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David Lucifer
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Atheistic Faith?
« on: 2006-11-30 16:14:42 »
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The latest KMO podcast is called Atheistic Faith.




My response:

I found your podcast "Atheist Faith" frustrating to say the least. I know you are a smart and knowledgable frood so I'm struggling to figure out why you are condemning the "new atheists".

Your guest Peter Christ is welcome to define "faith" however he likes but let's not pretend that hist definition has much to do with the faith that the new atheists are criticizing. Peter says he defines faith as when you believe in something that can't be proven to exist or don't believe in something that can't be proven to not exist. That's fine but in that case we all have faith because nothing can be proven to exist or not exist. Here I am assuming he meant "prove" as in 100% certainty which can never be achieved with empirical claims. On the other hand if he means proven beyond a reasonable doubt then he is incorrect to say "you can't prove a negative". Obviously that happens all the time in courtrooms where people prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "he didn't kill him" or "she didn't steal that". I can also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "New Zealand is not in the northern hemisphere" and (closer to the existence of God) "there is no element between carbon and nitrogen in the periodic table". The question is not what you can "prove", the real question is how much and what kind of evidence supports your claims.

Is it my imagination or was Dawkins accused of being a fascist? Yes, he wants others to believe as he does, but in the sense that he wants to educate people about science and share his joy and wonder of knowledge of the natural world. If he's a fascist than so is every great teacher and educator. So is Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi and even Jesus for working to enlighten those around them. Obviously I think you are way off base here. Nobody using just words to influence should be accused of fascism.

Perhaps there is something wrong with what theists believe. Wouldn't you agree something is wrong when the president of the USA announces that he invaded Iraq because Santa Claus told him to? Don't you think something is wrong when people all over the world are killing each other depending on whether they side with vampires or werewolves? Isn't something wrong when people with PhDs in the study of unicorns are invited to participate in ethical discussions because of their special insight? If you think the reality of the world in which we live differs in any essential way from my examples above please explain.

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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #1 on: 2006-12-03 12:11:48 »
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The modern scientific method is totally predicated on the idea of attempting to support the alternative hypothesis, or in the dated terminology used here, of "proving the negative".  So while a hypothesis to become a theory must bear the burden of proof (i.e. positive support (preferably, some would say necessarily, an empirical observation) must be shown for adopting an hypothesis before it can be proffered for examination), we prefer that the challenges to a hypothesis be in the form of affirmation of an alternative. This is because it is all too easy to see only evidence for the primary hypothesis when examining something from this perspective.

In other words, let us suggest that the hypothesis is that "all crows are white." Clearly, it is impossible to prove that all crows are white, although Bayes permits allows us to draw some statistical inferences about their probability based on empirical observations, still, no matter how many white members of the Corvidae you succeed in scaring up in support of your hypothesis, it is easy to show that one instance of a green crow, or even a black crow would cast some doubt on the white crow hypothesis; and a flock of blue crows would have the white crow hypothesis languishing at the wayside for want of support.

As a more practical example, no matter how many times we prove that steady state current in a DC circuit is dependent on potential difference over total DC impedance, which is the definition of "Ohm's Law," we have not "proved" that this is the case, we have only supported the theory that it is the case. A cluster of repeatable observations showing that "Ohms Law" failed to make good predictions about current in a circuit under these conditions would tend to invalidate Ohms "law". Which is why, in scientific circles, we talk about theories, rather than laws and see "supporting the alternative" (or proving the negative) as being very much more useful to progress than the reverse. The only time when it is legitimate to invert the burden of proof is when there are two competing explanations, and neither can be confirmed by observation. In these instances it may be reasonable to infer that an observed relationship is most likely causal from a lack of conflicting evidence. Inference is however, always subject to Ockham's Razor, and the simplest explanation must be accepted as being more likely. God thingies, with dangling questions of origin, capabilities, invisibility, motivations and mechanisms are invariably vastly more complex than straightforward naturalistic explanations and thus, in those few instances where we have to be satisfied by inference (e.g. cosmological questions), the massive confirmations we have found supporting our theories based on natural causes have utterly invalidated appeals to hypothesised god thingies with all of their suggested complexities.

