logo Welcome, Guest. Please Login or Register.
2024-04-26 01:28:09 CoV Wiki
Learn more about the Church of Virus
Home Help Search Login Register
News: Donations now taken through PayPal

  Church of Virus BBS
  General
  Evolution and Memetics

  Memetics and the Modular-Mind
« previous next »
Pages: [1] Reply Notify of replies Send the topic Print 
   Author  Topic: Memetics and the Modular-Mind  (Read 7022 times)
David Lucifer
Archon
*****

Posts: 2642
Reputation: 8.94
Rate David Lucifer



Enlighten me.

View Profile WWW E-Mail
Memetics and the Modular-Mind
« on: 2003-08-08 13:10:37 »
Reply with quote

Author: hkhenson
Source: alt.memetics
Dated: 1997.02.16

This 40k article on memes is one of few I have written in the past
10-15 years not webbed anywhere.  It was originally published in
_Analog_, August, 1987.  A somewhat edited version was reprinted in
_Whole Earth Review_, Fall, 1987 (with some great art work).  A short
version was anthologized in WER _Signals_, (1988?) and about a year
later the Reason Foundation sent reprints of the WER version to about
half the high schools in the US for debate resource material.  [Reason
Magazine asked me to write an article on memes which was rejected
after they had a management change.  That article is widely webbed as
"Memes, MetaMemes and Politics."]  (Permission is granted to put this
and my other articles on web sites.)

Analog anthologized the '87 article (slightly updated) in the 1990
hardback, ANALOG ESSAYS ON SCIENCE, Copyright (c) 1990 by Davis
Publications, Inc.  For some reason I could not find an electronic
copy, and my copy of the (out of print) book has been missing for
years.  I finally found a library copy and scanned it in.  I did not
update it because it is of historical interest.  A few 1997 comments
are in {}, footnotes are in [].

Where it mentions the Soviet Union it is definately of out of date.  :-)

H. Keith Henson, Feb. 1997

MEMETICS AND THE MODULAR-MIND

AUGUST  1987

{Lead-in by Stanley Schmidt}

    In his Foundation stories, Isaac Asimov proposed a future science
called "psychohistory," in which the collective behavior of human
populations could be predicted with high precision.  In our time, the
social sciences are often viewed as sharply different from the
physical sciences because they cannot do much predicting.  Is this an
inherent limitation on the social sciences, or might it be possible to
put them on a truly predictive basis by means that have not been
formulated yet?  There are a number of lines of research suggesting
that it might.  One of them is based on the "meme": a concept created
by analogy with the gene and describing an entity supposed to behave
in a somewhat similar way.

    H. Keith Henson was one of the founders, and the first president
of the L5 Society, which has since become part of the National Space
Society.  He describes himself as a carrier for several highly
infectious memes relating to space colonies, nanotechnolaay, personal
computers, and cult-watching.

*****************************

    SCIENCE fiction writers do not always manage to stay ahead of
science.  One significant concept showed up in the scientific
literature 13 years before Charles Sheffield and Arthur Clarke
simultaneously wrote stories that incorporated the "Skyhook" or
"Beanstalk."  But in projecting a science of social prediction, SF
writers have been far ahead of the scientists.  Isaac Asimov based the
entire Foundation series on "Psychohistory."  Robert Heinlein
developed the theme of predicting social movement in his Future
History stories, especially in Revolt in 2100, Methuselah's Children,
and in the unwritten saga of Reverend Nehemiah Scudder.*

  [ * "First Prophet," President of the United States, destroyer of
  its Constitution, and founder of the Theocracy.  If this makes you
  vaguely uncomfortable, it is probably because you have been reading
  about fundamentalist preacher/presidential candidate Pat Robertson.
  As the Ayatollah Khomeini recently demonstrated, fundamentalist
  religion and politics can make a nasty mix.]

    Science fiction aside, we don't have a science of social
prediction.  Until recently, we haven't even had much in the way of
theories.  Our continual surprise at the development of cults,
religions, wars, fads, and other social movements is a notable
exception to the steady progress humans have made in building better
models of our environment.  When you consider the suffering associated
with some social movements, our lack of good models must he considered
a major deficiency.

