation --
the Anglosphere nations form a significant cluster at the top,
accompanied only by the Scandinavian countries and a few
outliers such as Switzerland.

Anglo-Saxonists of the early twentieth century were concerned
that mass immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe was
diluting America's Anglo-Saxon stock with "unassimilable"
newcomers, and that over time the population would have less and
less in common with British and Commonwealth peoples. In fact,
the immigrants assimilated the political values of the Anglosphere
quite readily, and do so today despite the attempts of politically
correct elites and governments to promote multiculturalism.
Today's Anglospherists see immigrants forming a new layer of
intra-Anglosphere ties, as the East and South Asian, Caribbean,
and Mediterranean origins of immigrants throughout the
Anglosphere create new cross-relationships.

Civil Society, Democracy, Prosperity, and the Anglosphere

Why do some nations do well, and not others, and what does this
say about the alignments and associations in international politics
that we currently have?

In the past two decades, we have observed such varied phenomena
as the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, the collapse of the East Asian economic bubble, and the
revival of entrepreneurship in Britain in the wake of the Thatcher
reforms. These experiences have created a better appreciation of
the link between strong civil society and prosperity. In the
emerging economy of this next phase of the Scientific-
Technological Revolution, these strong civil society values will be
even more central to success.

A civil society is one that is built of a vast network of networks.
These networks start with the individual and the families,
community organizations, religious congregations, social
organizations, and businesses created by individuals coming
together voluntarily. Continuing up through the local, regional,
national, and international networks, the tying together of local
organizations creates civil societies, which in turn beget civic
states. Such states are based on the notion that authority begins at
the local and community level and is gradually built upwards to
deal with wider-scale issues. Civic states rely on community
assent and a feeling of participation in a local, regional, and
national community. Law is generally accepted in civic states, as
are the common rules of society. The authority of the state is
upheld not by constant exercise of force, but by the willingness of
citizens to comply. Civic states are thus opposed to "economic
states" in which loyalty is primarily pragmatic and based on
expectation of benefits through cross-subsidization.

It is important to make clear that at the root of civil society is the
individual. People who define themselves primarily as members
of collective entities, be they families, religions, racial or ethnic
groups, political movements, or corporations, cannot form the
basis of a civil society. Individuals must be free to dissociate
themselves from such collectives without prejudice and reaffiliate
with others. Societies that permanently bind individuals under the
discipline of inherited or assigned collectives remain bogged
down in ethnic, racial, or religious factionalism, nepotism, and
economic systems such as the "crony capitalism" so prevalent in
East Asia and Latin America.

It is likewise important to make clear that a family in a civil
society is a voluntary association, even though it is built on
inherited connections. It should not place loyalty to its members
above moral obligations to the rest of society, such as fair dealing,
and should have no power over its members other than the
sanction of withdrawal of help or association. Similarly, its
individuals may choose to join associations marked by inherited
ties, such as ethnic or religious organizations, but are not
penalized for declining to join. The state deals with those
individuals independently, rather than as members of that
collective. Thus, would-be advocates of civil society are often
fooled into seeing family-dominated societies as civil societies,
when in fact they are the opposite. Other observers see societies in
which the state deals with everyone as members of ethnic, racial,
or religious communities (such as the vilayet system of the
Ottoman Empire) as civil societies, whereas in fact they are
authoritarian societies corrupted by the lack of choice.

The "family values" of a crony society are not the same as the
family values of a civil society, nor are the ethnic- or religious-
based voluntary associations of a civil society the same as the
ethnic or religious compartments of an authoritarian society. One
of the quiet success stories of strong civil societies, particularly
the United States, has been the manner in which the compulsory
family and religious affiliations of immigrants from the Old
World were transformed in the New World into voluntary
associations of civil society, and the immigrants themselves
changed from members of traditional societies into self-actualized
individuals. This took place within the same generation in some
families and in no more than two or three generations in others.

Most societies have some elements of civil society, but their
strength differs greatly from society to society. Some states,
generally the most peaceful and prosperous ones, are civic states,
or possess elements of the civic state, but others have little or no
civic nature: totalitarian states, personal dictatorships, and
kleptocracies. The latter exist primarily to permit the persons in
control to steal from those subject to its power. Most of the poorer
and strife-wracked states of the world are in the latter category.
The relationship between civil society and prosperity, and civic
statehood and domestic peace, is not coincidental. However, the
causal link has often been misunderstood.

It is now quite clear that prosperous states are rich because of the
strength of their civil society, and that peaceful states are peaceful
because of the strength of their civic statehood, not the other way
around. States that have inherited vast natural wealth relative to
their populations have been able to spread wealth around, but this
has not generally strengthened civil society or the coherence of
the civic state. When the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, the sons of the
rich Kuwaitis fled to Cairo, while their parents negotiated the
price of Western intervention. This is not a strong civic state.

