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David Lucifer
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Enlighten me.
  
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #15 on: 2002-06-15 13:55:20 » |
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[Walpurgis]
There is no "outside world". As I-ve said: mind/matter dualism is a false one. Consciousness has the appearance of locality at higher levels (like everything else), but is in fact non-local at lower levels (like everything is).
[Lucifer] Can you elaborate on what you mean by non-local consciousness? It seems to be based on a mistaken assumption that every particle in the universe is entangled with every other particle. It is also worth noting that QFT does not allow information to travel FTL. A pair of entangled particles will collapse their waveforms simultaneously no matter how far apart, but the phenomenon cannot be used to transmit information FTL.
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Walpurgis
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holism
« Reply #16 on: 2002-06-16 03:17:52 » |
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[Lucifer] Can you elaborate on what you mean by non-local consciousness? It seems to be based on a mistaken assumption that every particle in the universe is entangled with every other particle. It is also worth noting that QFT does not allow information to travel FTL. A pair of entangled particles will collapse their waveforms simultaneously no matter how far apart, but the phenomenon cannot be used to transmit information FTL.
[Walpurgis] (Disclaimer - we're in the realm of philosophical speculation here  ) Let me unpack my earlier blitherings:
I believe you are primarily referring to this paragraph:
"Consciousness is an activity of the brain and the body (I don-t think the brain would be very conscious in isolation - it would have no bio or sensory feedback). But when we consider what the brain/body is at the lowest levels (fluctuating quanta which are entangled with all other quanta) we must come to the conclusion that consciousness is as much part of this level as everything else is. Everything is necessarily built on this basic quantum level."
I understand that no *useful* information passes between entangled quanta due to indeterminacy (that is: any signals are random). This doesn't rule out the possibility of somehow manipulating spin to pass communicative info. however...
However, information of a sort "passes" between them ("correlates" is a better word). But this is not FTL, this "passing" is in "no-time". It is worth emphasising that in the Nicolus Gisin experiments (at Uni of Geneva) the spins of each photon carries no info., any observer will see randomness. But this randomness makes non-random sense only if we compare it to the pattern of the other paired photon. The info. in the two derive from the fact that the properties of the photons exist in complementary relation, and that info. is uncovered only through comparison of the difference between the two random patterns.
Holism is a defensible position when we consider that everything in our immediate physical environment is made up of quanta that have been interacting with other quanta (in the manner revealed by Aspect ie: wave/particle complimentarity) since the Big Bang to the present. We exist in a single quantum system.
Holistic interaction between all particles is only *suggested* by these experiments - we cannot observe this in its totality (how could we?).
Here are some reasons to back the philosophy.
The special character of wholeness in physics is, a unity without internal content is a blank of empty set and no recognisable as a whole. A collection of merely externally related parts does not constitute a whole in that the parts will not be mutually adaptive and complementary to one another.
Wholeness requires a complementary relationship between unity and difference and is governed by a principle of organisation determining the interrelationship between parts. This organising principle must be universal to a genuine whole and implicit in all parts that constitute the whole, even though the whole is exemplified only in its parts. This principle of order is nothing real in and of itself. It is the way that parts are organised, and not another constituent additional to those that constitute the totality.
In a genuine whole, relationships between the parts must be internal or immanent in the parts, as opposed to a spurious whole in which parts appear to disclose wholeness due to relationships that are external to the parts - as in classical physics.
This describes the character of the whole as we understand it in relativity theory, quantum mechanics and biology.
Parts can never be fully isolated (any attempt to do so results in ambiguity) and the whole cannot be full disclosed in analysis of parts. But study of the differences between parts provides insights into the dynamic structure of the whole present in each part.
Order does not exist between or outside parts, the connections are immanent in the event.
If the universe is a seamlessly interactive system that evolves to higher levels of complexity, and if the lawful regularities of this universe are emergent properties of the system, we can assume that the cosmos is a single significant whole that evinces progressive order in complementary relation to its parts. Give that this whole exists in some sense within all parts (quanta), one can then argue it operates in self-reflective fashion and is the ground for all emergent complexity. Since human consciousness evinces self-awareness in the human brain and since this brain (like all physical phenomenon) can be viewed as an emergent property of the whole, it is not unreasonable to philosophical conclude that the universe is conscious.
Since this whole cannot be represented or reduced to its parts, its lies beyond human representations and descriptions.
This position lends no support to conceptions of design, meaning, purpose, plan, or intent associated with our cultural mytho-religious heritage. There is also nothing in the scientific description of nature that can refute this position. It is also not possible to argue that holism (so often dismissed as a religious experience) can be undermined or invalidated with appeals to science. However, you are free to dismiss my philosophical speculations as just that. However, there is a firm conclusion - there is no basis in science for Cartesian dualism as sanctioned by classical physics. This is a macro-level illusion fostered by limited awareness of physical reality and by mathematical idealisations extended beyond the realm of their applicability.
Thanks for the prodding Lucifer - I had to explain myself sometime!
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rhinoceros
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #17 on: 2002-06-16 20:06:58 » |
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[Walpurgis 4]
Shit. I knew we wouldn-t be able to avoid this consciousness thing *L*
[rhinoceros]
Oh! A target! :-)
[Walpurgis 4]
I wouldn-t say there is no consciousness at the lower level. Consciousness (like everything) is non-local, but has the appearance of locality (that is, ones self). This is more complimentarity - consciousness cannot be solely understood on the local or non-local level, both levels contribute to our understanding. In this sense, there are really no *levels* to speak of, but it is useful for analytic purposes.
[rhinoceros 4]
In the same way, couldn't we say that a chair or a car can only be understood by combining the quantum level with the high level, where a chair is something to sit on? Talking about a chair is only meaningful at a high level. So is talking about mind or consciousness.
The second issue is the use of the terms local and non-local. In everyday conversation, locality means that something is confined within a defined space, or even that something can be identified as a separate entity. In quantum physics, locality means that something is confined within a distance which light can travel within the time between two related events. Sometimes, these two meanings of locality are carelessly confused.
[Walpurgis 4]
Consciousness is an emergent property of a whole (the self, the universe) from the sum parts. If you broke a body down, it would be conscious, consciousness would not be *found*. But together, consciousness emerges as more than the sum.
[rhinoceros 4]
Agreed that consciousness is an emergent property of a whole from the sum parts, and that consciousness emerges as more than the sum. But then, how can you say "if you broke a body down, it would be conscious, consciousness would not be *found*"? Isn't consciousness an emergent property of a whole?
[Walpurgis 4]
Because everything is non-local (and local) and because mind and matter are one (no dualism), the universe itself can be said to be conscious. We do not perceive this because of the illusion of conscious locality.
[rhinoceros 4]
Mind and matter are one? Why should an emergent property of something be one with that something.
The universe itself can be said to be conscious? By what definition of consciousness?
Illusion of conscious locality? I assume that by "locality" here you mean identifying oneself as a separate entity, and by "illusion" you mean a false perception. Should I assume that the right perception should be "I am myself and at the same time I am the Universe"? How could this make meaningful a linguistic construct such as consciousness?
[Walpurgis 4]
Whether universal consciousness is basic - on the lowest levels, or emergent - on the highest levels - is an interesting speculation (for me anyway!). Again, it illustrates that talk of *levels* is just useful.
[rhinoceros 4]
Yes, I like speculation too, and I think speculating is useful.
[Walpurgis 4]
Consciousness isnt hemmed into our skulls, it permeates our bodies (something we are keenly aware of) and ultimately our surroundings and the universe (something we are rarely aware of, if ever).
Take for example the fact that people can be born and live well with very little brain. You don-t need a whole brain to be conscious, because it is a highly redundant organ.
[rhinoceros 4]
I don't know much about that. Has anyone ever tried to find and destroy the parts of the *brain* where memories about the body and the surroundings of oneself reside?
[Walpurgis 4]
Now take this example of people how have had organ transplants an have inherited character traits and memories from their donors. Also, consider out-of-body experiences and the weight of evidence that can verify the death of the brain at a certain time, but a later recollection by the patient of people in a room, or objects on a roof, which at the time of brain-death, they could not have possible have perceived. Finally, consider the weight of mystical experiences of *oneness* with an object, an environment or even the cosmos. It must be said that this latter example cannot be verified, but the others have to my (though not necessarily you) satisfaction. (I refer you to Fortean Times 159 pages 22 & 24)
check out www.walpurg.iwarp.com/FT for scans of these pages.
These experiences hint at the non-locality of consciousness.
[rhinoceros 4]
The link didn't work, so I cannot comment on this evidence. One thing I can say is that an out-of-body experience where someone could recollect objects on the roof would imply that our sensory organs are irrelevant. Also, in the phrase "These experiences hint at the non-locality of consciousness", non-locality seems to mean "at different places" and is different from the non-locality of quantum physics.
[Walpurgis 4]
Consciousness as *we know it* is a particular experience on a particular level. This means we cannot exclude higher or lower-level states of consciousness. What is the experience of a less complicated animal? What is the emergent property of the whole planet (are you familiar with the Gaia hypothesis)? Of the whole universe? (Don-t expect the planet or universe to be able to consider us. After all, do we consider our individual neurons in anyway? Try it and see. The best you can do is on the conceptual levels, not an experiential one).