    A successful theory of the development of social movements will
have to provide a unifying theory for events that make up much of the
evening news.  It will have to discover common features that lie
behind the diverse trends causing problems in Nicaragua, South Africa,
Northern Ireland, and the Middle East.  A good theory should be able
to evaluate the danger or lack of danger from the LaRouche
organization, whose accidental win in the Democratic primary forced
Adlai Stevenson III to run as an independent in the Illinois
governor's race.  (This cult more recently made the news when the FBI
raided its offices in the wake of alleged massive credit card frauds.) 
It should be able to produce a plausible model for the breakup of the
Rajneesh cult (whose Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh accumulated 93 Rolls
Royces before abandoning his Oregon community).  The theory should be
able to predict the conditions under which Turkey will be subverted by
a fundamentalist version of Islam similar to that which led to so much
grief in Iran.

    A tall order!  But an emerging field of study, _memetics_, holds
just such promise.  Sometimes thought of as "germ theory applied to
ideas," memetics is an outgrowth of evolutionary biology.  It provides
models where social movements are seen as side effects of infectious
ideas that spread among people in a way mathematically identical to
the way epidemic disease spreads.  It has been noticed, for example,
that use rates for various drugs, most recently "crack," have closely
followed epidemic-like curves that seem to be as oblivious to the
efforts of authorities as the Black Death was in 1348.  At a deeper
level, research in neuroscience and artificial intelligence is
starting to develop an understanding of why we are susceptible to
"infectious information," both the benign and the deadly.

    As useful as these models may be, they are not without the
potential to seriously affect our cherished institutions.  A good
understanding of the mechanisms of our minds and the dynamics that
underlie the spread and persistence of any social or political
movement has the potential to forever alter the way we think about all
other social movements, including those of our own culture, religions,
and nation.  When viewed from the perspective of tolerance that has
been developing in Western culture since the Renaissance, the changes
in outlook seem to be positive, but it would not surprise me to find
memetics condemned from the pulpit even more than evolution has been.

    Memetics comes from "meme" (which rhymes with "cream"), a word
coined in purposeful analogy to gene by Richard Dawkins in his 1976
book, _The Selfish Gene_.  To understand memes, you must have a good
understanding of the modern concepts of evolution, and this is a good
source.  In its last chapter, memes were defined as replicating
information patterns that use minds to get themselves copied much as a
virus uses cells to get itself copied.  (Dawkins credits several
others for developing the concepts, especially the anthropologist F.
T.  Cloak.)  Like genes, memes are pure information.*

  [*The essence of a gene is in its information.  It is still a gene
  "for hemoglobin" or "for waltzing behavior in mice" whether the
  sequence is coded in DNA, printed on paper, or is written on
  magnetic tape.]

                                                  They must be
perceived indirectly, most often by their effect on behavior or by
material objects that result from behavior.  Humans are not the only
creatures that pass memes about.  Bird songs that are learned (and
subject to variation) and the songs of whales are also replicating
information pattern that fit the model of a meme.  So is the
"termiteing" behavior that chimps pass from generation to generation.

    "Meme" is similar to "idea," but not all ideas are memes.  A
passing idea which you do not communicate to others, or one which
fails to take root in others, falls short of being a meme.  The
important part of the "meme about memes" is that memes are subject to
adaptive evolutionary forces very similar to those that select for
genes.  That is, their variation is subject to selection in the
environment provided by human minds, communication channels, and the
vast collection of cooperating and competing memes that make up human
culture.  The analogy is remarkably close.  For example, genes in cold
viruses that cause sneezes by irritating noses spread themselves by
this route to new hosts and become more common in the gene pool of a
cold virus.  Memes cause those they have successfully infected to
spread the meme by both direct methods (proselytizing) and indirect
methods (such as writing).  Such memes become more common in the
culture pool.

    The entire topic would be academic except that there are two
levels of evolution (genes and memes) involved and the memetic level
is only loosely coupled to the genetic.  Memes which override genetic
survival, such as those which induce young Lebanese Shiites to blow
themselves "into the next world" from the front seat of a truck loaded
with high explosives, or induce untrained Iranians to volunteer to
charge Iraqi machine guns, or the WW II Kamikaze "social movement" in
Japan, are all too well known.  I have proposed the term "memeoid" for
people whose behavior is so strongly influenced by a replicating
information pattern (meme) that their survival becomes inconsequential
in their own minds.