Also misunderstood are the concepts of democracy and the market
economy. Democracy and free markets are effects of a strong civil
society and strong civic state, not causes. Over the past century,
there has been a misdirection of attention to the surface
mechanics of democracy, to nose-counting, rather than to the
underlying roots of the phenomenon. We know that a society
containing strong networks of voluntary association also develops
means of expressing the interests of those networks to the state. It
is the need for effective means of expression that gave rise to the
original mechanisms we now call democratic. Later, intellectuals
in states that did not have a strong existing civil society, especially
pre-revolutionary France, looked at states that did, especially
England, and attempted to distill an abstract theoretical construct
that captured the essence of that experience. These intellectuals
called this thing democracy, but they subsequently focused
attention on their model (and its misunderstandings) rather than
the essence of the thing they actually admired.

England's strong civic state had its roots in the local expressions
of civil society in the civic realm, a process that may or may not
be traced back to the era before the Norman Conquest but was
certainly well-rooted by the fourteenth century. These include the
grand and petit jury systems, the election of various aldermen and
other local officials, the quasi-official role of many civil
institutions, and the heritage of common law administered by an
independent judiciary. Selecting members of the House of
Commons was one of many different mechanisms by which local
communities gave or withheld their consent to the state.

Today we tend to focus on the many ways in which pre-modern
England differed from contemporary norms. The restricted
franchise, the "rotten boroughs" which elected members of
Parliament with a handful of voters, the lack of a party system,
and the open purchase of votes for money or favor all seem very
undemocratic. But it is a mistake to ignore the many ways in
which England's system created a far more effective means of
assent and dissent compared to other state systems of the times.
The lesson from English history is repeated many times over, up
to and including contemporary events in Taiwan and South Korea.
When civil society reaches a certain degree of complexity,
democracy emerges. Absent that civil society, the importation of
mere mechanisms of democracy only creates one more set of
spoils for families and groups to fight over at the expense of the
rest of society.

Similarly, the market economy requires more than merely the
absence of socialism or an overweaning government. It is the
economic expression of a strong civil society, just as substantive
(rather than formulaic) democracy is the political expression of a
civil society and civic state. Democratic mechanisms no more
create civil society than wet streets cause rain. There is
theoretically no reason why democracy needs a market economy,
or vice versa -- but in practice they are almost always found
together. Entrepreneurship in business uses and requires the same
talents, and often the same motives, that go into starting a
religious, nonprofit, or political organization. The society that can
create entrepreneurial businesses tends to be the same society that
creates the other forms of organizations as well -- often the same
individuals start several of each form at different stages in their
lives.

The market economy also requires a civil society with general
acceptance of a common framework of laws, practices, and
manners. Without a general acceptance of fair dealing, an
agreement on what fair dealing means, and a system that can
adjudicate disputes, a true market economy cannot exist. Just as
post-Soviet Russia's politics demonstrated that the mechanics of
democracy alone cannot create a civic state, its economy
demonstrated that market formulas cannot by themselves create a
market economy or a civil society. They are necessary but
insufficient conditions in each case.

The Link to Science and Technology

These realizations have immense implications for the next stages
of the Scientific-Technological Revolution. It is highly likely that
the current information revolution will continue to be a source of
innovation for the next stages of growth. They will emerge in an
entrepreneurial environment marked by the rapid creation of
teams and capitalization through venture money and public
markets possible only in a strong civil society. The crucial role of
non-company organizations (such as professional and industry
associations and informal networks of acquaintance) in creating
the Silicon Valley phenomenon also indicates that this form of
entrepreneurism is a strong civil-society phenomenon.

Looking at the geography of the next stages of this scientific-
technological revolution, it is no accident that it is emerging first
in the United States. Strong civil society has its roots in medieval
Europe, as a result of the society being built of a mix of tribal,
feudal, local, church, family, and state institutions, characterized
by the lack of a single, overwhelming power that could impose its
will. Gradually the different interests established negotiated
relationships of power and influence, none of which involved full
submission of one element to another. At first these institutions
were for the most part neither free nor voluntary in nature.
However, the multiplicity of institutions eventually permitted
some liberty, and eventually many individuals to establish a
substantial freedom and independence through astute negotiation.

England, by virtue of its being the strongest part of an island at the
periphery of Europe, was insulated from many of the more
centralizing influences that eventually eradicated the complexity
of emerging medieval civil society. In particular, its security from
invasion after 1066 and consequent lack of need to maintain a
large land army shielded it from the royal absolutism that
continental monarchies fashioned in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. Thus, England was free to continue combining
medieval institutions such as Parliament, juries, and corporations
into effective forms of complex civil societies. These forms were
present throughout Western Europe, but faded or changed into
instruments of state power over civil society on the continent,
while still flourishing in England.

The colonization of North America happened in such a way that
the most useful characteristics of civil society were brought to its
soil from England, while many of the less useful remnants of
feudalism were left behind. In fact, Anglo-America was a
particularly strong civil society from the start, especially in New
England and Pennsylvania, where Puritans and Quakers, both of
whom were strongly dedicated to the fundamentals of civil
society, brought particularly robust institutions. Above all, they
elevated the sanctity of contract and covenant to central places in
their moral universe, an critical advantage in fostering civil
society, and particularly, dynamic entrepreneurship.

The entrepreneurial cultures of the Quakers of Pennsylvania and
northern England, the Methodists of northern and midland
England and America, and the Calvinists of New England and
Scotland seem to have fundamentally contributed to the
emergence, development, and continuing dominance of the
industrial and information revolutions.