This could provide a good definition of what it is to be a homo sapiens sapiens - a species that operates on particular levels of computation.
[rhinoceros 4]
Sure, we cannot exlude any of this. But you realize that this is speculation. About the Gaia hypothesis... well, I have read Asimovs "Foundation" series.
[rhinoceros 3]
It is not true that *all* quanta are entangled. In the experiments, you have to choose a pair of entangled particles, or make them entangled. This does not make everything entangled. Besides, two entangled quanta are not the same quantum.
[Walpurgis 4]
You seem to be ignoring how observation affects experiment. We can-t choose to make quanta do these things. Quanta are and are not entangled. This state depends on our perception of them.
[rhinoceros 4]
Check again Aspect's experiment. The source was consisted of atoms in an excited state, each one emitting pairs of photons with exactly oposite polarities, in rapid succession. This is what made the photons of each pair entangled. You can't affect a particle's state by affecting just any other particle.
[Walpurgis 4] Yes, universal holism is beyond us at present. But that doesn-t invalidate the theory.
[rhinoceros 4]
No, but the word "theory" has also many different meanings.
[rhinoceros 3]
The interpretation that a high-level consciousness must intrude to make the wavefunction collapse is accepted by very few physicists.
[Walpurgis 4] I-m not espousing this position - there is not empirical way to test how ones brain/body might cause this transformation. Nevertheless, there is clearly a relationship between consciousness/energy/matter.
[rhinoceros 4]
Of course there is.
[rhinoceros 3] Kurzweil's speculation goes even further than that. It contradicts the interpretation of consciousness as an activity of the brain in a theological way: What consciousness would cause real events leading to the development of the brain and consciousness if there was not a consciousness in the first place.
[Walpurgis 4] *The first place* is an interesting phrase. If space is non-local, then so is time. There is no *first place* really. Non-local space/time explains everything as a zen-like single moment. The results of experiments like those baring out Wheeler-s predictions in the labs of Munich and Maryland (the delayed-choice experiments) illustrate that the observer and observed are not distinct and separate in space or time. These experiments seem to show that we cause something *after* is happened. The past is inexorably mixed with the present and time is tied to specific experimental choices.
[rhinoceros 4]
We can't say space is non-local. There are just some non-local effects involving quantum particles, i.e. faster-than-light effects. And this does not make all space a singular point.
Time is affected in a different way. These effects seem to violate special relativity and permit the effect to happen before the cause. Still, the rational view is retained because, although the "effect" seems to happen before the "cause" in these experiments, we can know this fact only after the "cause". Besides, this is not a matter of observers but a matter of relativistic frames of reference.
We already knew from special relativity that the flow of time was dependent on the chosen frame of reference. Of course, this reversal of time in quantum experiments involving a pair of entangled particles is a very serious issue to consider, but it does not mean that all time is the same or anything like that.
[rhinoceros 3]
Einstein did belong to this camp, the Realist. Some realists are still around, making these discussions more interesting. They have surrendered locality but not causality,
[Walpurgis 4]
How can you surrender space/time locality, yet still hold to a linear tool like causality? Sure, causality is a useful tool on our level, but not on the micro-level.
[rhinoceros 4]
Not a "deterministic" causality and not my invention. Still, there were some "heretic" attempts for a deterministic causality, mostly by David Bohm. Bohm was the first to develop an explicitly non-local formalism for quantum mechanics, even before Aspect's experiment, and his formalism (unlike the standard one) was also able to explain macroscopic locality.
Oh, I just found something very interesting: David Bohm, who advocated deterministic (although non-local) quantum mechanics, also proposed something similar to what you describe, based on the idea that every quantum particle carries a real quantum field (this was his interpretation instead of the wave-particle duality), and that this quantum field carries "active information" which makes it similar to the mind.
"A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter"
http://members.aol.com/Mszlazak/BOHM.html
But it looks like a weak case.
[rhinoceros 3]
I cannot just dismiss something so pervasive in human history without trying to understand how and why it worked.
[Walpurgis 4]
Neither do I. But what do you mean by *worked*? for me, metaphysics *works* on a conceptual level. Religion *works* as part of the dynamic of socio-historic developments.
[rhinoceros 4]
Isn't it clear what I mean?
[rhinoceros 3]
I would dare to add some marxist overtones from historical materialism, to the effect that science has also an immediate relation with the sociopolitical conditions and the technology of its time, although I may be accused of being a teleologist because I used the word "marxist".
[Walpurgis 4]
I don-t see non-theistic teleology as a great sin. I do see theories based on Hegel-s philosophy as problematic.
[rhinoceros 4]
I had no intention to defend any form of teleology. I hope that some time soom I will find the time to post something on the Popper vs Hegel issue, which I thing has been misunderstood and makes me appear as holding mutually contradictory views.
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David Lucifer
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Enlighten me.
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Re:holism
« Reply #18 on: 2002-06-16 23:13:22 » |
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[Walpurgis] I understand that no *useful* information passes between entangled quanta due to indeterminacy (that is: any signals are random). This doesn't rule out the possibility of somehow manipulating spin to pass communicative info. however...
[Lucifer] I recall reading that the spin is a property of the particle and cannot be manipulated. I can try to find a source if you want.
[Walpurgis] <big snip>
If the universe is a seamlessly interactive system that evolves to higher levels of complexity, and if the lawful regularities of this universe are emergent properties of the system, we can assume that the cosmos is a single significant whole that evinces progressive order in complementary relation to its parts. Give that this whole exists in some sense within all parts (quanta), one can then argue it operates in self-reflective fashion and is the ground for all emergent complexity. Since human consciousness evinces self-awareness in the human brain and since this brain (like all physical phenomenon) can be viewed as an emergent property of the whole, it is not unreasonable to philosophical conclude that the universe is conscious.
[Lucifer] I cannot claim to understand your explanation of wholeness, but using your reasoning would you say that any quality ascribed to part of the universe is also a property of the universe? If parts of the universe are conscious (namely humans), then you say it is reasonable to conclude that the universe is conscious. Does the same go for parts that are wet, luminous, small and/or furry?
[Walpurgis] This position lends no support to conceptions of design, meaning, purpose, plan, or intent associated with our cultural mytho-religious heritage. There is also nothing in the scientific description of nature that can refute this position. It is also not possible to argue that holism (so often dismissed as a religious experience) can be undermined or invalidated with appeals to science. However, you are free to dismiss my philosophical speculations as just that. However, there is a firm conclusion - there is no basis in science for Cartesian dualism as sanctioned by classical physics. This is a macro-level illusion fostered by limited awareness of physical reality and by mathematical idealisations extended beyond the realm of their applicability.
[Lucifer] I thought Cartesian dualism referred to a separation between mind and body. I don't see how classical physics would sanction that and, as far as I know, no one here would advocate that position.
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Walpurgis
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #19 on: 2002-06-17 07:33:28 » |
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[rhinoceros 4]
In the same way, couldn't we say that a chair or a car can only be understood by combining the quantum level with the high level, where a chair is something to sit on? Talking about a chair is only meaningful at a high level. So is talking about mind or consciousness.
[Walpurgis 5] Right.
[rhinoceros 4]
The second issue is the use of the terms local and non-local. In everyday conversation, locality means that something is confined within a defined space, or even that something can be identified as a separate entity. In quantum physics, locality means that something is confined within a distance which light can travel within the time between two related events. Sometimes, these two meanings of locality are carelessly confused.
[Walpurgis 5] Well spotted, thanks. From now on I’ll refer to locality and QTlocality.
[rhinoceros 4]
Agreed that consciousness is an emergent property of a whole from the sum parts, and that consciousness emerges as more than the sum. But then, how can you say "if you broke a body down, it would be conscious, consciousness would not be *found*"? Isn't consciousness an emergent property of a whole?
[Walpurgis 5] A typo. I meant "if you broke a body down, it would NOT be conscious, consciousness would not be *found*"? There is no (or little) consciousness in body parts outside the whole (except in the sense that consciousness is also everywhere).
[rhinoceros 4] Mind and matter are one? Why should an emergent property of something be one with that something.
[Walpurgis 5] I’ve given you my arguments against dualism in previous posts.
[rhinoceros 4] The universe itself can be said to be conscious? By what definition of consciousness?
[Walpurgis 5] If the universe is a seamlessly interactive system that evolves to higher levels of complexity, and if the lawful regularities of this universe are emergent properties of the system, we can assume that the cosmos is a single significant whole that evinces progressive order in complementary relation to its parts. Give that this whole exists in some sense within all parts (quanta), one can then argue it operates in self-reflective fashion and is the ground for all emergent complexity. Since human consciousness evinces self-awareness in the human brain and since this brain (like all physical phenomenon) can be viewed as an emergent property of the whole, it is not unreasonable to philosophical conclude that the universe is conscious.