In the same way, in theology, it is possible to prove that consequences of specific claimed attributes of gods contradict one another or observation (thus disproving either the law of identity, or proving that claimed capability is impossible in a Universe compatible with our observations of our Universe without breaking the strong theory of General Relativity). This form of analysis is clearly "supporting the alternative hypothesis" (that beings with the claimed attributes of god thingies are incompatible with our Universe) or, in the outdated metaphysical formulation, "proving the negative". It is also evident that as the idea of gods is not dependent in any way upon observation and is indeed an unsupported, unnecessary and overly complex hypothesis, that this entire purported line of argument is faulty. The idea of god thingies as being anything more than an idea in the mind of man lacks any support, meaning that the normal burden of proof is being reversed by those advancing the ideas which Lucifer is arguing against. This is always a logical fault and invalidates any putative arguments that the supporters of such ideas might be attempting to proffer.

Regards

Hermit
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With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #2 on: 2006-12-03 17:52:56 »
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I probably should have mentioned that "Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi were both egomaniacs and if aggressive authoritarians are equivalents to "fascists", then fascists too. The third case, "Jesus," if an historic prototype existed at all, then, if Robert Eisenman is even slightly correct about the Jewish prototype (which I consider extremely likely if there was a Jesus, rather than just a James), was way nastier than the other two, advocating a return Mosaic law in all its bloodthirsty pettiness.

For Gandhi see http://www.markshep.com/nonviolence/Myths.html
For MLK see http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/epstein9.html
For Jesus just think of any bit of Deuteronomy - or read (from your currently least favorite people) http://www.nobeliefs.com/jesus.htm

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Hermit
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With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #3 on: 2006-12-03 19:45:02 »
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David Lucifer
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #4 on: 2006-12-07 20:40:22 »
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Quote from: Hermit on 2006-12-03 12:11:48   

In other words, let us suggest that the hypothesis is that "all crows are white." Clearly, it is impossible to prove that all crows are white,

Consider 2 hypotheses:

All crows are X.
All crows are Y.

We know that X and Y are adjectives and X is not Y by definition (and vice versa).
Are either or both hypotheses impossible to prove?

(Just curious)
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #5 on: 2006-12-07 23:02:34 »
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It depends on the nature of X and Y. Because both are universal placeholders which can potentially speak to the nature of universals (i.e. they could possibly speak to the nature of language, not necessarily to things which are described by language), and further because they have been placed in a context which is also universal (In the form "All Xs are Ys" which can in turn be transformed into "All {X|Not X}s are {Y|Not Y}s") , so there are strong constraints on what logical transforms may be performed upon them. This is simply a consequence of the nature of deduction and induction that can be derived from propositions  formulated like this, due to the variables expressing universal affirmations or negations in positive or negative form.

When the two adjectives form an exclusive complement, then support for one can sometimes tend to disprove the other, and disproof of one may or may not tend to support the other. To rephrase somewhat more technically, we can universally disprove either or both if they are phrased as positive universal affirmatives and sufficient unarguable negative affirmations are found e.g. X = 'Green', Y = 'Blue', but all the crows you find are purple. Notice that no amount of positive confirmation can prove either if both are ascribed positive universal affirmations, because an affirmation can only make a positive universal more likely, not prove it absolutely.  An example of this might be if X = 'Travel Alone' and Y = 'Travel in Groups', then when two crows are seen together, X tends to be invalidated, and Y becomes more likely (In science, unlike philosophy which has the joy of dealing with consistent virtual crows, we tend to be cautious about single instances or even a small number of instances of some observable thing, because after all, the crows may not be together voluntarily, may frequently change their habits, may have different habits under different circumstances, may not be traveling, or maybe are not both crows but only look like crows). The reverse would be true for crows seen traveling in parties of two or more. Thus either negation of an exclusive complement tends to disprove one instance, but supports, rather than proving the complement. So even when a descriptive universal hypothesis is well supported by numerous observations, it cannot be called proved unless:

  • you can view all possible instances at all possible times (which tends to trivialize the hypothesis by lessening its generality)
  • the laws of logic force or preclude some thing. For example if X = "things which can possibly exist" and Y = "things which cannot possibly exist" then the X statement would be tautologically true and the Y statement deductively false, even if there were no actual crows seen, but the idea of a crow existed.
  • the laws of the Universe preclude it, e.g. crows might immolate immediately if there were more or less than a critical mass of crows in a given volume at a certain time).