It is important to reject a narrow, triumphalist view of the Anglo-
American role in this matter and to stress again that it was the
confluence of a number of factors that created this link. This
implies that the characteristics that have given the Anglosphere its
leadership can be lost as well as acquired, that other cultures can
acquire (and to some extent have acquired) characteristics with
similar effects. It also implies that these cultural and institutional
characteristics are fairly deep-seated, and changes, negative and
positive alike, usually require several generations to take full
effect.

As the saying goes, "There is a lot of ruin in a nation." Thus
England took more than a few generations to lose the
characteristics that sparked entrepreneurial vigor, and when
relatively shallow political and institutional changes reversed the
climate of decline, entrepreneurial vigor quickly resurfaced there.
Conversely, it will take more than "anti-corruption" campaigns in
low-trust cultures in the former Soviet states, Latin America, or
East Asia to change their deep-rooted cultural biases feeding
nepotism in business and government.

If the above historical observations are at all valid, the obvious
conclusion is that the new scientific-technological revolution is
likely to emerge in a high-trust culture -- specifically, the
Anglosphere. Hence, the most important political challenge of the
near future is to create close cooperative ties among groups of
strong civic states, starting with the Anglosphere nations. These
conclusions also suggest that one critical preparation for this
process is for Anglosphere nations to gain an awareness of the
distinctiveness of their own civilization, not in order to feel
superior to others, but to create a realistic basis for addressing the
serious problems arising within this civilization.

Finally, we must realize that every advance brought by the next
stages of the scientific-technological revolution will bring a
serious potential for danger and disruption. The potential
solutions to such dangers must come from the strengths of the
civilization from which they emerged: the strengths of advanced
civil societies.

Some visionaries advocate a world government in hopes that it
would control such hazards. Such a government (unless it is a
disguised empire of the major powers imposed on the rest) would
have to be constructed on a lowest-common-denominator basis to
include a substantial collection of hapless dictatorships, rotten
oligarchies, and shabby kleptocracies. It may be more useful to
construct a framework for cooperation starting with a small
number of significant strong civil societies and to work on
improving constitutional structures which can restrain harmful use
of power, whether political or technological, while preserving
safeguards against political abuse.

Any such institution would have to draw on the civil society's
strengths of openness, voluntary consent and compliance,
inclusion, constitutional restraint of authority, and flow of
participation from the fundamental levels of society to the top.
Any other approach to solution is unlikely to be effective in its
goals or tolerable to its citizens.

An understanding of the success of market economies and
democratic government will lead inevitably to skepticism about
ambitious, broadly inclusive international or transnational
institutions. International cooperation will be essential to meet the
challenges of the next stages of the scientific-technological
revolution. But the first challenge of organizations is to attempt to
link those civic states that already have much in common. If we
cannot make such forms work, there is no hope whatsoever for
institutions hoping to link across different cultures, except in the
most superficial ways.

Thus, the first challenge is creating the institutional ties to parallel
the economic realities of the convergence within the English-
speaking economies. Since the changes sparked by the Thatcher
reforms, some signs of entrepreneurial takeoff can be discerned in
the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. But other areas of
the world displaying creativity and entrepreneurship are, not
surprisingly, strong and relatively open civil societies themselves,
such as Scandinavia and the Netherlands. It is no accident that
Linus Torvalds -- who created the phenomenally successful Linux
computer operating system -- is a Finnish citizen. It is also
noteworthy that he eventually moved to the English-speaking
world -- in this case Palo Alto, California -- in order to further his
dreams.

By contrast, such high-tech entrepreneurship as does emerge in
the core European or Japanese economies tends to be content-
related and based on local knowledge inherent in language or
location. These are classic strategies of follower economies, and,
although they are intelligent strategies, English-speaking countries
do not adopt them. Rather, they tend to compete in the
mainstream, taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage, such as
Ireland's low taxation or Canada's more rational technology export
laws, and pursuing global, not regional niches.

The problem is not any lack of creativity, energy, or
entrepreneurial drive among non-English-speaking people. The
problem is that when creativity does arise and ventures start, the
prevailing set of social, economic and political institutions retards
their growth. In corrupt and undemocratic countries with weak
civil societies, family networks permit entrepreneurs to get around
these obstacles, up to a point. But they cannot expand easily
beyond that point.

In stronger civil societies such as Germany, which have high-trust
characteristics but lack openness and flexibility in their political
and social systems, ventures are frustrated by bureaucratic
barriers. Thus, while in America computer industry start-ups draw
heavily on South Asian programmers and entrepreneurs, a
German proposal to give visas to Indian programmers prompted
the slogan "Kinder statt Inder" -- "(our) Children, not Indians."

This resistance may change, but not overnight. The European
Union will likely go through one or more rather severe crises
before it broadens its purview, and the Japanese system is even
more rigid. The decades it will require for these changes to take
place will also be the critical decades of the next stages of the
scientific-technological revolution. In the short term, therefore, it
is likely that the Anglosphere nations will continue to pull away
from Continental Europe and Japan.