    For a vivid example we can hark back a few years ago to Rev. Jim
Jones and the People's Temple incident, where 912 people, including
Jones, died of complications--poison and gunshot wounds--induced by an
information disease.

    The Children's Crusades of the middle ages were larger and more
lethal; only 2 of 20,000 returned from one.  The mass suicide in the
first century by the Jews at Masada is a clear example of information
patterns in people's minds having more influence over their behavior
than the fear of death.

    A more seductive example of a social movement set off by a
lethal meme comes from South Africa.  In the 1850s, a meme (originally
derived from a dream) led to a great sacrifice by the Xhoas people
during which they killed their cattle, burned their grain, and
refrained from planting in the belief that doing so would cause their
ancestors to come back from the dead and expel the whites.  At least
20,000 and perhaps as many as 60,000 starved when the predicted
millennia of plenty failed to arrive.  Known as the Cattle Killing, it
was not a unique response for a primitive society being displaced by a
more technically advanced one.  The "Ghost Dancers" phenomenon among
American Indians was a similar response.

    Memes that bring about suicidal behavior are at least
self-limiting.  Those which induce one group of people to kill another
are much worse, and the social movements they induce are often much
larger.  The scope of the social movement known as the Inquisition is
seldom mentioned in history textbooks, but:

          The number of victims claimed by the witch-hunts, which
    lasted for three hundred years, is reckoned by historians to be
    between five and six million people; it therefore caused more
    deaths than all the wars waged over the period.

          It is only when one takes into account the brutal, pitiless,
    expression of mass-mania, and that a belief in the devil, his
    traffic with witches and warlocks, was constantly being fanned
    anew by the Church . . . that it is possible to gain any measure
    of understanding. .  *

  [* Five Thousand Years of Medicine by Gerhard Venzrner, Tr. Marion
  Koenig, Taplinger Publishing Co., NY 1968 pg. 163.]

    The depredations and brutality of the Inquisition were about
typical of deadly memes stemming from religions or closely related
social movements such as Marxist-Leninist communism.

    In the last decade, the people of Kampuchea were infected with an
anti-intellectual, agrarian utopian meme clearly mutated (in the minds
of Pol Pot and his close associates) from the Vietnamese variation of
the communist meme.  They were Eric Hoffer's "True Believers" of the
most extreme stripe.  The resulting social movement was a massive
self-genocide.  Over one third of the population of Kampuchea,
including almost all of the city dwellers and the educated, died
before the Vietnamese (embarrassed by news stories of rivers clogged
with bodies) invaded and put a stop to the killing.  Many more would
have died had the social movement run its course without interference. 
Kampuchea will take decades to recover, but "'tis an ill wind ..." 
The people of Thailand, with a front seat on the slaughter, seem to
have lost all sympathy for their own related social movements.

    History classes have made us more aware of the genocidal
depredations resulting from the "master race" meme that was part of
the Nazi meme complex.  Considered from the viewpoint of memes, Hitler
was less a prime mover than a willing victim of this particularly
nasty and pervasive variety of information disease.  Had plague struck
Germany in the '30s instead of Nazism, we would have understood it in
terms of susceptibility, vectors, and disease organisms.  What did
happen may soon be modeled and understood in terms of the social and
economic disruptions of the time increasing the number of people
susceptible to fanatical beliefs, just as poor diet is known to
increase the number of those susceptible to tuberculosis.  For
vectors, we have personal contact, the written word, radio, and
amplified voices substituting for rats, lice, mosquitoes, and
coughed-out droplets.  A pool of "sub-memes," many of them ancient
myth, contributed to the syncretic Nazi meme in much the same way
mobile genes contribute to the virulence of the influenza viruses.

    Nazism was not the only fanatical movement growing and evolving
in the fertile social media of Germany between the wars.  The
Marxist-Leninist meme was a visible competitor in the early period.
Even though most of those infected with the Nazi meme were conquered
or killed and Nazism became a suppressed meme, it cannot be said to
have died.  As a replicating information pattern that has gone through
a great deal of evolutionary honing, it is still successful in
infecting a few susceptible people today.