As the number of instances of some thing for which an hypothesis exists increases, and the likelihood will be that the proof or disproof will come to be fully supported. Where it is a negative universal it may come to be proved. After all if X = 'is white' and Y = 'is green', and 5000 green crows flew past you, then after a while, it would be safe to deem X to have been falsified even though the 5001st crow could well be black. Or the 5 millionth. Or whatever. Perhaps all crows change color everyday, and tomorrow they will all be white. That would tend to invalidate both statements, but could not tend to support either.

Now consider that X could be "Not White" and Y could be "Not Blue", making them both universal negatives, whereupon a relatively small number of observations of orange crows over time could tend to support both, even if you never saw either a white or a blue crow. Then too, the adjectives could speak to different things and possess various truth qualities possibly unrelated. For example, let X = Carnivorous Pink and Y = Vegetarian Duck footed. Now let all the crows you find be Carnivorous Pink. You have not proved - or disproved - either proposition, but have tended to support X and disproved Y. But finding a non-duck footed omnivorous crow at any time would tend to strongly disprove both statements. Finding a flock of non-duck footed omnivorous crow would in all likelihood invalidate both.

This is why logic as used in science has long graduated from the simple binary of earlier philosophers to propositional logics supporting various degrees of fuzziness. This is also why modern logics recognize that zero values imply not impossibility, but rather a total inability to assign truth values to a proposition (usually because of a lack of information, sometimes because of too much (e.g. the two chronometer problem) and often because of ambiguity). It is also why somewhat likely and somewhat unlikely occurrences cannot be dealt with arithmetically, due to the the fact that while the negative identifier (-1) can actually refer to an absolutely false assertion, a positive assertion can only have a provisionally truth value approaching to unity (+1) - unless it is:

  • a simple truth of identity (all corvidae are birds)
  •   or other logic (all crows are things which can possibly exist),
  • a propositional truth deductible through logic (all baryonic corvidae are made of solids which are non-transparent, therefore all corvidae are not invisible), or - best of all
  • if it can be converted into a falsified negative proposition coupled to a non-universal positive (e.g. X = any color but pink, and Y = may be pink. Then one pink crow falsifies X and proves Y).


To reiterate and add emphasis, 'All Crows are pink' (positive universal) can be invalidated by a small number of non-pink crows, but no number of crows, be they never so many and all ever so pink, can absolutely prove the hypothesis. Conversely, 'All crows are not pink' (negative universal) can be invalidated by a relatively small number of crows that are not pink, but no number of crows, be they never so many, and all without a hint of pink, can prove the assertion. This opens the door to the use of an alternative hypothesis to invalidate a proposition or sequence of propositions which may then be used within a hypothetico-deductive framework to establish a primary proposition on a solid logical basis.

Kind Regards

Hermit

PS Caveat. The above has now been rechecked by me, and after editing to improve the structure, the value of the examples and to increase the fields of applicability, it seems correct. Ideally it should be peer reviewed due to the notorious invisibility of beams protruding from one's eye or indeed from one's work. Should somebody competent in logics read this, please add a confirmatory or dissenting note to the thread.
« Last Edit: 2006-12-08 10:09:00 by Hermit » Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
David Lucifer
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #6 on: 2006-12-07 23:19:57 »
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I should have been more clear that Y is defined as not-X. In other words all crows are either X or Y.

But I see your point and I realize my mistake. I was thinking that if you can disprove one than that would prove the other, but that is not the case. The logical negation of "All crows are X" would be "Not all crows are X" or "Some crows are Y". It is all coming back to me now
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #7 on: 2006-12-08 02:09:15 »
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[Blunderov] Isn't it more properly the duty of philosophy to dispose of what remains of the religious delusion? With the exception of the flat-earthers, most theists seem these days to be very careful to speak only in terms that have no foundation in anything empirically verifiable.