Many young continental Europeans use their EU rights to relocate
to Britain, whose entrepreneurial culture and freedom they seek.
Free movement has been reported as a triumph of EU principles,
but it is very much a one-way street. Young continentals move to
Britain and Ireland, suggesting the continual attraction of the
English-speaking world for the smart, talented, and ambitious.
The real "French Silicon Valley" does not lie in any of the planned
technology centers created by the French state, but stretches
instead from Dover to London, where thousands of young French
men and women have relocated to pursue their dreams without the
high taxes and social burdens prevailing on the continent.

Becoming A Self-Aware Civilization: The Anglosphere
Perspective

An Anglosphere perspective differs from any of the lenses through
which our societies have been viewed in the past. It could not
have arisen at an earlier point in time. Although aspects of the
perspective may seem familiar, they are applied in new ways and
combined into new synergies. The principal characteristics
emphasized by the Anglosphere perspective include the following:

¢ Historical continuity. The Anglosphere is a relatively old social
construct among human societies, with a tangible continuity
reaching back at least twelve centuries. Although substantially
transformed by each human wave added to the whole, and by each
invasion of ideas which have affected development for good and
for bad, the Anglosphere is recognizably evolved from Alfred's
kingdom. Americans or Australians who long for depth of
historical perspective ought properly to find it in the Anglosphere
identity. The better we understand history, the more we
understand that the voyage to those countries was more continuity
than re-creation. This perspective has substantial consequences on
our understanding of political, social, economic, military, and
technological history.

¢ Memetic, rather than genetic, identity. Richard Dawkins
popularized the concept of the meme, the equivalent of a gene in
the process of evolution of information. This has proven to be a
useful concept. Memes reproduce, spread, and evolve far faster
than genes, and thus human societies are far more affected by
memetic than by genetic evolution. (The classic example: it is far
quicker to evolve the concept, or meme, of the corrective lens and
spread the use of eyeglasses worldwide, than it is to wait for
genetic evolution to weed out the near-sighted.) A century ago,
proponents of English-speaking political unions had a primarily
genetic view of the English-speaking world and sought to reunite
the British with their cousins in America. This vision failed, partly
because so many Americans were already of non-British descent
by that time. In contrast, the Anglosphere is a memetic concept.
Those who come to use the language and concepts of the
Anglosphere (and further their evolution) are the memetic heirs of
Magna Carta, the Bills of Rights, and the Emancipation
Proclamation, whatever their genetic heritage. "Innocent until
proven guilty" now belongs to Chang, Gonzales, and Singh, as
well as Smith and Jones.

¢ Networked, rather than hierarchical, structure. The first
expression of a vision of unity was the coining of the term "Great
Britain" by James I, king of Scotland and England alike. The unity
of the United Kingdom, formalized finally in 1707, was contested
many times by Scots and Irish, and rejected altogether in
Philadelphia in 1776. The second vision, that of Rhodes and
Milner, was of a co-dominion jointly run from London and
Washington. The high-water mark of this vision was the Anglo-
American high command of World War II, which merged the two
militaries far more than a mere alliance. But this relationship was
diluted into NATO and the United Nations, and as a vision,
dissolved. The third vision, the plan of Harold Wilson and Lyndon
Johnson for a North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, was waylaid
by the politics of the day and the suspicion that it would have
ended in an American hegemony made obnoxious by the Vietnam
War and the shadow of the Suez crisis. The network
commonwealth vision is thus the fourth iteration of Anglosphere
cohesion. It is polycentric and collaborative, befitting an era in
which the network, not some plan, is the ruling paradigm.
Coalitions of the willing, variable geometry, and multiple,
overlapping political ties, rather than One Union, One Parliament,
and One Capital, are the characteristics of the Network
Commonwealth approach.

¢ Emphasis on similarities and recognition of differences. Narrow
racial and nationalist narratives have emphasized the differences
among Anglosphere nations and deemphasized similarities. At the
same time, a superficial universalism has suppressed appreciation
of genuine differences between the Anglosphere and other
civilizations. This has led to the facile and futile attempt to
impose the surface mechanisms of the Anglosphere on cultures
with none of the background of slow evolution of strong civil
society. Kosovo cannot be turned into Kansas or Kent in two
years. An Anglospheric perspective concentrates on tending and
perfecting our own garden first, on creating deep and strong ties
between highly similar nations and cultures, and seeking to help
other nations by serving as an example (and sometimes, as a
caution). It does not impose solutions on nations that cannot
benefit thereby.

The English-speaking peoples are now at the threshold of the
perception stage. To move forward, new mental categories must
be given name and definition and brought to general attention. As
noted above, there is no concise term for the category of "English-
speaking nations." Even that clumsy phrase is imprecise, as it
focuses excessively on the linguistic aspects and ignores the much
wider set of shared legal, constitutional, and social values which
these nations hold in common. Hence the term "Anglosphere,"
which is concise, goes beyond mere linguistic commonality, and
has no racial overtones. However, it is not clear that it will
become the term of the future since it still has overtones of
"Anglophile," which is a value not universally considered positive
in the Anglosphere. In California "Anglo" is a term identified with
"Non-Hispanic Whites"; in Canada "Anglophone" has come to
mean "non-French whites." In Ireland, it carries overtones of
ancient British oppression, rather than English-speaking
civilization as a whole. An Anglospheric Perspective reclaims the
term from narrow usage and connotation.