    A fascinating footnote to the German experience with Nazism and
its horrors happened in 1969 when Ron Jones, a teacher in Palo Alto,
exposed a high school history class to an intensive, five-day
experience with the ideas that made up the Nazi meme.  The experience
of that week was originally published as "Take as Directed" in _The
CoEvolution Quarterly,_ {later WER} Spring '76 and a few years ago was
made into a TV movie, _The Wave_.  Over four days, Jones introduced
and drilled his students in concepts of Strength Through Discipline,
Community, Action, and Pride.  (The fifth day was devoted to showing
them how easily they had started to slip into the abyss.)  The
enthusiasm with which most of the class adopted the memes and spread
them to their friends, swelling a 40 student class to 200 in 5 days,
made it one of the most frightening events the teacher had ever
experienced.  Given the track record of the Nazi meme, the mini-social
movement his experiment set off is no more surprising in retrospect
than the medical effects would have been if the teacher had sprayed
smallpox virus on the class.

    An empirical characteristic of large, long-lived religious
movements or related social movements (at least in the West) is a
scripture or body of written material.  This may function to
standardize the meme involved or at least slow its evolution as the
number of people infected with it grows.  From Scientology right back
to the Hindu Vedas, I can think of no counter-examples.  Social
movements involving more than a few thousand people or lasting more
than a few years may have been rare before writing came along.

    It is possible that the breakup of the Rajneesh cult was related
to its lack of an organized written scripture at a critical juncture.
The memes that were the origin of that particular social movement were
characterized by considerable instability; that is, parasitic memes
arose out of the local culture soup at short intervals.  Some of them
(tapping phones) made a kind of paranoid sense, but poisoning salad
bars at restaurants with Salmonella bacteria in the hope of
influencing local elections made no sense.  The group seems to have
amplified individual crazy impulses at the expense of propagating the
meme.

    I have noticed several features of the social movements that
derived from really dangerous memes.  One is self-isolation of the
infected group or at least new recruits from the rest of society. 
This need not be an "intelligent" action taken by the "leaders." 
There may be no more thought involved than the selection of dark moths
in industrial England.  The "fanatic cult" memes which incorporate
isolation are the ones we observe; those which do not incorporate
isolation are like light moths, gone and not observable.

    In the case of the Soviet Union, the cult-like communist meme
survives in a society largely isolated from the rest of the world.  In
recent years the isolation may have resulted from reasoned
considerations about the fragility of the communist meme in open
competition with other memes.  A more parsimonious view would note
that without originally having a strong isolation component, the
communist meme would have had no more social influence in the USSR
than it has had in, say, France.*

  [* The ferment in the USSR today is certainly consistent with this
  point.]

    Isolation makes possible exposure to a single meme (or meme set)
many times a day for months or years without much contact with other
memes.  Exclusive exposure to one meme (also known as brainwashing)
induces a "dependent mental state" in some people.

    Thankfully, most of us have not experienced the dependent mental
state firsthand, but we have all seen such people on the news programs
boarding buses for the front in Iran, or been harassed by them in
airports, or had them knock on our doors and try to infect us.  It is
clear that the people who suffer from extreme cases of "information
disease" have lost much of their ability to take care of themselves or
their children.  Truly dedicated people often fail to replace
themselves, since too much of their life energies are channeled into
propagating the infecting meme.  One example comes from the largest
subdivision of Christianity, where celibacy for its most dedicated has
long been institutionalized.  The Rajneesh cult practiced the opposite
of celibacy but discouraged births to the point of sterilizing the
barely pubescent female children of its resident members.

    Given that memes have been interfering with our reproduction for
a long time, one must wonder why humans are still so susceptible to
information diseases.  The answers to such questions are starting to
come from research in artificial intelligence (AI), neuroscience, and
archeology.  It is becoming apparent that our vulnerabilities are a
direct consequence of the way our minds are organized, and that
organization is a direct consequence of our evolutionary history.

    Marvin Minsky (a principal founder of Al) and Michael Gazzaniga
(one of the major workers in split-brain research) have independently
come to a virtually identical model of the mind.  Both view minds as
vast collections of interacting, largely parallel (co-conscious)
modules, or "agents."  The lowest level of such a society of agents
consists of a small number of nerve cells that innervate a section of
muscle.  A few of the higher level modules have been isolated in
clever experiments by Gazzaniga, some of them on split-brain patients.