[rhinoceros 4] Illusion of conscious locality? I assume that by "locality" here you mean identifying oneself as a separate entity, and by "illusion" you mean a false perception.
[Walpurgis 5] Yes, non QT locality.
Not a false perception, but a limited one.
[rhinoceros 4]
Yes, I like speculation too, and I think speculating is useful.
[Walpurgis 5] Hey! you’re talking to the right person then! *L*
[rhinoceros 4] I don't know much about that. Has anyone ever tried to find and destroy the parts of the *brain* where memories about the body and the surroundings of oneself reside?
[Walpurgis 5] I don’t know. That’d be interesting... I’m not sure such parts exist. I think you’d have to destroy a lot of brain to do this. *Parts* of the brain are often very closely interconnected, especially ones dealing with perception. The parts of the brain dealing with sight a lone travel all the way from the front, through them middle and to the back....
check out "http://www.walpurg.iwarp.com/FT.html" for scans of these pages. (this is the fixed link)
[rhinoceros 4]
The link didn't work, so I cannot comment on this evidence. One thing I can say is that an out-of-body experience where someone could recollect objects on the roof would imply that our sensory organs are irrelevant.
[Walpurgis 5] True. So, how did the person *see*? *Where* was *he*?
[rhinoceros 4]
Also, in the phrase "These experiences hint at the non-locality of consciousness", non-locality seems to mean "at different places" and is different from the non-locality of quantum physics.
[Walpurgis 5] Correct. I need to be clearer on that. But you’re keeping up with the ambiguity. However, I think there is a relationship between QTnon/locality and non/locality in the prosaic sense. What do you think?
[rhinoceros 4]
Sure, we cannot exlude any of this. But you realize that this is speculation. About the Gaia hypothesis... well, I have read Asimovs "Foundation" series.
[Walpurgis 5] Oh yeah, like I said, I’m just speculating now. With regards to Gaia, I was referring to Lovelock & Margulis theory, not Asimov (who I have never read). Check out
http://www.magna.com.au/~prfbrown/gaia.html
[rhinoceros 4]
Check again Aspect's experiment. The source was consisted of atoms in an excited state, each one emitting pairs of photons with exactly oposite polarities, in rapid succession. This is what made the photons of each pair entangled. You can't affect a particle's state by affecting just any other particle.
[Walpurgis 5] You*re quite right. However, the results of the Aspect and Gisin experiments *infer* wholeness in the sense that they show that the conditions for these experiments constitute an unanalysable and undissectible whole, although the abstract theory that helps us coordinate these results cannot in principle disclose the wholeness.
The Bohr/Bell/Aspect theory I*ve espoused can only deal in complimentary aspects of the complete reality disclosed in the act of measurement, that reality is not itself, in fact or in principle, disclosed.
My talk of holism is speculation based on these findings. But speculation is not guess-work, it is based on some very solid observations, as I*ve illustrated.
[Walpurgis 4] *The first place* is an interesting phrase. If space is non-local, then so is time. There is no *first place* really. Non-local space/time explains everything as a zen-like single moment. The results of experiments like those baring out Wheeler-s predictions in the labs of Munich and Maryland (the delayed-choice experiments) illustrate that the observer and observed are not distinct and separate in space or time. These experiments seem to show that we cause something *after* is happened. The past is inexorably mixed with the present and time is tied to specific experimental choices.
[rhinoceros 4]
We can't say space is non-local. There are just some non-local effects involving quantum particles, i.e. faster-than-light effects. And this does not make all space a singular point.
Time is affected in a different way. These effects seem to violate special relativity and permit the effect to happen before the cause. Still, the rational view is retained because, although the "effect" seems to happen before the "cause" in these experiments, we can know this fact only after the "cause". Besides, this is not a matter of observers but a matter of relativistic frames of reference.
We already knew from special relativity that the flow of time was dependent on the chosen frame of reference. Of course, this reversal of time in quantum experiments involving a pair of entangled particles is a very serious issue to consider, but it does not mean that all time is the same or anything like that.
[Walpurgis 5] Your remarks are fair and pertinent.
[rhinoceros 4]
Not a "deterministic" causality and not my invention. Still, there were some "heretic" attempts for a deterministic causality, mostly by David Bohm. Bohm was the first to develop an explicitly non-local formalism for quantum mechanics, even before Aspect's experiment, and his formalism (unlike the standard one) was also able to explain macroscopic locality.
Oh, I just found something very interesting: David Bohm, who advocated deterministic (although non-local) quantum mechanics, also proposed something similar to what you describe, based on the idea that every quantum particle carries a real quantum field (this was his interpretation instead of the wave-particle duality), and that this quantum field carries "active information" which makes it similar to the mind.
"A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter"
"http://members.aol.com/Mszlazak/BOHM.html"
But it looks like a weak case.
[Walpurgis 5] Thanks for the link! Why do you think the case is weak? I*m a little familiar with the his (and de Broglie*s) pilot-wave theory, but as a scientific theory, it isn*t experimentally verifiable....
I*m at once sympathetic and suspicious of Bohm. I appreciate his understanding of the universe as whole, but the things he says (*all moments are one*) about this sounds like Eastern ontological monism. But orthodox QT disallows any ontology at all. There are *implications* that the universe it whole, but physics can say nothing about its actual character.... Still, his assertions are similar to my own speculations....
[Walpurgis 4]
Neither do I. But what do you mean by *worked*? for me, metaphysics *works* on a conceptual level. Religion *works* as part of the dynamic of socio-historic developments.
[rhinoceros 4]
Isn't it clear what I mean?
[Walpurgis 5] Not really. Are you referring to personal faith?
[Walpurgis 4]
I don-t see non-theistic teleology as a great sin. I do see theories based on Hegel-s philosophy as problematic.
[rhinoceros 4]
I had no intention to defend any form of teleology. I hope that some time soom I will find the time to post something on the Popper vs Hegel issue, which I thing has been misunderstood and makes me appear as holding mutually contradictory views.
[Walpurgis 5] Please do! Sounds like it could be very interesting.
[Walpurgis1] I understand that no *useful* information passes between entangled quanta due to indeterminacy (that is: any signals are random). This doesn't rule out the possibility of somehow manipulating spin to pass communicative info. however...
[Lucifer] I recall reading that the spin is a property of the particle and cannot be manipulated. I can try to find a source if you want.
[Walpurgis2] No argument. I wasn’t just wondering if *one day* we might find a way of manipulating spin. If we could, it would make communication across the stars easier than shouting across the street.....
[Lucifer] I cannot claim to understand your explanation of wholeness, but using your reasoning would you say that any quality ascribed to part of the universe is also a property of the universe? If parts of the universe are conscious (namely humans), then you say it is reasonable to conclude that the universe is conscious. Does the same go for parts that are wet, luminous, small and/or furry?
[Walpurgis] In a sense, yes. As we are part of the universe, then our consciousness is the universe*s consciousness also.
[Lucifer] I thought Cartesian dualism referred to a separation between mind and body. I don't see how classical physics would sanction that and, as far as I know, no one here would advocate that position.
[Walpurgis] Cartesian dualism is the epistemological basis for the correspondence theory of truth to which physics ascribes. The result of the influence of classical physics on later thinking was that we still believe that the real is geometrical and subject to rigorous determination and measurement. Modern physics affirms this epistemology, though unwittingly, by understanding external reality as consisting of deterministic laws and atomised parts which constitute wholes. Many physicists also believe that truth is correspondence between theory and reality. Of course people are more likely to assume a correspondence between language and reality or theory and reality. Nietzsche noticed this when he said “We still believe in God because we have not gotten rid of grammar”. This assumption of correspondence is the reason is why its taken us to long to overcome this assumption.
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Kharin
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In heaven all the interesting people are missing.
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #20 on: 2002-06-18 09:33:12 » |
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Quote:| Perhaps you and other readers think this picky, but I object to androcentric language because it obscures over 50% of our species. Historically, it is a part of the dynamic of oppression. |
Having argued the converse on this forum in the past, it may be interesting to show the other side of the coin...
History is not necessarily pertinent. The etymology of language has only limited applicability as far as contemporary hermeneutics is concerned. While it is certainly true to say that language incorporates historical biases and prejudices that is far from ensuring that these prejudices are instantiated through language in contemporary mores (to make that connection one would have to accept such hypotheses as those of Sapir and Lee Whorf, which are very far from being proven). In this context, the question is not one of etymology but of usage; was the usage (and interpretation) of 'men' and 'mankind' done in a gender-specific manner? On the whole I would submit that this is unlikely.
Incidentally, as a footnote on issues of sexual politics and language, the issue of the nineteenth century use of the word 'gay' may not be inappropriate here.
Quote:| (Note: this is not a "politically correct" lecture, nor is it necessarily a comment on your own politics; it is more an observation on the cultural limitations/bigotry of our language. |
Forgive me for being blunt, but this is precisely a policitically correct lecture. That is not necessarily wrong but it seems somewhat excessively timorous to fail to apply the correct label. Assertions of this kind depend on (a) an assumption regarding the bias being inappropriate and (b) deliberate reformulation being the most suitable means to address that bias. Without those two assumptions the comments do not apply, which does mean that the comment is not exactly a neutral observation.