Time will tell whether this neologism will endure. Although
"Anglosphere network commonwealth" is a convenient shorthand
to discuss such things, the formal title of such an entity may be
more prosaic -- a "Community of English-Speaking States," for
example -- or it may reach for a more poetic form; a "League of
the Common Law," perhaps. It will depend on the temper of the
times that bring it forth.

More generally, what is needed is an explicit recognition of a
status that is "not a countryman, yet not a foreigner," but rather a
fellow member of a network civilization.

The Sinews of the Network Commonwealth: Evolving New
Forms from Existing Elements

Network Commonwealths will emerge evolutionarily, like most
viable political mechanisms, growing from, altering, and
redefining institutions and developing in the era of economic
states until these institutions become a new thing. When the
history of Network Commonwealths is written, the current time
will be seen not as the start of the process, but as perhaps a
halfway mark in the building of the Network Commonwealth.

1. Common Economic Spaces: Trade and Transmigration

As I discussed previously, common market areas for trade in
goods have blossomed over the past half-century, the successes
sparking numerous imitations. A Network Commonwealth will
have a set of free trade agreements as one of its fundamental
ligatures. It would differ from existing common markets in
focusing on facilitation of informational trade, services, and the
free flow of people and interpersonal cooperation.

The mental model of the European Union as a "harmonized" trade
area (to use the European Union's jargon for area-wide uniform
standards) could be illustrated by the example of a group of
corporations throughout Europe being able to manufacture an
airplane jointly, coordinating tens of thousands of workers
producing fuselages in France, wings in Germany, and tail
assembly in Spain. The mental model of a Network
Commonwealth is illustrated by a set of arrangements permitting
a software company incorporated in Bermuda to use
programmers, marketers, and financiers in California, Australia,
India, and Ireland to put together a Web-based product in
cyberspace and sell it worldwide. At the same time, they would
enjoy adequate intellectual property protection and have the
ability to resolve disputes in the process fairly and expeditiously.

It is relevant that the harmonizations needed to enable the
European example took decades to create, and imposed
substantial transition costs on the citizens of the member-states.
Most of the harmonizations needed for the latter example already
exist: common language, common software standards, and a
common law and understanding of business practices. The
Network Commonwealth places a greater emphasis on creation of
a common business space for information businesses than on the
elimination of traditional barriers like tariffs or quotas.
International processes such as the World Trade Organization are
already effecting many of the needed changes in such areas. A
NAFTA-EU free trade agreement, such as has been proposed,
which would reduce trade barriers between those areas, could
carry the process further and deeper.

In the Network Commonwealth, future trade will be more
dominated by informational goods and services than by physical
goods. In these areas, it is more important to avoid the creation of
new barriers than to eliminate existing ones. Instead, such a trade
regime would focus on resolving issues such as the different
treatment of state-generated intellectual property by the US and
the Commonwealth countries. In an era in which the US software
industry is economically more important and generates more jobs
than the US auto industry, these are the types of issues whose
resolution ought to have priority. Similarly, a Network
Commonwealth emphasis would ally Anglosphere nations, with
their more open, competitive industries, in international decision-
making forums such as those on radio spectrum allocation, where
Britain today undercuts its own interests in the name of European
solidarity.

In creating common trade and economic spaces, agricultural and
manufactured goods issues would have the lowest priority, both
because they will be of declining economic importance and
because they tend to have substantial entrenched protectionist
lobbies. There is no need to hold back the creation of fully free
markets in some areas because they cannot be had in all areas.
More important are agreements providing for free entry
throughout the community's economic space in the
communications and transportation sectors. Universal flat- or low-
rate communications and fully competitive air transportation
should be the end-goals of these agreements.

2. Sojourner Provisions: The Human Element of Trade and
Cooperation

I place substantial emphasis on immigration ties and "sojourner"
status: a right to travel to, reside in, and do business within all the
member-states of the Network Commonwealth on an equal and
reciprocal basis. The European Union has effectively
implemented such a status as of 1993; US-Canadian agreements
have moved in a similar direction. Sojourner status is important
because the critical ties within a Network Commonwealth are not,
as with the European Union, hierarchy-to-hierarchy relationships
between large corporations, but rather person-to-person
relationships between the enterprising individuals who will create
the businesses, civic organizations, and personal networks of the
future.

Sojourner status is also important because the Network
Commonwealth model incorporates a new model of transnational
personal movement appropriate to the era of Internet, cheap jet
travel, and worldwide media. The Machine Age model was
fundamentally one of immigration. In that model, individuals
were citizens of one nation-state and resided, worked, and paid
taxes within that state. The only way to change that status was to
give up citizenship in one nation, move to a new nation and adopt
residence, employment, and citizenship there. The immigrant who
adopted the identity and customs of the new nation and fit himself
into that structure, rarely if ever returned, lost contact with home
country media, and communicated with his previous home and
family slowly through mails, or not at all.