Science, in particular biology, has painted religion into a corner to great effect but it seems to me that it must be philosophy that administers the coup de grace.

Here is some more wood for the fire. I haven't finished reading this for detail yet but it seems quite strong on first inspection. Interesting certainly.

http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/jeff_lowder/ipnegep.html

Is a Sound Argument for the Nonexistence of a God Even Possible?* (1998)
Jeffery Jay Lowder

If I were asked to prove that Zeus and Poseidon and Hera and the rest of the Olympians do not exist, I should be at a loss to find conclusive arguments.

-- Bertrand Russell, "What Is an Agnostic?" 1953 [1]

A common objection to atheism -- one stated by many scholars and laymen, theists and nontheists -- is that it is impossible to prove the nonexistence of God. Yet the atheist response to this objection has been virtually non-existent.[2] This response is the purpose of this paper. Whether the atheist has a burden of proof[3], and whether any arguments for the nonexistence of a god have been successful, are issues beyond the scope of this paper.[4] Rather, I want to examine the mere possibility of a sound argument for the nonexistence of a god, by considering several objections to such an argument. Along the way, I shall argue that such an argument is indeed possible and does not require omniscience.

Objections from the Right
The Unprovability Objection: is it possible to prove a universal negative?
In his book Truth in Religion, Mortimer Adler distinguishes "logical disproof of religious belief" from universal negatives (or what he calls "negative existential propositions").[5] The former focuses on some proposition that is an "article of faith," a proposition that cannot be proved but can be "disproved by the proof of propositions that are their logical contraries or contradictories." For example, the Islamic belief that the prophet Muhammad received the Koran directly from Allah is classified by Adler as an "article of faith," because it cannot be proven. Yet, according to Adler, a disproof of an article of faith is possible. If a contradictory of an article of faith could be proven, then by the law of noncontradiction the article of faith would be disproven. Adler offers the following example of how an article of faith might be disproven by a contradictory:

It may be useful here to offer an example, in the case of Christianity, of scientific and technological advances that may call an article of faith into question. If the prediction of computer technologists and researchers into artificial intelligence is ever realized -- that machines can be constructed in the future, the behavior of which will be indistinguishable from the behavior of human beings -- then the Christian belief in the immortality of the human soul will be challenged. That belief depends for its rational support on the immateriality of the human intellect.

If purely material machines can do everything the human intellect can do, in a manner that is indistinguishable from the performance of the intellect, then there is no philosophical ground for affirming the immateriality of the intellect.[6]

Yet Adler believes that this sort of disproof can only go so far. According to Adler, a "negative existential proposition," a proposition which "denies the existence of some thing," "cannot be proved." Just exactly why Adler believes this to be so is unclear, for he does not directly defend his claim. Perhaps Adler believes that negative existential propositions are not or cannot be disproven by proving contradictory, positive existential claims (which he admits can be supported "beyond a reasonable doubt"). Yet even William Lane Craig, an outspoken critic of atheism, recognizes that this position is false. According to Craig, the claim that "you can't prove a universal negative" is

false. In the first place, of course you can. For example, you could disprove the statement that "there are polka-dotted geese." That would be a universal negative and you can disprove that. But more importantly, the claim that 'God does not exist' is not a universal negative. It's a singular negative. And certainly you can prove negative singular statements, such as, 'There is no planet between Venus and the Earth.' You can provide arguments to show that a singular negative statement is true.[7]

Indeed, there are actually two ways to prove the nonexistence of something. One way is to prove that it cannot exist because it leads to contradictions (e.g., square circles[8], married bachelors, etc.). I shall refer to arguments that rely on this method as "incompatible-properties arguments."[9] Because incompatible-properties arguments attempt to demonstrate a logical contradiction in the very concept of the thing in question, incompatible-properties arguments are deductive arguments.