Quote:| today, many mailing lists.disussion boards/newsgroups use gender neutral terms like "sie" or "s/he" or "humans"). |
The problem with such clumsy reformulations is that they suffer from the same problems encountered by artificial languages like Esperanto (i.e. widespread usage is predicated on a consensus of opinion which does not exist, leaving them unlikely to win popular support). A term that can only be used in written form is a particular example.
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Kharin
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #21 on: 2002-06-18 11:54:56 » |
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Some general comments (since the debate has been too protracted for a point by point approach). With regard to Hermit's definition of truth as an emergent quality of shared models which effectively reflect external, shared realities, I suspect that the definition is probably rather more satisfying than you might think.
As appended to this post, the definition of truth that Hermit was alluding to is one based on Karl Popper's [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/] theories (Popper was a vigorous opponenent of totalitarianism and therefore had little in common with Foucault). Popper accepted Hume's critique of induction (i.e. that experimental proof is not valid since the possibility remains that another result may be obtained and that this possibility remains no matter how often an experiment may be repeated). As you yourself have indicated all such proof offers is a notion of probability, not truth. Instead, Popper substitutes falsification for verification, in which case truth assumes a provisional character:
http://virus.lucifer.com/bbs/index.php?board=15;action=display;threadid=11515
Quote:Gödelian incompleteness and Popperian falsifiability together necessitate that outside of a formal system of limited application, a "truth", to have any measure of rational support, must by necessity, always be provisional, incomplete and falsifiable, in other words, there must always, at least hypothetically, exist some evidence which would permit that supposed truth to be rejected.
This implies that outside of formal systems, the truth of a thing is not an absolute, but encompasses a range of probabilities which will have varying truth values (i.e. from "false" through "insufficient evidence to adduce a truth value" to "true") depending on the evidence for or against such a thing. |
While I would describe myself as an admirer of Derrida (though not of Lacan or Barthes), I think there is a need to be careful at this point. The concept that language is a system of differences does not necessarily undermine the notion of the distinction between presences and absences (i.e. a referential component), since, as John Searle put it:
Quote:| I understand the differences between the two sentences 'the cat is on the mat' and 'the dog is on the mat' in precisely the way I do because the word 'cat' is present in the first while absent in the second, and the word 'dog' is present in the second, while absent from the first ... the system of differences is precisely a system of presences and absences. |
With that in mind, I would prefer to cite Gadamer rather than Lacan i.e. the interplay (or jouissance if you like) of interpretations take place within the context of a certain 'fusion of horizons.' One of the advantages of such a model is that it allows room for such notions as Tarski's idea of meta-language since it grants the reader a role rather than assuming language to be some form of monolithic entity.
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David Lucifer
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #22 on: 2002-06-19 14:15:04 » |
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[Lucifer1] I cannot claim to understand your explanation of wholeness, but using your reasoning would you say that any quality ascribed to part of the universe is also a property of the universe? If parts of the universe are conscious (namely humans), then you say it is reasonable to conclude that the universe is conscious. Does the same go for parts that are wet, luminous, small and/or furry?
[Walpurgis2] In a sense, yes. As we are part of the universe, then our consciousness is the universe*s consciousness also.
[Lucifer3] In the same sense, I must have a very low IQ because my fingernail is not very intelligent. Perhaps ipso facto I do not find this "sense" very useful.
[Lucifer1] I thought Cartesian dualism referred to a separation between mind and body. I don't see how classical physics would sanction that and, as far as I know, no one here would advocate that position.
[Walpurgis2] Cartesian dualism is the epistemological basis for the correspondence theory of truth to which physics ascribes.
[Lucifer3] Are you suggesting there is no correspondence between physics theory and intersubjective reality?
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Walpurgis
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #23 on: 2002-06-20 04:35:12 » |
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[kharin] In this context, the question is not one of etymology but of usage; was the usage (and interpretation) of 'men' and 'mankind' done in a gender-specific manner? On the whole I would submit that this is unlikely.
[Walpurgis] These words *men*, *man* or *mankind* have been defined by our liberal tradition as *gender blind*. This means that these words supposedly represent all people, with no other recognition of their particular identity other than a universal and abstract citizenship. But this is in fact historically equated with the masculine. (see Ann Phillips - *Which Equalities Matter?*, p23). This notion of neutrality is based on the idea that all must be treated the same as all are equally the same, but this is a form of assimilation that imposes dominant values and norms on oppressed groups. (Phillips - *ibid*., p25).
“Founded by men, the modern state and its public realm of citizenship paraded as universal values and norms which were derived from specifically masculine experience. (Young - *Polity and Group Difference* in Ethics, Vol. 99, p253). Words which are *gender blind* ignore the specific identities and issues associated with women. It does not equalise, but simply ignores because equality has been conceived as sameness. (Young - *Polity and Group Difference* in Ethics, Vol. 99, p250. *Men* is always gender specific - claims to neutrality are false.
Even if you disagree that *men/etc.* are not historically equated with the masculine, despite the claim to neutrality, is it still not worth incorporating the female noun *woman/etc* into speech/writing so as to emphasise the need for equality of gender recognition? Using *s/he* or *wo/man* is a political act which promotes gender parity.
[kharin] Incidentally, as a footnote on issues of sexual politics and language, the issue of the nineteenth century use of the word 'gay' may not be inappropriate here.
[Walpurgis] I think the appropriation of *gay* by homosexuals is a politically defensible move. It is good PR and a good psychological tool, for an oppressed minority to label itself with a positive word.
Similarly, it is a good move for sexual non-conformists to re-appropriate *queer* (a slur used against non-conformists) which now has positive connotations: it is good to be weird. Similarly for *nigger* by blacks.
[kharin] Forgive me for being blunt, but this is precisely a policitically correct lecture.
[Walpurgis] No. *Political correctness* was a US left-wing ideology which was against certain kinds of speech. What I said should be labelled *feminist* rather than PC. I am pro-free speech (which include criticising others free speech!).
[kharin] The problem with such clumsy reformulations is that they suffer from the same problems encountered by artificial languages
[Walpurgis] What is so clumsy about *humans* and *s/he*? The former is a common word and meaning of the latter is self-evident. You are making an aesthetic evaluation, which is fair enough.
[kharin] Some general comments (since the debate has been too protracted for a point by point approach). With regard to Hermit's definition of truth as an emergent quality of shared models which effectively reflect external, shared realities, I suspect that the definition is probably rather more satisfying than you might think.
[Walpurgis] I get stuck at the word *reflect*. Any theory which proposes correspondence between itself and reality is problematic for the reasons I-ve been elucidating. Theory doesn-t need to correspond, but simply to work in practice.
[kharin] As appended to this post, the definition of truth that Hermit was alluding to is one based on Karl Popper's [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/] theories (Popper was a vigorous opponenent of totalitarianism and therefore had little in common with Foucault).
[Walpurgis] Huh? Foucault was anti-authoritarian in the extreme, some have described him as a neo-anarchist. I*m not sure how this squares with your remark.
[kharin] Popper accepted Hume's critique of induction (i.e. that experimental proof is not valid since the possibility remains that another result may be obtained and that this possibility remains no matter how often an experiment may be repeated).
[Walpurgis] Yes, I*ve read a lot of Hume. He-s one of my favourite philosophers. I*d recommend his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* any day. Not only is it entertaining, and easy to read (like a play) but it uses the philosophical method I believe is the most efficient (dialogues between persons - it-s why I-m here) and it is beautifully written:
*Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!*
[kharin] As you yourself have indicated all such proof offers is a notion of probability, not truth. Instead, Popper substitutes falsification for verification, in which case truth assumes a provisional character:
[Walpurgis] Yes, I like this idea too. Falsification can get a grip where positive proof is beyond us. The difference between science and non-science seems to be which scientific theories make testable predictions and are given up when they fail... The more I speak to you all about Popper, the more I want to read in depth. I-ve done a little online and have noticed a few problems:
Must scientists always reject their theories when faced with counter-evidence as Popper says?
If the most we can do in science is disprove theories, how do we know which theories to believe and act on?
Popper says we should act on the theories that have survived the most severe testing, but how different is this from *induction* which he rejects?
His political philosophy seems more attractive.
[kharin] While I would describe myself as an admirer of Derrida (though not of Lacan or Barthes), I think there is a need to be careful at this point.
[Walpurgis] Yeah, really. A girlfriend of mine went crazy over trying to get to grips with Derrida - it is all she read for a whole term, and she was urged by staff to leave Derrida alone. *L*
[kharin] The concept that language is a system of differences does not necessarily undermine the notion of the distinction between presences and absences (i.e. a referential component), since, as John Searle put it: (snip)
With that in mind, I would prefer to cite Gadamer rather than Lacan i.e. the interplay (or jouissance if you like) of interpretations take place within the context of a certain 'fusion of horizons.'