    One surprise from this work is that we seem to have our mental
modules arranged in a way that guarantees we will form beliefs.  What
we believe in depends, at least in part, on what we are exposed to and
the order in which we are exposed.  Gazzaniga argues that we slowly
evolved the ability to form beliefs because the ability provides a
major advantage in surviving.  Being able to infer, that is to form
new beliefs, and to learn, in the sense of acquiring such beliefs from
others, was a major advance over learning by trial and error.  Being
able to pass the rare new ways our ancestors found for chipping rock
or making pots from person to person and generation to generation was
vital in allowing humans to spread over the earth.  But as this
ability became the norm, communicating human minds formed a new
"primal soup" in which a new kind of non-biological evolution, that of   
replicating information patterns or memes, could get started.  A wide
variety of competing memes has evolved in the intervening seventy
thousand years or so.  It should not be surprising that the survivors
of this process, like astrology or religions, are so effective at
inducing their hosts to spread and defend them.  It is also plausible
that in the tens of millennia since memetic evolution became a major
factor, there has been a biological co-evolution.  The parts of our
brains that hold our belief systems have probably undergone biological
adaptation to be better at detecting dangerous memes and more
skeptical about memes that result in death or seriously interfere with
reproductive success.

    This type of co-evolution is known as an "arms race" to
biologists.  One such biological arms race has resulted in almost
perfect egg mimicry by the cuckoo and in correspondingly sharp visual
discrimination in the birds it parasitizes.  By analogy, while we get
better at spotting dangerous memes, the memes may be evolving to be
more effective at infecting us.  Advancing technology (which itself is
an improving collection of memes) changes the environmental conditions
where memes survive or fail as well.  The modern telephone system and
the tape cassette player were major factors in the takeover of Iran.
It has been argued that the rise of the Nazis depended strongly on
radio reaching a previously unexposed and unsophisticated population.
Exposure to modern advertising may be one factor which makes a
television broadcast by Lyndon LaRouche attacking (among others) the
L5 Society so absurd that tapes of it are used as entertainment at L5
parties.  He might have been taken seriously in the '3Os.

    I have picked dangerous examples for vivid illustrations and to
point out that memes have a life of their own.  The ones that kill
their hosts make this hard to ignore.  However, most memes, like most
microorganisms, are either helpful or at least harmless.  Some may
even provide a certain amount of defense from the very harmful ones. 
It is the natural progression of parasites to become symbiotes, and
the first symbiotic behavior that emerges in a proto-symbiote is for
it to start protecting its host from other parasites.  I have come to
appreciate the common religions in this light.  Even if they were
harmful when they started, the ones that survive over generations
evolve and do not cause too much damage to their hosts.  Calvin (who
had dozens of people executed over theological disputes) would hardly
recognize Presbyterians three hundred years later.  Contrariwise, the
Shaker meme is now confined to books, and the Shakers are gone.  It is
clearly safer to believe in a well-aged religion than to be
susceptible to a potentially fatal cult.

    History doesn't change, but our interpretation of it can.  For
example, the contemporary "causes" of historical epidemics (such as
the miasma theory) have been totally supplanted by germ theory
explanations.  Before germ theory came along, memes of causality for
epidemics were remarkably stable.  The "explanation" for the Black
Death of 1348 was still in use for the Philadelphia Yellow Fever
epidemic of 1796.  Similarly, various "explanations" for wars have
been with us for hundreds of years.

    Memetics provides an interesting alternate way to analyze recent
wars and the roots of current disputes.  In this view, the ultimate
(though unaware) protagonists of World War II were memes such as the
Nazi "master race" and the Marxist-Leninist meme (MLM).  The current
clash between the Soviets and the western world can be viewed as a
meme conflict (for space in minds) between the religion-like,
competition-intolerant mono-meme of communism and the western
meta-meme of tolerance.  While it is not a religion by any reasonable
definition, the Marxist-Leninist meme is clearly in competition for
the "belief space" in minds usually occupied by religious memes.  It,
and its more cultish offshoots, have the typical virtues and excesses
of cult-stage religious memes.  In an amusing twist, the "god-less"
communist meme is the more religion-like of the two in its battle for
mind space with secular western culture!