The Network Era model of transnational personal movement is
sojournership. A sojourner is one who moves from one country to
another to reside and engage in economic activity, but does not
give up his previous identity, returns to previous countries of
residence frequently, and remains in constant communication with
his home network. This sojourner is an essential element of
transnational cooperation, making possible entrepreneurial
activity on a wide scale with an extremely low cost of entry. The
sojourner often serves to cross-pollinate activity from place to
place, accelerating ties begun or continued via Net and Web. As
humans cease to be inhabitants and economic actors solely of
physical space, we begin to have an "amphibious" existence split
between physical space and information space. Each space has its
own rules and realities, and the sojourner is the person who helps
tie the two together by combining cyberspace and physical-space
contact.

Existing immigration law is poorly adapted to such activity. The
levels of state benefits attached to citizenship have risen to such
levels during the Machine Age that an immigrant's slot becomes a
valuable prize, particularly for persons from poorer countries. Yet
the sojourner does not seek to fill a citizen's slot. The immigration
machinery and provisions of most of the world's industrialized
states are designed to ration these entitlements by rationing
citizenship. Sojourners face the choice of trying to fit the
immigrant's slots or to abuse tourist, student, or temporary worker
provisions, none of which are appropriate to their needs.

Similarly, national borders create other obstacles to effective
sojourning. Consider the situation among English-speaking
nations. Despite the similarity in the legal, financial, and business
systems of the English-speaking nations, and the transparency of
credit records due to common language, it is difficult for an
ordinary sojourner to obtain credit or secure loans across the
borders of the English-speaking nations. At a minimum, credit
checks in the US require a Social Security number. But to gain a
Social Security number is to stake a claim on numerous benefits,
none of which were things the sojourner sought to begin with. Yet
the would-be sojourner cannot renounce those benefits to get a
Social Security number merely for the purposes of gaining credit
status. Network Commonwealth agreements could reduce such
burdens with a substantial net gain to financial institutions as a
result of an expansion of the common economic space.

A sojourner agreement among English-speaking nations would
create a reciprocal right of sojourning for citizens of the adhering
nations, permitting those citizens to travel to, reside in, and to
perform economic transactions in all member nations. Sojourners
would not be eligible for state benefits and would pay core taxes,
but not taxes earmarked for state benefits. Thus, a Briton
sojourning in America would pay tax supporting basic
governmental functions, but would not make a Social Security
contribution nor be eligible for Social Security benefits, unless the
U.S. chose to include sojourners in the system on a voluntary
basis. Similarly, an American sojourner in the UK would pay
basic tax, but not support the National Health Service or be
eligible for those benefits.

Although it would be generally beneficial to permit sojourners to
hold employment, concerns about competition for formal
employment slots may create a barrier to agreement. More
important, and less controversial, would be a provision permitting
sojourners to conduct business, including acting as contractors
and consultants. As such, they would be in line with the emerging
economic trends. They would not have political rights in the host
nations, though there is a reasonable argument for giving long-
resident sojourners who pay local sales and property taxes a vote
in local elections, as the European Union does.

Most importantly, sojourner status would not be rationed; it would
be freely available to any applicants, subject to a basic check for
criminal record. Misbehavior of a sojourner in a host nation would
be dealt with primarily by expulsion; similarly, need for welfare
services would be dealt with by repatriation. Countries could
remove sojourners from the competition for state benefits and
insulate host citizens from potential problems caused by their
presence. They could make grant of status dependent on strict
reciprocity and ensure that sojourners come primarily from
countries within the network civilization of the host nation
(thereby minimizing interpersonal transaction costs). This would
deliver many of the benefits of immigration. It would also
minimize the commonly ascribed costs to the host nation and its
people.

Despite the theoretical availability of a sojourner-like status
throughout the European Union, young Britons and Irish have
made relatively little use of it. Large numbers of both nations'
young (and those of the other principal Anglosphere nations)
come to the United States to live and work, often by abusing
immigration statuses designed for other purposes. Sojourner status
would turn current violators into constructive economic
participants.

A sojourner agreement would create a powerful incentive for
active, entrepreneurial persons in all parts of a network
civilization, particularly the young, to support the creation of the
Network Commonwealth. It creates a direct and visible benefit to
individuals from the creation of the Network Commonwealth.

3. Collaborative Organizations in Science and Technology

The European Union was seen as the outgrowth of the European
Coal and Steel Community, which evolved gradually into the
European Economic Community, then the European Community.
However, the EEC was only one of several elements from which
the European Union was forged. Also important were a group of
organizations for joint scientific and technological cooperation,
including the European Atomic Energy Agency, and the European
Space Agency. These programs had two important functions. The
first was a pragmatic one, of permitting European nations to
participate in scientific and technological projects beyond their
individual means. Second was the symbolic function of
demonstrating that a united Europe could remain competitive in
science and technology, at a time when the USA and the USSR
seemed destined to dominate those fields.

The cooperation model for European scientific-technical
organizations was, as in nearly all pan-European programs, one of
top-down negotiated relationships between national hierarchical
structures. Programs are composed under the rule of "juste retour"
-- money is spent in each member-nation in proportion to the
percentage of funding contributed by that nation.

Nations benefit from these programs to the degree their national
economic and technical structures are organized in a top-down,
state-directed hierarchical structure; and their political systems
can generate the bureaucratic and funding stability needed to
properly support such programs. France and Germany are good
examples of such nations; the United Kingdom has historically
been a poor example; not surprisingly. The United Kingdom has
tended to get the worst of the deal in most European cooperative
science and technology programs in which it has participated.