[Walpurgis] I-m not familiar enough with Gadamer, to comment. I-m only aware of his role as the main proponent of hermeneutics. If by *horizon* you are referring to Merleau-Ponty-s phenomenological theory of perception which is set in a cultural tradition, then I would agree with (Gadamer?) that interpretation necessitates empathy with other cultural horizons (be they past or present cultures). What I do remember and appreciate of my readings of Gadamer is that he promotes reflection on our own cultural horizon (when dealing with historical texts), the assumptions on which our own perceptions are based. To me, hermeneutics has always seemed to be a strange spiral.... Something more I must explore!
[kharin] One of the advantages of such a model is that it allows room for such notions as Tarski's idea of meta-language since it grants the reader a role rather than assuming language to be some form of monolithic entity.
[Walpurgis] Tarski*s theory of truth has always eluded me, though I appreciate that there must be some meta-language in the sense that we must have some sort of neurological foundation for grammar (I*m not making a Chomskian argument here though, I believe Chomsky ignores the role of evolution - symbolic as well as biological evolution. I*m in agreement with Terrance Deacon regarding the ad hoc nature of Chomsky*s *deep structure*. The co-evolution of brains and grammar/syntax are more likely than a sudden emergence because the brain got a bit larger).
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Walpurgis
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #24 on: 2002-06-20 04:40:40 » |
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[Walpurgis2] In a sense, yes. As we are part of the universe, then our consciousness is the universe*s consciousness also.
[Lucifer3] In the same sense, I must have a very low IQ because my fingernail is not very intelligent. Perhaps ipso facto I do not find this "sense" very useful.
[Walpurgis3] Useful? No. The concept has no implications for everyday living. If it did, I wouldn't need to state it - it would be obvious.
[Walpurgis2] Cartesian dualism is the epistemological basis for the correspondence theory of truth to which physics ascribes.
[Lucifer3] Are you suggesting there is no correspondence between physics theory and intersubjective reality?
[Walpurgis3] I'm suggesting that "truth" does not refer to any metaphysical or a priori state. Phyiscal theory does not refer to anything ontological - QT does not allow an ontology. Ontology is a matter of philosophical/religious speculation.
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Kharin
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #25 on: 2002-06-20 09:11:47 » |
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Quote:| This notion of neutrality is based on the idea that all must be treated the same as all are equally the same, but this is a form of assimilation that imposes dominant values and norms on oppressed groups... Words which are *gender blind* ignore the specific identities and issues associated with women. |
In the first place, I think it is probably unwise to speak of gender as entailing a separate set of values, norms, identities and so on, since the only basis for such norms would have to be biological rather than cultural, in which case we are back to those nineteenth century ideologies referred to elsewhere. In fact, that has always been the problem with this particular strain of feminism (and a strain it is, and a comparatively minor one) i.e. it essentially recapitulates the most sexist ideologies of the right; the nineteenth century viewed women to a very large extent as rarified creatures of benevolence. Subsequently, twentieth century feminists developed a critique of society based on male aggression, and following Marcuse, saw women as a force for changing society. Of course, this also sahred quote a lot of common ground with the nineteenth century view of women...
That said, the leftist preference for balkanisation in favour to assimilation has always left me somewhat underwhelmed.
Quote:| *Men* is always gender specific - claims to neutrality are false. |
Then please demonstrate it to be so. The bulk of your argument above has been concerning etymology rather than usage. You cannot simply leap from 'historically equated' to 'is always.' There is no necessary connection between the two.
Quote:| Even if you disagree that *men/etc.* are not historically equated with the masculine, despite the claim to neutrality, |
No. I did not at any point claim that there were not historical biases in language (quite the contrary as I recall), I merely observed that language use and meaning has changed to posit gender-neutral meanings. It was precisely my point that etymology is splendidly irrelevant as far as meaning is concerned. Given that it was the likes of Saussure who broke with the nineteenth century view that language is largely defined by past meaning and instead (as with Derrida) posited an endless present of differance, it has never been clear to me why it is that people who cleave to the Derridean view of language in all other matters, seem so obsessed with arguments regarding the etymology of gender terms, which are supposedly locked into historical meanings that are set in stone and immune from differance.
Quote:| is it still not worth incorporating the female noun *woman/etc* into speech/writing so as to emphasise the need for equality of gender recognition? Using *s/he* or *wo/man* is a political act which promotes gender parity. |
Given that I do not accept that Foucauldean connection netween discourse and power I see no worth in such an exercise as anything other than a stunt. The evidence of sociolinguistics suggests that language evolves and adapts to meet the needs of its users (most of whom in my experience refute the view that their use of language is sexist and are usually offended at being patronised in that manner); social change leads to language change, not vice versa.
Quote:| No. *Political correctness* was a US left-wing ideology which was against certain kinds of speech. What I said should be labelled *feminist* rather than PC. I am pro-free speech (which include criticising others free speech!). |
Yes. In the first place, feminism tended to be a intrinsic component of the left-wing ideology that you allude to. In the second place, PC is a very fluid term indeed (I often think of how I've heard people refer to works they consider subversive or shocking as being 'non-PC' by which they mean opposed to perceived right-wing political norms - as a word it means very little), and in the third place it does seem to me that there is an implict censorship in your argument; that is you wish to revise language, and therefore to revise meaning. The grounds of your revision could after all be contested from a number of positions including that of feminism itself; since many feminists reject the notion you appear to be advocating of women as a form of separate identity and regard that as a source of oppression.
I would remind you that this thread emerged when you not only criticised someone else's speech but sought to promulgate a change in their use of language. I'm afraid my view remains that as soon as we seek to control and manipulate language (which is after all a model derived from the marxist model of state control generally) we are into the realm of the Orwellian (or Foucauldean) notion of doublespeak, no matter how laudable the aims may be.
Quote:| I think the appropriation of *gay* by homosexuals is a politically defensible move. It is good PR and a good psychological tool, for an oppressed minority to label itself with a positive word. |
It would be if they had done so. However, the original etymology of 'gay' was that it referred to frivolity, immorality and promisicuity (a great irony I feel). There's a famous nineteenth century engraving of two women (one of whom is obviously a prostitute) the one approaching the other and observing 'Oh no Fanny! You haven't gone gay?'
Quote:| Similarly, it is a good move for sexual non-conformists to re-appropriate *queer* (a slur used against non-conformists) which now has positive connotations: it is good to be weird. Similarly for *nigger* by blacks. |
I fear I cannot agree. In the first place, the term 'queer' is not used by the majority by the majority of gays and lesbians who do not wish to reinforce their exclusion from society by establishing themselves as a group apart when they do not regard themselves as such and had actually been striving to break down the barriers to social inclusion (alienation, to use the Marxist term, is not something that a majority of people are ever going to willingly accept). What is the point of arguing in favour of equality, if (to cite a notorious example) you are not prepared to support employment rights regarding the military - as certain groups were not prepared to.
As such, there is far from being any consensus regarding the use of those terms, which again points to what I was referring to concerning the rather poor success rate of linguistic interventionism. I recall a very pertinent example from University when the student rag carried a piece headlined' queers hound christian activist.' A somewhat homophobic title certainly, but the LBG association had effectively denuded themselves of any arguments to counter it. They wrote a peevish letter to the paper accusing them of 'violating thr words we have sought to empower out communities with' leaving out the fact that if the meaning of a word can be contested by one group, then it can be restored to the original meaning by another (though as I say, I am less than sure that branding oneself as an outcast is a contested meaning).
Incidentally, your description of 'queer' is inaccurate. The term was a very specific slur and not one ever applied to'non-confromists' until it was 're-purposed.' Its subsequent dilution achieved nothing other than to erroneously yoke the interests of a number of groups together.
Quote:| What is so clumsy about *humans* and *s/he*? The former is a common word and meaning of the latter is self-evident. You are making an aesthetic evaluation, which is fair enough. |
Not quite: a term that can only be used in written form is crude and clumsy and is not likely to gain mass acceptance, not to mention the fact that the term is best described as being 'agrammatical.' As for human, it is indeed common; common in bad sci-fi films. I was also making a political evaluation though and artificial intervention tends to be problematic unless it can attain a widespread consensus. Frankly, if feminism were capable of doing so, it would have by now. Changes in language use typically occur very quickly;
Quote:| I get stuck at the word *reflect*. Any theory which proposes correspondence between itself and reality is problematic for the reasons I-ve been elucidating. |
And for the reasons I've elucidated I do not regard it as being problematic at all (I do regard Derrida's infated claims as problematic; the fact that a word and a thing are not identical has been known since Plato and is nothing much to fuss over for pecisely the reaons I cited Searle on). Moreover, if you deny that language changes to reflect the needs of its users I would suggest that you are denying a preponderance of evidence from sociolinguistics and that you would have to find another means of explaning why much language usage and change appears to correlate very closely with social status and peer group.