    Reviewers of an earlier draft of this article objected to my
description of Soviet memes.  Words like "tolerant" or "intolerant"
have acquired a great deal of positive/negative connotation in the
western world, but in describing memes, I am using them in the same
way we would say that a mold colony is intolerant of a bacterial
invasion.  With respect to the belief system that dominates the meme
pool of the other superpower, I am trying to be descriptive, not
partisan.

    If anything, I would think that understanding the memetic nature
of religions and related movements like communism would defuse the
emotional connections and substitute something closer to dispassionate
understanding of the parasitic-to-symbiotic memes behind such social
movements.  It has had that effect on me.  Many, even the most
gruesome, features of communism are what they are simply because those
features were (and are) necessary for the meme to exist in a world of
competing memes.  Isolation, for example, is a common feature of
virtually all successful religious memes while they are in the cult
stage.  Anyone who has studied history knows that suppression of
competitive memes by the power of the state is a common experience
once a meme of this class has infected the leaders or they have been
replaced by those infected.

    And if the Christian religion was a mainstay of the aristocracy,
serving to keep the peasants in place, Soviet Communism is no less
supportive of its own hereditary elite.  As a successful and
persistent meme, that has appeal even to people who know the realities
of its practice, it commands a certain grudging respect.  From a
meme's viewpoint, tolerance of other memes is not a virtue; it is, in
fact, a fatal characteristic for a particular meme, as memes inducing
intolerance to other memes would soon displace it.  On the other hand,
a meta-meme of limited toleration, even cooperation among memes is
possible.  The western metamere of tolerance seems to have emerged
from an ecosystem of memes in much the same way that cooperative
behavior has been modeled as emerging from an ecosystem of
individuals.*  In the area of meme tolerance the western world may be
unique.  We think of censorship as evil; where but in an advanced
ecosystem of memes could such a strange idea have emerged?

  [* See _The Evolution of Cooperation_ by Robert Axelrod, 1984 Basic
  Books, NY. ]

    I have recently had a lot of fun reading history to trace the
development of the meta-meme of tolerance.  This particular character
of our ecosystem of memes has been developing at least since the
writings of the Greeks and Romans were a rediscovered during the
Renaissance.  Studying inactive pagan religions may have been the
first step in developing tolerance for a variety of religious memes. 
The fragmentation of the dominant religion during the Reformation led
to a series of largely indecisive religious wars in most of the major
countries of Europe.  Sheer exhaustion may have been one of the most
significant factors in developing a grudging tolerance, which in these
later times has taken on a patina of virtue in the division of our
culture known as "liberal."

    In this view, western culture is a vast ecosystem where memes of
many classes engage in "fair" competition with each other.  Attempts
to subvert fair competition by changing laws or education (such as
introducing "creation science" into schools) draw opposition from
defenders of a wide variety of memes which have evolved within this
environment.  This model may provide testable explanations for both
western culture's tolerance of intolerant memes (such as creation
science and the MLM) and the hostility these memes evoke from various
segments of the culture.  David Brin's "Dogma of Otherness" in the
April 1986 Analog prompted considering a memetic explanation for such
peculiar ambiguities in our culture.

    Several current social movements are obvious candidates for
examination with memetic theory.  Given the available data, we may be
able to predict the remaining course of the "non-literate graffiti
epidemic," which has spread in the past 15 years from New York City to
remote corners of the country.  There are substantial financial
reasons (such as the cost of mark-resistant walls) to want to know if
scribbler behavior will be a limited epidemic or will become an
endemic part of our culture.

    Drug use, clearly a replicating pattern of behavior passed from
person to person, is another "social movement" where the similarity to
epidemic waxing and waning has been widely used by reporters, and
noted without much explanation in a number of learned journals.  If it
were formally considered as an epidemic with memes as the infecting
agents, the ways by which the behavior spreads might get more
attention.  Counter-drug programs might be evaluated in terms of how
well they induce reasonable behavior.  Some efforts in the past,
especially those which wildly exaggerated the dangers of a drug such
as marijuana, may have increased the behavior of taking other drugs.
These efforts may have immunized those exposed against believing any
official pronouncements about drugs.

    Formal consideration of drug use as an epidemic of meme-induced
behavior might also lead to the realization that the percentage of
people susceptible to abusing most drugs is not all that large. 
(Cigarette smoking is an exception.)  For example, most of the people
I know who have tried cocaine don't care for it.  Not liking the
effect, they wouldn't use it if it were free.  People who really like
opiates aren't that common, either.