Incompatible-properties arguments can also be applied to states of affairs involving several objects. In other words, it may be logically impossible for two objects to exist simultaneously. For example, some gods cannot coexist with other gods. The god of Islam (Allah) and the god of Christianity (Jehovah), despite their common origin in the god of Judaism (Yahweh), are mutually exclusive. Jehovah and Allah, at least as traditionally understood, cannot both exist at the same time. Both claim to be the Creator of the universe, but they have contradictory attributes (e.g., Christianity claims that there are three "persons" known as God but Islam claims that there is only one). Therefore, Allah and Jehovah cannot both be "God"; at least one cannot exist.

Thus, the Christian theist who makes the positive existential claim that the Christian god exists, is implicitly making the negative existential claim that all gods contradictory to the Christian god do not exist. Similarly, the Islamic theist who makes the positive existential claim that the Islamic god exists is implicitly claiming that all gods contradictory to Allah do not exist. And both the Christian and the Islamic theist presuppose the nonexistence of the god of Deism, an impersonal Creator of the universe.

The other way to prove the nonexistence of something is, in the words of Keith Parsons, "by carefully looking and seeing."[10] The basic idea is that some objects are said to be detectable in some way. Either their existence is directly observable or their existence is not directly observable but the object causes effects which are directly observable. For example, consider the existence of an ordinary rattlesnake. Suppose someone standing next to you claims that a rattlesnake is directly in front of you. You look down and see nothing. In such an instance, it would follow that there is no rattlesnake in front of you. This same method allows us to know that such things as the Loch Ness Monster, Bigfoot, the Abominable Snowman, etc. do not exist. In the context of arguments for the nonexistence of God, I will adopt Theodore Drange's terminology and refer to arguments which rely on this "looking and seeing method" as "God-vs.-world arguments."[11]

But the most decisive refutation of Adler's claim that "negative existential propositions cannot be proven" is the fact that the claim that "negative existential propositions cannot be proven" is itself a negative existential proposition. If negative existential propositions cannot be proven, then that implies there are no proofs for negative existential propositions. But the claim that "there are no proofs for negative existential propositions" is itself a negative existential proposition. Therefore, Adler could never claim to have any proof for his claim that negative existential propositions cannot be proven.

The Omniscience Objection: is it possible to know a universal negative?
Hank Hanegraaff, Ron Rhodes, and Kenneth R. Samples take a slightly different approach.[12] They argue that atheism is unknowable. This is because, in the words of Hanegraaff,

Simply stated, a person would have to be omniscient and omnipresent to be able to say "there is no God" from his own pool of knowledge. Only someone capable of being in all places at the same time -- with a perfect knowledge of all that is in the universe -- can make such a statement based on the facts. In other words, a person would have to be God to say there is no God. Hence, the assertion is logically indefensible.[13]

Yet it is not clear why the person who asserts that a particular god does not exist must be "capable of being in all places at the same time -- with a perfect knowledge of all that is in the universe." To be sure, theists who make the claim that "a specific god exists" do not feel that they must be omniscient and omnipresent. So why must the atheist be omniscient and omnipresent in order to affirm the opposite conclusion? Ron Rhodes has an answer to this question. He writes:

This point can be forcefully emphasized by asking the atheist if he has ever visited the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. Mention that the library presently contains over 70 million items (books, magazines, journals, etc.). Also point out that hundreds of thousands of these were written by scholars and specialists in the various academic fields. Then ask the following question: "What percentage of the collective knowledge recorded in the volumes in this library would you say are within your own pool of knowledge and experience?" The atheist will likely respond, "I don't know. I guess a fraction of one percent." You can then ask: "Do you think it is logically possible that God may exist in the 99.9 percent that is outside your pool of knowledge and experience?" Even if the atheist refuses to admit the possibility, you have made your point and he knows it.[14]

Of course, in response, the atheist could simply ask the theist, "Do you think it is logically possible that a knock-down, deductive disproof of your god may exist in the 99.9 percent that is outside your pool of knowledge and experience?" If the theist replies, "Yes, it is possible that there is such a disproof", then on Rhodes' reasoning the theist should not claim to know that God exists. If, however, the theist answers, "No, it is not possible that there is such a disproof," then the theist apparently thinks she can know a negative existential proposition to be true without being omniscient.