A Network Commonwealth would find cooperative science and
technology programs similarly useful in creating added leverage
for national expenditures in those fields. Highly visible programs,
like space exploration, would yield similar benefits in producing a
visible source of pride in cooperation for accomplishment.
However, such cooperative programs would be conceived and
structured quite differently from the Machine Age structures of
the European Union.

As with all Network Commonwealth efforts, its science and
technology programs would seek to exploit the deeper cooperation
possible among persons with similar cultural backgrounds. The
universality of English as the world language of science would
seem to reduce the value of Network Commonwealth
commonalties. However, it is not the difficulties of interpersonal
communications among scientists that is the barrier to
international cooperation; scientists are often capable of forming
effective transnational teams. The problem lies in the way that the
conflicts of their sponsoring states often intrude into the
possibilities of further cooperation once initial work has produced
promising results.

Consider the invention of the World Wide Web: although
developed by two researchers (one of them English) at CERN in
Switzerland, a pan-European scientific research institution, its
benefits were first and most widely reaped by Americans, who
neither participated in the CERN consortium nor were present at
the creation of the Web. The incompatibilities of the CERN
member-states and the slowness of state-to-state cooperation
made it unlikely that any of the member-states would be able to
exploit this breakthrough, as indeed they did not. By aligning
nations with similar and more compatible political systems; and
by encouraging person-to-person and institution-to-institution
rather than state-to-state cooperation, a Network Commonwealth
is likelier to promote effective science and technology
cooperation than international structures created on other bases.

4. Security Organizations: Sailing With the Fast Convoy

Permanent security alliances rank high among the institutions that
can evolve into building blocks for the Network Commonwealth.
Since its founding, NATO has become more than a military
alliance: it is now an elaborate set of permanent structures and
institutions which have had a profound effect on the military,
political, and economic life of the nations which have joined
them. One need only look at the importance of NATO
membership to Spain, Greece, Turkey and now, the states of
Eastern Europe in stabilizing and democratizing them to see that
permanent alliance structures have become one of the central
building blocks of transnational institutions.

It is also instructive to note the failures in building or maintaining
security alliance structures. The U.S.'s unsuccessful attempts to
replicate NATO's success in CENTO and SEATO and the
immediate collapse of the Warsaw Pact with the fall of
communism, demonstrate that permanent structures require
substantial alignment of interests and values. Perception of
immediate threats can create an incentive to join an alliance, but
when the perception of threat changes, (or the perception that
resistance, rather than accommodation, is the effective way to
meet it) that incentive disappears, and the alliance collapses.

Just as the transition to the Machine Age made mastery of
manufacturing the key to success in warfare, so will mastery of
information be the key to success in Information Revolution
warfare. Already, the predominance of the US military is due
more and more to its superior information technology.

Information war is war directed not against persons or things
directly, but against the information that controls and affects both.
That information war will become a major new form of warfare,
on three levels: state vs. state; state vs. individual; and individual
vs. individual. This will lead to a transformation of the nature of
privacy, with new winners and losers. Individuals and small
groups careful to master the new information technology can gain
a level of privacy vis-à-vis governments and other individuals
unthinkable during the Machine Age; those who ignore these
developments will have far less privacy, both from the state, and
from private eavesdroppers. The great powers of the new age, to
the extent there are great powers, will be those nations that
possess a high degree of information-age literacy, a vigorous
software industry, and the ability to develop the political-military
doctrines to exploit its advantages.

The US prevailed in the Machine Age because of its general
mastery of machinery, its enormous industrial base, and its ability
to find and give command to generals such as Dwight
Eisenhower. Eisenhower and his peers understood how to use
these assets to win in the face of clear German superiority in
weapons, morale, and training throughout most of the war.
Germans had, for most of the war's length, better tanks, planes,
and guns -- the U.S. had better trucks. It also had the only army
where almost every draftee knew how to drive, and most how to
fix motor vehicles, from civilian life.

The dominant powers of the future will be those who have a
strong domestic software capability, potential soldiers who are
comfortable with use of computers, and the ability to generate
political-military strategies to exploit the new technologies
properly. The Network Commonwealth provides a means for
today's economic states to minimize the loss of defensive potential
as they undergo devolutionary pressures and fiscal constraints as
their previous ability to divert large percentages of their GDPs
diminishes. Those who can effectively implement it will retain
substantially more power than those who don't .

The balance of power has already begun to change as a result of
the increase in the rate of transition from the Machine to the
Information Age. Powers like Russia, which dominated the
Machine Age because of their ability to cover square miles with
medium-tech tank battalions, have lost capability. Ironically,
powers such as Britain and France, which had fallen to the middle
rank of military capability, today have returned to the rank of top
powers precisely because of their greater ability to master the
cutting edge of today's information-based technologies.