    Part of my interest in memes stems from a ten-year (and
continuing) experience of being infected with the space colony meme
which developed in the minds of Gerard O'Neill and his students in the
late '60s.  (See "Memes, L5 and the Religion of the Space Colonies,"
September, 1985 and "More on Memes," June 1986, both in _L5 News_.)
Memetics provides candidate explanations for why the space colony meme
spread in the first place, why it is not making much progress now, and
some insight into what might be done to revitalize the meme and
actually accomplish the implicit goals.

    From a recent survey of L5 members, there seems to be two main
factors and a minor one that contributed to the attractiveness of the
space colony meme.  First was the "new lands" factor.  We are the
genetic and memetic heirs of people who moved into vacant areas of the
planet.  It should be no surprise that the prospect of new lands is an
irresistible attraction to many people.  This may also explain the
higher than proportional membership in L5 from California, where the
last of the restless pioneers piled up.  The minor factor (suggested
by Dale Skran of Bell Labs) is fear of random events such as nuclear
war, asteroid impact, worldwide epidemics, or crazy social movements
that could badly damage civilization or even extinguish human life. 
As Heinlein put it, one planet is too fragile a basket to put all the
human eggs in.  The other main factor was possibility of personal
involvement, of going into space.  Surprisingly this is still a very
important factor.  Some 60 percent of respondents to a survey at the
1986 L5 annual conference said they expected to live in space.

    If the attractiveness of the space colony meme is in the prospect
of large numbers of people being able to live in space within a short
time, these factors are quite at variance with today's reality; since
the Solar Power Satellite project bit the dust, there haven't even
been any widely accepted proposals that would get us out there in the
next 50-100 years.  Since the space colony meme never had a fixed
deadline, the lack of correspondence between the meme and reality
hasn't hit as hard as "the day after" hits a millennial religion, but
informal surveys of former members indicate that lack of a timetable
was an important factor in their becoming inactive.  If we want to get
out there, we need to tap a very large source of social energy.  The
biggest single source of social energy on the planet is the meme
conflict between the MLM and the western metamere.  There are ways
this might be tapped to get us into space, but that would take another
article.

    The memes which embody the germ theory of disease emerged when
they did partly b&cause "the time was right."  The work of von
Leeuwenheok, Semmelweis, Spallanzani, and their less remembered
colleagues established in scientific culture the background memes
about microorganisms.  Without these cooperating memes, the ideas of
Pasteur and Koch could not have replicated.  The tragic history of
Semmelweis and his statistical work on childbed fever stands as an
example of the failure of a meme to take root in a culture before the
conditions are right for its spread, no matter how true or useful to
humans it may be.

    If most conflict in the world is an indirect effect of memes,
memetics holds as much potential for reducing human misery as the germ
theory of disease.  Just being able to model the interaction between
the Soviets and the West in terms of memes might go a long way toward
making the world a safer place.  It took at least 60 years for the
germ theory of disease to be widely accepted, though, as anyone who
has traveled much knows, it still has a ways to go in many parts of
the world.  What are the prospects in the near future for a similar
acceptance of the meme-about-memes? If it were widely accepted, what
changes could we expect to see analogous to public health? Would
widespread awareness of infectious information make us less
susceptible to dangerous memes?  Can we separate ourselves from the
memes that possess us?

    Further exploration of the analogy between replicating
information patterns and the ecosystems-epidemic models biologists
have painstakingly developed for other purposes may provide badly
needed insight into the origin and courses of social movements and the
nature of meme competition/cooperation.  If memetics develops soon
enough, it may provide help in evaluating proposed solutions to
current international problems, predict the course of troublesome
social movements, and suggest solutions for conflicts between social
movements.  If this article succeeds in infecting you with the
meme-about-memes, perhaps it will help you be more responsible about
the memes you spread and less likely to be infected by a meme that can
harm you or those around you.

POSTSCRIPT 1989

    Lyndon Larouche has now been sent to jail for credit card fraud.
Cults such as this one can almost be defined by the central meme
gaining ascendency in the minds of the infected over all other
considerations, moral and legal.