Quote:| Huh? Foucault was anti-authoritarian in the extreme, some have described him as a neo-anarchist. I*m not sure how this squares with your remark. |
Very well; most extremist ideologies tend to join up at some point with their diammetrical opposite in rejection of the centre-ground and Foucault was no exception to that (given that he stated that he saw no difference between Truman and Stalin and endorsed Maoism and Ayatollah Khomeini). But by and large the reason for the remark is what is elided in Foucault and what is elided is any proper means of stepping outside the discourse of power in his work, since to seek to resist power is a act of power in itself (hence the disagreement with Chomsky who described Foucault as the most amoral man he had met). Accordingly, when André Glucksmann spoke of the "the fascism within us all," Foucault agreed. Since Foucault saw the construction of the self as a function of power the only solution is the disappearance of the self; but I'm afraid that behind this I can only see Foucault's own quest (and I make no apologies for citing the author function) for oblivion of the self at the hands of sexual masochism and the dynamics of power itself.
More generally, since he posited power as the dominant social force, the only notion of liberation in his writings is the distinction between the use of power through discourse, regarding what Slavoj Zizek would call 'the good terror.' If I may quote Zizek on this point:
Quote:The starting point of my book on the subject is that almost all philosophical orientations today, even if they strongly oppose each other, agree on some kind of basic anti-subjectivist stance. For example, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida would both agree that the Cartesian subject had to be deconstructed, or, in the case of Habermas, embedded in a larger inter-subjective dialectics. Cognitivists, Hegelians - everybody is in agreement here.
I am tempted to say that we must return to the subject - though not a purely rational Cartesian one. My idea is that the subject is inherently political, in the sense that 'subject', to me, denotes a piece of freedom - where you are no longer rooted in some firm substance, you are in an open situation. |
I think this points a clear path; beyond the notion that 'subject' and 'subjection' are contingent. Without the individual self as a point of resistance totalitarianism is inveitable (for instance, in Koestler's Darkness at Noon, the notion that the needs of the individual must be subordinated to the comon good leads inexorably to the oppression of the individual).
Incidentally, given the importance of feminism to you, I would recommend reading 'The Burning Library' by Edmund White, which has a revealing essay on Foucault's attitude to women, which would seem to have been very similar to that of William Burroughs.
Quote:| Must scientists always reject their theories when faced with counter-evidence as Popper says? |
Certainly.
Quote:| Popper says we should act on the theories that have survived the most severe testing, but how different is this from *induction* which he rejects? |
In practice, induction remains a useful procedure; it is more a question of shifting the goal posts.
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David Lucifer
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #26 on: 2002-06-20 15:23:25 » |
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[Walpurgis3] I'm suggesting that "truth" does not refer to any metaphysical or a priori state. Phyiscal theory does not refer to anything ontological - QT does not allow an ontology. Ontology is a matter of philosophical/religious speculation.
[Lucifer4] I'm still not sure I understand. Are you saying that physical entities like "molecule", "planet", "organism" are nothing more than arbitrary language constructs? Do the words not correspond to real patterns outside of human culture?
What is QT? Quantum Theology? 
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Walpurgis
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #27 on: 2002-06-21 06:44:15 » |
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[kharin] In the first place, I think it is probably unwise to speak of gender as entailing a separate set of values, norms, identities and so on, since the only basis for such norms would have to be biological rather than cultural, in which case we are back to those nineteenth century ideologies referred to elsewhere.
[Walpurgis] I disagree. Gender can and does entail a separate set of values etc. and the basis can clearly be cultural (thus avoiding the thoughtful criticisms you aim at this position). This is due to how one can understand social groups. Iris Young provides a clear understanding of what constitutes a group and of what types of group there are. The first is an interest group which is an association of persons striving for the same ends. The second is a social group, these people share a way of life and practices and some interests. The third is an ideological group, a group who have shared political beliefs. These groups can overlap and some can foster others. (Squires quoting Young in - *Quotas for Women: Fair Representation?* in Parliamentary Affairs Vol 49, #1, p78). Women can and do belong to any or all of these groups. The problem lies primarily with the multifaceted reality of women*s identity. Like any person*s identity, a woman*s identity is more than her gender. Here lies the basic distinction between aggregate groups and association groups. The former is a matter of classification according to an attribute. Biological sex is an attribute, and typically women are socialised into their gender role as a result. The latter is where people voluntarily come together as typified by social groups. Young - p259
There are two distinct problems associated with understanding the identity of women *as a group* that can be drawn from this complexity. The first is the problem of group essentialism (a problem you have isolated from a biological PoV). The second is the problem of women*s identity under patriarchal oppression. Anne Phillips outlines the charge of essentialism against the notion of a group. Defining women as a group sediments their identities and exaggerates ascribed characteristics leading to an obscuring of the differences between the individual women within the group *women*, resulting in a false homogeneity just as oppressive as the wider society.
However Phillips also points out that this charge is invalid. There is a difference between the group and its members, which can and must be emphasised to overcome this difficulty. Therefore it is not the group that is being represented, but the group members. (Phillips - Which Equalities Matter?, p38-41). This is achieved by reflecting the diversity of *subject positions* (or differences) within the structure of the group. Since no list of differences can be complete, particularly because identities are always changing, this diversity can only be learnt through trial and error allowed by group autonomy. (Phillips - *Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas or a Politics of Presence?* in Benhabib, S (ed). Democracy and Difference, p145-146). A group is thus understood in relational terms between its members, rather than in terms of common attributes. (Young - *Polity and Group Difference* in Ethics, Vol. 99, p260).
The notion of difference is also used as a tool towards solving the second problem of identity. Women*s identity is a central issue in feminist theory, something which must be examined and deconstructed and then re-created outside the prison of subjection; a task that can barely be sketched here. Phillips outlines the problem thus: *The relationship between the sexes is peculiar in one respect, for each sex is defined precisely through its relation to the other... the categorising of people by their physiognomy... only makes sense in relationships of domination and subordination.* (Phillips - Which Equalities Matter?, p95). Phillips is not advocating androgyny or asexuality, but is writing about the false and oppressive enforced homogeneity found in the binary idea that there are *men* and *women*. For Phillips, the first step towards a new identity for women is the recognition of difference between the two gender groups and within these groups. This difference entails differences in values and norms which differentiate the separate identities.
One of the primary differences which affects values/norms between men and women is that women are experiencing domination and oppression within a male-dominated culture. This experience is evident in the political gender gap (amongst many other problems). The gender gap is a lack of interest and identification with mainstream party politics. Squires discusses this as a *positive statement of disillusionment and discontent.* This is because the political agenda is set mainly by men, alienating women from it. (Squires - Gender in Political Theory, p196-197). Indeed, those very women who do gain representative powers do not mark their political careers with their sexual identities because of this sense of diffidence. (Boccia - *The Gender of Representation* in Italian Feminism, p352). The point is not that women are not interested in politics at all, but that they typically organise outside of state structures and are not involved in politics in the way that men are. (Squires - ibid., p197). As a result, they are much less represented in parliament and have less power to make the decisions that men do. (The current number of women MPs is one hundred and twenty out of over six hundred and fifty. See: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/womenmps.htm ). The democratic mechanisms that supposedly allows all of us to be represented as equal individuals are failing for this very reason.
[kharin] That said, the leftist preference for balkanisation in favour to assimilation has always left me somewhat underwhelmed.
[Walpurgis] Balkanisation or even separatism seem to be valid tactics against oppression IMHO - nevertheless, these positions aren*t unproblematic. But neither is assimilation. Like you, the feminist writer Judith Squires considers the Balkanisation problematic for several reasons. It poses a threat to national unity. It detracts from pursuits towards the common good. It is much harder to define a social group than an interest group. It will work to *reify and normalise identities in a manner that might then be used to resubordinate the group in question.* (Squires - Gender in Political Theory, p210). This last objection of essentialism can be fended off using the conclusions above regarding the requirement for a variety of *subject positions*. It is quite evident that men cannot fully empathise with women -thus providing a stumbling block for full assimilation - because empathy only goes so far. *for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate... marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.* (Young - *Polity and Group Difference* in Ethics, Vol. 99, p257). If men could fully empathise with women, they would not be oppressed in the first place. If men can empathise with women*s multiple and various interests and identities to the degree that women do not need to represent themselves, then men can empathise with women*s issues so well that women do not even need to vote, or even think for themselves.
Absurd as this argument is, it is often used by detractors of quotas and affirmative action (discussed below). The following two objections concerning national unity and common good are cleverly disguised forms of conservatism. The terms *unity* and *common* yet again invoke the gender blind lie, where the terms refer to masculine values posing as universal values. In a nation of men where what is commonly though of as good are men*s values, these things need to be challenged. In addition to this, Young calms the fear underlying the objection that oppressed groups will be selfish. There is no contradiction in maintaining group identity and public spiritedness. (Young - ibid., p257-258). Thus the terrifying spectre of Balkanisation fades away. Squires* final objection of definition is a problem of accountability. However, group nebulousness can also be a strength which again fends off the problem of essentialism and resubordination; a group is more open to change and redrawing its strategies if it is not easily pigeonholed and restricted.
Thus, assimilation is not only unnecessary, but a clearly disgusted form of re-appropriation and oppression.