Even in Rhodes' scenario, all that is necessary is that a particular god's existence logically imply something that we know is false within the .1% of knowledge that Rhodes says we have. It then logically follows -- we have a deductive proof -- that that particular god does not exist. If Rhodes is going to claim that all propositions having any kind of deductive relationship to "god exists" are outside of what we know, then Rhodes has the burden of proof to show that.[15]

Indeed, many theological statements entail negative existential propositions, yet I doubt that many theists would claim they are omniscient:

The claim that, "God is all-knowing", is just another way of saying that, "There is no knowledge which an omniscient being lacks".
Theists often say that God is "omnipotent", meaning that God can do anything which is logically possible. In other words, there is no logically possible act which an omnipotent being is incapable of.
If a theist says that, "God is wholly good", that entails there is no evil act for which an omnibenevolent being is responsible.
Similarly, all of the theistic arguments for the existence of God assume negative existential propositions. For example:

The ontological argument assumes, "There is no being greater than the greatest being."
The cosmological argument assumes, "There is no thing that came from nothing."
The teleological argument assumes, "There is no naturalistic origin for the design and order of the universe."
The (metaphysical) moral argument assumes, "There are no objective moral values in a godless universe."
The transcendental argument assumes, "There is no atheist in the world."[16]
Finally, certain theological doctrines entail negative existential propositions. For example:

The doctrine of creation ex nihilo entails the negative existential proposition, "There is no infinite regress of causes in the universe's history."
The doctrine of biblical inerrancy entails the proposition, "There were no errors in the original autographs of the biblical manuscripts."
The doctrine of the Virgin Birth entails the proposition, "There was no material cause of Mary's conception."
The General Considerations Objection: what would we have to know about an object to prove its existence or nonexistence?
A final objection from the right to the possibility of an atheological proof perhaps may be found in Dallas Willard's commentary on the debate between J.P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen. I emphasize the word "perhaps" because it is unclear whether Willard is arguing that atheistic arguments are inherently more difficult to prove than theistic arguments in light of their negative existential status; Willard may believe that atheistic and theistic arguments are on equal footing in terms of what they must accomplish in order to be successful. Here is what Willard writes:

["There is no God"] is a negative existential, and looking for God here or there, finding or proving this not to be God and that not to be God, does nothing to budge it one bit toward or away from the status of knowledge or even of justified belief. To make any headway at all with the atheist's project, we will have to settle on some general considerations that will provide a structure within which particular facts may evidentially count for something. For example, take the general consideration that if God exists, suffering will not be allowed. Given this, the particular fact of this child being sexually abused by a drunken relative gains evidential significance for the existence or nonexistence of God. But then, of course, we have the task of securing the truth of this particular general consideration. A notoriously difficult undertaking![17]

This, of course, is perfectly compatible with my earlier observation that there are two ways to prove something does not exist: one way is to demonstrate a logical contradiction and the other way is to simply look and see. Willard's "general considerations" are simply an analysis of the attributes of the object in question, and that is a prerequisite for both negative and positive existentials. We must have an adequate understanding of what an object's existence entails before we can argue for or against its existence. Positive existentials do not have an advantage over negative existentials in this sense. In other words, we must have an understanding of the nature of a god before we can determine whether that god exists.

Willard suggests that "securing the truth" of his particular example of a general consideration, "that if God exists, suffering will not be allowed," will be "notoriously difficult." Now I would certainly join Willard in rejecting that particular consideration, for even theism is compatible with some suffering. But I would also suggest that there is some suffering -- namely, pointless suffering -- which is incompatible with theism. So let us consider a slightly modified version of Willard's example, "the general consideration that if God exists, no pointless suffering will be allowed." I think this consideration is fairly uncontroversial. I therefore conclude that there is at least one such consideration -- agreed upon by both theists and atheists -- which demonstrates the possibility of an atheological argument.

Moreover, with respect to the existence of a particular god, there is a sense in which negative existentials have an advantage over positive existentials. According to the principle of indifference, when we don't have any evidence favoring any of a set of alternatives over the others, we should count each alternative equally likely. Since there is literally an infinite number of logically possible gods, the prior probability of any individual god existing is very small. I shall have more to say about the significance of this fact later on in this essay.