    Computer viruses are an additional analogy to the more
destructive memes.  While memes infect _human_ operating systems,
computer viruses and worms infect _computer_ operating systems

    Sadly, the meme-about-memes is not spreading as fast as I would
like.  Those interested in helping spread it can contact me at:

{1997 updated address}
                 
              P.O. Box 60012
              Palo Alto, CA  94306       

or through email at:

                hkhenson@netcom.com or
                keith@xanadu.com

{Additional articles include Memes, MetaMemes and Politics, A
Theoretical Understanding (memes and cryonics), one on meme trapping
of leaders, and a recent one on a connection between cults and
evolutionary psychology}


REFERENCES

    In addition to Dawkins's '76 and '82 books, there are a number of
books and articles directly discussing memes.  One that reached a
large number of readers was Douglas Hofstadter's Metamagical Themas
column "On Viral Sentences and Self-Replicating Structures" in
Scientific American (Jan. 1983) and reprinted in his recent book. 
There are numerous supporting sources, and a reliable source indicates
that a journal of memetics may be offered soon.


Bohannan, Paul. "The Gene Pool and the Meme Pool," Science 80,
November 1980, pp. 25, 28.

Cloak, F.T. , Jr. "The Causal Logic of Natural Selection: A General
Theory," Oxford Surveys in Evolutionary Biology 3, article 6, 1986. In
press.  Preprints available from F.T. Cloak, Jr., 1613 Fruit Avenue,
NW, Albuquerque, NM 87104.

Dawkins, Richard.  The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as the Unit of
Selection. W.H. Freeman and Company, Oxford and San Francisco, 1982.
See esp. Chapter 6, pp. 97-117.

Dawkins, Richard.  The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press, New
York, 1976.  See Chapter 11, first use of "meme."

Drexler, K. Eric.  Engines of Creation. Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden
City, New York, 1986.  See esp. pp.35-38 and other references to
"memes" in the index.

Henson, H. Keith.

"Memes, L5 and the Religion of the Space Colonies," L-5 News,
September, 1985.

"More on Memes," L-5 News, June 1986.

"Memes, Mental Parasites, and the Evolution of Skepticism,"
unpublished monograph.

"Original Sin and Liberal Guilt," Cryonics, in press. {on the web}

Hofstadter, Douglas R. Metamagical Themas. Basic Books, Inc., New
York, 1985.  See esp. Chapter 3, pp. 49-69.

Stefik, Mark. "The Next Knowledge Medium," The AI Magazine, Spring
1986, Vol.7, #1.

Wilson, Edward o. and Charles J. Lumsden. Genes, Mind and Culture: The
Coevolutionary Process.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA,
1981. See esp. Chapter 3 and earlier definitions of "culturgen" and
"epigenesis."

    The following works do not use the word "meme," but their
contents help elucidate human behavior and cultural evolution.

Baker, Sherry. "A Plague Called Violence," Omni, Vol.8, No.11 (August
1986), pp 42ff.

Chase, Stuart. The Tyranny of Words. Harcourt, Brace and World; New
York, 1938.

Cloak, F.T., Jr., et al. "The Adaptive Significance of Cultural
Behavior: Comments and Reply," Human Ecology, Vol.5, No.1(1977),
pp.49-50 (with references appended to the monograph).

Cloak, F.T., Jr., "Is a Cultural Ethology Possible?," Human Ecology,
Vol.3, No.3 (1975), pp.161-82.

Conway, Flo and Jim Siegelman. Snapping. Dell Publishing, New York,
1979.

Gazzaniga, Michael S. The Social Brain: Discovering the Networks of
the Mind.  Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1985.

Kelly, Kevin.  "Information as a Communicable Disease," CoEvolution
Quarterly, Summer 1984.

Minsky, Marvin.  Society of Mind.  Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986. 

Nisbett, Richard, and Lee Ross.  Human Inference: Strategies and
Shortcomings of Social Judgment.  Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980.

Report to moderator   Logged
Pages: [1] Reply Notify of replies Send the topic Print 
Jump to:


Powered by MySQL Powered by PHP Church of Virus BBS | Powered by YaBB SE
© 2001-2002, YaBB SE Dev Team. All Rights Reserved.

Please support the CoV.
Valid HTML 4.01! Valid CSS! RSS feed