All that said, I consider gender assimilation/balkanisation to be unnecessary binary options - I would rather see a genderless androgynous society.
[Walpurgis] *Men* is always gender specific - claims to neutrality are false.
[kharin] Then please demonstrate it to be so.
[Walpurgis] For example Walby writes: *A phallocentric order... holds that only the heterosexual masculine is fully equivalent with the human and the normal.* in Waldby, C. - AIDS and The Body Politic - Biomedicine and Sexual Difference, p9
The *man* - in word and form - is the norm; and this norm is masculine.
[kharin] The bulk of your argument above has been concerning etymology rather than usage.
Walpurgis] could it be that etymology *is* usage? Perhaps it is the history of use and how words were first used and how that use changed?
[kharin] Given that it was the likes of Saussure who broke with the nineteenth century view that language is largely defined by past meaning and instead (as with Derrida) posited an endless present of differance, it has never been clear to me why it is that people who cleave to the Derridean view of language in all other matters, seem so obsessed with arguments regarding the etymology of gender terms, which are supposedly locked into historical meanings that are set in stone and immune from differance.
[Walpurgis] I*m not sure if you are referring to my view, but I don*t cleave to Derrida. Or Saussure. My views are more in line with Wittgenstein.
[kharin] The evidence of sociolinguistics suggests that language evolves and adapts to meet the needs of its users (most of whom in my experience refute the view that their use of language is sexist and are usually offended at being patronised in that manner);
[Walpurgis] Such observations are not necessarily condescension. I am in no position to patronise anyone on this message board and any reading as such is mistaken. Personally, I am pleased if my unwittingly sexism has been pointed out so I can change it, as I am when any mistake I make is qualified, or if I am given food for thought.
[kharin] social change leads to language change, not vice versa.
[Walpurgis] A believe this is another false dichotomy. Language and society are too intimately connected for one to change the other in such a way. These phenomenon are part of a daily feedback loop. furthermore, the awareness that language supports certain gender ideologies can affect thinking and acting. If no-one ever pointed out linguistic biases, I*m sure oppressed groups would be in a worse position than they are now. If you see the use of gender neutral terms as stunts, then why not use them? What is wrong with such promotion if it illustrates gender inequity (even if - as you claim - said inequity isn*t on a linguistic level?)
[kharin] In the first place, feminism tended to be a intrinsic component of the left-wing ideology that you allude to.
[Walpurgis] Perhaps one kind of feminism - but not *all* feminism.
[kharin] In the second place, PC is a very fluid term indeed (I often think of how I*ve heard people refer to works they consider subversive or shocking as being *non-PC* by which they mean opposed to perceived right-wing political norms - as a word it means very little),
[Walpurgis] and as such seems rather useless.
[kharin] and in the third place it does seem to me that there is an implict censorship in your argument; that is you wish to revise language, and therefore to revise meaning.
[Walpurgis] Is being critical of a form of speech censorship? I am not trying to force users of gender-bias words to stop, neither am I trying to silence them. Rather, I am interested in point out what I believe are sexist errors.
[kharin] The grounds of your revision could after all be contested from a number of positions including that of feminism itself; since many feminists reject the notion you appear to be advocating of women as a form of separate identity and regard that as a source of oppression.
[Walpurgis] Of course. Feminism is not a monolithic movement (thankfully), and I am happy to accept criticism from any PoV. And yes, women can be a form of seperate identity - so long as the other forms of identity (age, race, class etc) that intersect gender are taken into account ( see the *group differences* argument by Phillips above).
[kharin] I would remind you that this thread emerged when you not only criticised someone else*s speech but sought to promulgate a change in their use of language.
[Walpurgis] I make no excuses for trying to change someone*s mind. And it is fine and good for them to try to change mine.
[kharin] However, the original etymology of *gay* was that it referred to frivolity, immorality and promisicuity (a great irony I feel). There*s a famous nineteenth century engraving of two women (one of whom is obviously a prostitute) the one approaching the other and observing *Oh no Fanny! You haven*t gone gay?*
[Walpurgis] *L* I had no idea! Then how did *gay* become appropriated? Was it a way of subverting an insult? In which case, it was still a clever PR move.
[kharin] In the first place, the term *queer* is not used by the majority by the majority of gays and lesbians who do not wish to reinforce their exclusion from society by establishing themselves as a group apart when they do not regard themselves as such and had actually been striving to break down the barriers to social inclusion (alienation, to use the Marxist term, is not something that a majority of people are ever going to willingly accept).
[Walpurgis] Odd. Many of the gay/les., BDSM and TV groups I am aware of accept *queer*, as do the Bi and polyamorous groups I associate with. *Queer* is seen as an umbrella term for sexual non-conformity - similar to *pan-sexual*.
This is not a way of excluding (but so what if it was? given the chance I*d happily bail out of this culture) but a way of *differentiating*. One can argue for equality AND difference (non-conformity). One can want to be identified as *queer* and *equal*.
Do you believe we have to conform to be equal?
[kharin] Its subsequent dilution achieved nothing other than to erroneously yoke the interests of a number of groups together.
[Walpurgis] Erroneous? Perhaps in some cases, but in others, sexual non-conformity is a basic unifier amongst the G/L/TV/BDSM/poly communities.
You might find
http://www.sfc.org.uk/
interesting.
[kharin] a term that can only be used in written form is crude and clumsy and is not likely to gain mass acceptance,
[Walpurgis] A fair point. Pragmatism is key.
Quote:
I get stuck at the word *reflect*. Any theory which proposes correspondence between itself and reality is problematic for the reasons I-ve been elucidating.
And for the reasons I*ve elucidated I do not regard it as being problematic at all (I do regard Derrida*s infated claims as problematic; the fact that a word and a thing are not identical has been known since Plato and is nothing much to fuss over for pecisely the reaons I cited Searle on).
[kharin] Moreover, if you deny that language changes to reflect the needs of its users
[Walpurgis] I have not and do not espouse this view.
[kharin] Very well; most extremist ideologies tend to join up at some point with their diammetrical opposite in rejection of the centre-ground
[Walpurgis] I believe the left/centre/right model is a load of shite frankly. Sure, there is no join up (like less state from the *left* and *right*) but non regarding other issues (the monopolising or spreading of power).
[kharin] and Foucault was no exception to that (given that he stated that he saw no difference between Truman and Stalin and endorsed Maoism and Ayatollah Khomeini).
[Walpurgis] What is your source for this? I*ve never seen him support these people, though I am aware he has some disappointing/repulsive views.
[kharin] But by and large the reason for the remark is what is elided in Foucault and what is elided is any proper means of stepping outside the discourse of power in his work, since to seek to resist power is a act of power in itself (hence the disagreement with Chomsky who described Foucault as the most amoral man he had met).
[Walpurgis] Foucault recognised that the flip side of power was resistance and the field of power in unavoidable (see Foucault – *What is Critique?* p59).... actually I*m not sure what point you are making here.
[kharin] Accordingly, when André Glucksmann spoke of the *the fascism within us all,* Foucault agreed. Since Foucault saw the construction of the self as a function of power the only solution is the disappearance of the self; but I*m afraid that behind this I can only see Foucault*s own quest (and I make no apologies for citing the author function) for oblivion of the self at the hands of sexual masochism and the dynamics of power itself.
[Walpurgis] Interesting autobiographical interpretation.
[kharin] I think this points a clear path; beyond the notion that *subject* and *subjection* are contingent. Without the individual self as a point of resistance totalitarianism is inveitable
[Walpurgis] Yes, this is a recognised problem with Foucault and the Frankfurt school (whose theories of power/self are very similiar). I believe Foucault did provide a good retort to this criticism, and when one takes Deleuze*s views into account, a strong defence can be mustered. If you*re interested, I*ll post my views on this is a more relevant forum in a new thread?
[kharin] Incidentally, given the importance of feminism to you, I would recommend reading *The Burning Library* by Edmund White, which has a revealing essay on Foucault*s attitude to women, which would seem to have been very similar to that of William Burroughs.
[Walpurgis] Thanks for the recommendation. I*m aware of WSB*s misogyny. As he wrote in the 70s *Love is a trap designed by women to ensnare men*. But that same man wrote before his death *love is the greatest painkiller of them all* so perhaps he changed his mind? Again, Foucault also disappoints in this way. Nevertheless, both F and WSB are fascinating writers/thinkers. *Junkie* and *Discipline and Punish* are among my favourites books.
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Kharin
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #28 on: 2002-06-21 11:02:42 » |
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Quote:| I disagree. Gender can and does entail a separate set of values etc. and the basis can clearly be cultural (thus avoiding the thoughtful criticisms you aim at this position). |
I'm not convinced. Cultural difference, must, ultimately be derived from biological difference. There can be no other source. Your argument seems to be that because gender is an attribute, it follows that there is an intrinsic connection between that and its classification and subsequent socialisation. Gender, as with any other signifier is arbitrary and the degree to which differance is perceived is therefore likely to vary.