The centrality of information technology, combined with
organizational and weapons-technology innovations, constitutes
what has become known as the "Revolution in Military Affairs"
(RMA, in defense-wonk shorthand). The U.S. has already begun
to consider the issue of how to cooperate with its NATO and other
principal allies in using the "Grid" -- the dense network of
information, using Internet-like techniques, that links information-
gathering sensors, command and control centers, and weapons and
men in the field. The defense sinew of Network Commonwealth
ties will center around cooperation in the use of the Grid by the
core alliance. NATO has built a series of standards, such as a
common rifle caliber, making it easy for units of NATO member
nations to cooperate in the field. A Network Commonwealth
defense alliance would be built primarily around common
standards in information.

A Call For Civilizational Construction

The next stages of the Scientific-Technological Revolution will
require a great deal of flexibility if nations are to respond
creatively to new technologies and the unprecedented individual
and social options they will provide. The history of the developed
world since the onset of the scientific-technological revolution has
been a search for a new equilibrium following the creative
destruction of the Medieval order. The search has been long and
bloody, and has led down many fake paths. But we may now be
able to avoid, after such bitter experience, all utopian temptations
and construct an adapted civilization firmly on the roots of the
strong civil society we have inherited. The twentieth century saw
many failed attempts at ideological social construction; we live
yet among their ruins. It also saw many attempts to reinstitute the
values of previous eras, or (in many cases) imagined versions of
previous eras. None of these returns to the past was successful,
although new generations often look back to previous generations'
revivals as nostalgic models.

The call for an Anglosphere network commonwealth is neither
utopian nor nostalgic, but simply a response to the challenges
likely to be posed in the next stages of the scientific-technological
revolution. It is a call to repair the weakened roots of civil society
and to construct civic states to replace the failing institutions of
the economic state. Doing so will require civilizational self-
awareness, to be won not by creating a new civilization, but by
appreciating the value of those that have already emerged.

These tasks will no doubt seem tame to those who long for exotic
and wholly novel forms of human society. However, the
construction of a society that can lead humankind through the
challenges of the next stages of the scientific-technological
revolution without repeating the disasters of the twentieth century
is not a trivial piece of work. Rather, it is a task that will dominate
even the long lives of today's young people and future generations.
For those whose lives have been occupied with preventing or
repairing the disasters of failed utopian visions, the turn to
construction, rather than opposition or remediation, will require a
major change of mentality. Above all, it requires in young and old
alike the recovery of self-assurance. It requires the knowledge that
we are the standard-bearers of a civilization that has defeated
much evil (including that generated by our own wrong paths) and
now stands poised to lead the Anglosphere, and someday the
world, to the stars.

A Note on Sources

The following books are among the principal works of scholarship
and thought on which I have drawn in proposing the idea of the
Anglosphere perspective; their influence underlies the entire
book. My describing them as "Foundational Anglosphere Works"
should not be taken to imply that their authors endorse or agree
with the arguments of my work in part or in full, credit or blame
for which is entirely mine.

Fischer, David Hackett Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in
North America
Fischer's work challenges effectively one of the central myths of
American exceptionalism: the Turner's frontier thesis. He argues
convincingly that American culture exhibits great continuity from
the British Isles to the New World, and that differences between
American regional cultures are overwhelmingly the product of the
differences between regional cultures of the British Isles. Turner's
theories of a transformation through the frontier experience is
effectively disproved, particularly in light of a continual evolution
of the Anglosphere cultures through ongoing frontier experiences
within the British ideas and subsequently. Fischer's picture of
Anglosphere continuity is consistent with the Anglosphere
exceptionalism whose English roots are shown by Macfarlane to
be deep, and whose overall characteristics are shown by Véliz to
be wide and distinct when viewed through a comparative lens.
Together, they add up to an Anglosphere culture that is persistent
and pervasive over many generations, distinct throughout its
history from other European-origin civilizations around it, and
bearing for its time a particularly strong variety of civil society.

Fukuyama, Francis Trust: The Social Virtues & The Creation of
Prosperity 1995 The Free Press, New York One of the most
important books for thinking about, and comparing and
contrasting cultures and subcultures, and particularly about the
role of high trust in successful civil societies.

Macfarlane, Alan. The Origins of English Individualism. Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1978. One of the critical foundation books of
modern Anglosphere thought. It refutes in detail the prevailing
Marxist assumption that England had been just another European
peasant society before the modern era and the Industrial
Revolution. Macfarlane makes a strong case for the distinctness of
English-speaking civilization and its unique social mode reaching
back to at least the fifteenth century, and possibly well before.
Rather than a product of the Industrial Revolution, Anglosphere
individualism may have been one of the leading causes of it.

Phillips, Kevin, The CousinsT Wars: Religion, Politics, and the
Triumph of Anglo-America, Basic Books, New York. An
excellent and comprehensive treatment of the three principal
internal conflicts of the Anglosphere -- the English Civil War, the
American Revolution, and the American Civil War. Phillips
mentions the prospect for closer Anglo-American collaboration at
the end of the book, but fails to elaborate.

Véliz, Caludio The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and
Economy in English and Spanish America University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1994 An extremely erudite and
impressive survey of the contrasting natures of the oGothic Foxes�
of the Anglosphere and the oBaroque Hedgehogs� of the
Hispanosphere. Professor Véliz, a Chilean who has lived much of
his life in Australia, England, and America, knows both spheres
intimately.

---
To unsubscribe from the Virus list go to <http://www.lucifer.com/cgi-bin/virus-l>