Quote:| Defining women as a group sediments their identities and exaggerates ascribed characteristics leading to an obscuring of the differences between the individual women within the group *women*, resulting in a false homogeneity just as oppressive as the wider society. |
No. The imposed homogeneity is frequently identical to that of wider society. It is an acceptance of marginalisation.
Quote:| However Phillips also points out that this charge is invalid. |
The correct phrasing is 'Phillips asserts that this charge is valid.' I think we can drop the doublespeak; I am not going to accept an argument on a vagary of phrasing.
Quote:| There is a difference between the group and its members, which can and must be emphasised to overcome this difficulty. Therefore it is not the group that is being represented, but the group members. |
In which case, we have only indviduals and not a group. Groups are defined in sociological terms on the basis of common attributes, not relational terms, no matter what Phillips might wish to be the case.
Quote:| *The relationship between the sexes is peculiar in one respect, for each sex is defined precisely through its relation to the other... the categorising of people by their physiognomy... only makes sense in relationships of domination and subordination.* |
Opposition is simply not intrinsically contingent to the opposed values being hieratic. While I know that Cixous identified it as being such her argument was also that this was a particular flaw for western societies; yet it is the west that has done the most to improve the standing of women, while countries like Japan remain deeply patriachal. I do not regard this as being accidental.
Quote:| This experience is evident in the political gender gap (amongst many other problems). The gender gap is a lack of interest and identification with mainstream party politics. Squires discusses this as a *positive statement of disillusionment and discontent.* This is because the political agenda is set mainly by men, alienating women from it. |
This is simply inaccurate. When the Labour party established the Emily's list system, women fell over themselves to take part in it. The result was that Parliament did attain gender parity, which suggests to me that the problem lay with selection procedures not the relation of women to politics.
Quote:| Indeed, those very women who do gain representative powers do not mark their political careers with their sexual identities because of this sense of diffidence. |
This is a very patronising argument (and not entirely truthful either). Are you really so sure that women do not wish to be defined by their gender identity in public life? When the Lib Dems proposed discrimination for Parliamentary candidates it was women who rejected the notion that their gender defined them, who rejected being made into tokens and who defeated the party motion.
Quote:| This last objection of essentialism can be fended off using the conclusions above regarding the requirement for a variety of *subject positions*. |
As explained above, it cannot outside of the page.
Quote:
More doublespeak! It's not remotely evident.
Quote:| If men could fully empathise with women, they would not be oppressed in the first place. |
On the basis of that argument there is no alternative to oppression since the conditions that produce the discrimination cannot be amended or altered. Again, that is simply accepting the arguments of the conservative right in reverse. Nor would any separate structure be of any practical utility since it's very novelty would leave it unable to compete with existing structures (and because it would be unable to claim broad consent; very few (my estimate, but you must agree that there would be division on this) women have any wish to be perceived as a community in their own right).
Quote:| Thus, assimilation is not only unnecessary, but a clearly disgusted form of re-appropriation and oppression. |
Doublespeak! There's nothing clear about it!
Quote:| The following two objections concerning national unity and common good are cleverly disguised forms of conservatism. |
Ad hominem arguments are another logical fallacy and dismissing an argument on the basis of origins is not helpful. Even the most pluralistic society does depend on having what Gadamer would call a common horizon. It seems to me that what you are proposing would make any such notion impossible.
Quote:| The terms *unity* and *common* yet again invoke the gender blind lie, where the terms refer to masculine values posing as universal values. |
As we have already gone over, terms do not intrinsically refer to anything. There is absolutely no reason why unity and commonality cannot be universal. Historical origins are persiflage, nothing more.
Quote:| the awareness that language supports certain gender ideologies can affect thinking and acting. |
There is no evidence whatsoever for this. The Sapir/Lee Whorf hypothesis has pretty much been completely discredited. The only grounds to assert that language is paramount in this regard are essentially those of a private mythology.
Quote:| If you see the use of gender neutral terms as stunts, then why not use them? |
Precisely because, as Orwell knew, the manipulation of language away from consensus positions leads into very dangerous waters indeed.
Quote:| For example Walby writes: *A phallocentric order... holds that only the heterosexual masculine is fully equivalent with the human and the normal.* in Waldby, C. - AIDS and The Body Politic - Biomedicine and Sexual Difference, p9 The *man* - in word and form - is the norm; and this norm is masculine. |
That doesn't answer the question. Nor does it demonstrate, it asserts and is accordingly worthless. I was asking for evidence as to contemporary linguistic usage not unsubstantiated assertion. Appeal to authority is a logical fallacy as far as debate is concerned.
Quote:| could it be that etymology *is* usage? |
I consider that extremely unlikely. The vast majority of etymology is little more than dead layers of meaning which point to the hermeuntics of the past, not the present. In my view eytmology is now little more than a historical anachronism and should be treated as such.
Quote:| I*m not sure if you are referring to my view, but I don*t cleave to Derrida. Or Saussure. My views are more in line with Wittgenstein. |
Forgive me. As you were alluding to the above previously though, I'm sure you can see how the confusion arose.
Quote:| *L* I had no idea! Then how did *gay* become appropriated? Was it a way of subverting an insult? In which case, it was still a clever PR move. |
No, the meaning had already shifted to mean 'happy, carefree' etc. I doubt if any re-appropriation would have been attempted on a mass scale had that not been the case, and any attempt would certainly have failed in the way that 'queer' already has.
Quote:| Odd. Many of the gay/les., BDSM and TV groups I am aware of accept *queer*, as do the Bi and polyamorous groups I associate with. |
Groups would. Groups, however, are completely beside the point. Most gays and lesbians are not members of said groups and do not wish to be (the likes of Peter Tatchell have always been despised more in the gay community than by the conservative right; largely because he was a liability to the former and an ally to the latter). You are referring to a very marginalised minority. The same applies to the issue of sexual non-comformity amongst what you term 'amongst the G/L/TV/BDSM/poly communities' (though I am less that persauded that such a notion is meaningful)' since in practice those groups have very little involvement with each other. More than a few gay people regards S/M as being morally abhorrent. I don't agree, but I see little reason as to why their sexuality should prevent that view. Incidentally, as a relevant sidenote I came across this today:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/20/books/20BOOK.html
Quote:African-Americans "support their authors and stores, even a book signing by gay black writers," he said. "But younger gays don't. I had a lesbian writer in the store for a signing. She signed books but said she buys the books she reads on the Internet."
For younger gays and lesbians, societal acceptance is a matter of course. Kim Brinster, manager of Oscar Wilde, said: "When I was coming out, it was drilled into us the importance of supporting gay restaurants, gay bars, gay bookstores. But now gays take this all for granted, a byproduct of assimilation." |
A very welcome move away from the ghetto I feel.
Quote:| This is not a way of excluding (but so what if it was? given the chance I*d happily bail out of this culture) |
Unfortunately you don't though, which leaves that a less than helpful observation. In which case, I would still assert that exclusion is not something to strive for.
Quote:| but a way of *differentiating*. One can argue for equality AND difference (non-conformity). |
I don't agree. Equality must be based on some notion of contingency or the term becomes utterly otiose. In practice demands for equality must be based on some notion of what that entails; and that can only be derived from some notion of contingency. A good example if the idea of gay marriage, where the conservative right and radical left have been happily fighting for the same cause for sometime (as they did on the issue of military service) in opposing the idea. If you seek partnerships as an alternative to marriage (the argument runs: the needs of gays are different and they do not wish to be trapped in a heterosexual institution etc etc) they it becomes very difficult to establish parity. How do you know if the partnerships actually deliver equality or whether they have not created a form of insititutionalised discrimination? Different but equal is essentially an impossiblity since it leaves you few means of establishing comparability.
Quote:| Do you believe we have to conform to be equal? |
I don't regard the term 'conformist' as meaning anything. Non-comformism typically seems to manifest itself in terms of group identification (even if the group happens to be a sub-group, identifying as queer is nothing more than conformism to a differing set of norms). It should also be observed the smaller the subgroup the greater the tendency towards conformism.
Quote:| Interesting autobiographical interpretation |
I suspect you could term it the figure in the carpet. I do recall that the Guardian review of his essential works quoted him as speaking of the desire"to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us." Don't have primary source re: maoism, though apparently he'd changed his mind on that by 1975.
Quote:| If you*re interested, I*ll post my views on this is a more relevant forum in a new thread? |
Yes please.
Quote:| But that same man wrote before his death *love is the greatest painkiller of them all* so perhaps he changed his mind? |
That does sound more congruent to what I said concerning his quest for oblivion of the self. As for Burroughs, I always liked Will Self's quote on Burroughs "When people say that I have so much in common with him, I say that he hated women and liked guns and I like women and hate guns.'
Quote:| I believe the left/centre/right model is a load of shite frankly. |
See: http://www.politicalcompass.org/ (though I think it is valid to suggest that the libertarian left category is not very meaningful)
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Kharin
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Re:brief critical analysis
« Reply #29 on: 2002-06-21 11:59:14 » |
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One point I should have made more forcefully: to suggest that group identity can be founded on a relational model rather than common attributes betokens a complete ignorance of either sociology or anthropology. It is sophistry, nothing more.
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