Objections from the Left
The Noncognitivity Objection: is the concept of "God" factually meaningless?
Some writers have suggested that religious language (including God-talk) is factually meaningless. If their claim is correct, then by definition the statement, "God does not exist", would be neither true nor false. Therefore, if God-talk is factually meaningless, a sound argument for the nonexistence of God would be impossible. Following Theodore Drange's terminology, I shall refer to this objection as the "Noncognitivity Objection".[18]

In order to understand this objection, consider the following proposition:

(1) God exists.

According to the noncognitivist, (1) is neither true nor false because there is no evidence that would count for or against it.[19]

Now, without a clarification of the concept of "God" being used in (1), I am willing to grant that it might initially be unclear what sort of evidence would count for or against (1). I agree that certain types of God-talk are difficult to understand, if not just pure gibberish. And I might even be willing to go along with the claim that the concept of theism in general is vague, slippery, and possibly meaningless. But other statements that contain the word "God" seem quite meaningful to me. Consider, for example, the following claim:

(1') There exists a being called God whose properties include:
      (a) It exists immaterially
      (b) It created physical space and time
      (c) It determined the values of the physical constants of our universe
      (d) It desires a personal relationship with every human being
      (e) The Bible is Its word; It ensures that the Bible is free from errors of any kind

I have absolutely no problem whatsoever imagining evidence that would count for or against (1'), and therefore conclude that (1') is a factually meaningful statement. But what about other conceptions of "God" than the one considered in (1')? The factual meaningfulness of a God-concept must be evaluated on a case by case basis. While I think the majority of God-concepts (including those embraced by the major world religions) are factually meaningful, I allow for the possibility that some God-concepts may be factually meaningless. Yet even if some God-concepts turn out to be factually meaningless, that fact would have no bearing on the other God-concepts which are factually meaningful.

The Deductive Argument Objection: Must an atheological argument be deductive?
Yet another objection to the possibility of a sound argument for the nonexistence of a god can be found in the writings of Bertrand Russell. In order to understand the basis for Russell's objection, we must first understand how Russell defined the terms 'atheist' and 'agnostic':

An atheist, like a Christian, holds that we can know whether or not there is a God. The Christian holds that we can know there is a God; the atheist, that we can know there is not. The Agnostic suspends judgment, saying that there are not sufficient grounds either for affirmation or for denial. At the same time, an Agnostic may hold that the existence of God, though not impossible, is very improbable; he may even hold it so improbable that it is not worth considering in practice. In that case, he is not far removed from atheism.[20]

On Russell's view, while the agnostic is a person who holds that the existence of a god "is so improbable that it is not worth considering in practice" is "not far removed" from the atheist who holds that we can know that god does not exist, apparently they are removed far enough for Russell to insist upon the distinction. Yet what is the distinction in question here? If the agnostic who holds that the existence of a god "is so improbable that it is not worth considering in practice" is not an atheist, then, on Russell's view, the atheist who holds that that same god does not exist must have a deductive proof for the nonexistence of that god.

But why must the person who claims that a specific god does not exist be able to prove so deductively? Russell never says. And there is good reason to reject Russell's view. Inductive arguments form the basis for many of our beliefs, such as the belief, "The sun will rise tomorrow." Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the concept of a god that somehow makes it inappropriate to form probabilistic conclusions about the existence of that god, in the light of all the available evidence.[21] Moreover, what Russell wrote elsewhere seems to contradict his position:

None of us would seriously consider the possibility that all the gods of Homer really exist, and yet if you were to set to work to give a logical demonstration that Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, and the rest of them did not exist you would find it an awful job. You could not get such proof.[22]

Yet Russell does not state that he is "agnostic" concerning the existence of such a deductive proof; rather, he knows "you could not get such proof" even though he does not prove so deductively.[23] Granted, there may be no way to *deductively) disprove certain interpretations of the Greek gods, if they are defined so that there are no contradictions either internally or with the observable world. But other possible gods are falsifiable. They have self-contradictory properties or logically entail empirical data other than what we in fact see, and Russell never demonstrates the impossibility of disproving those gods. The possibility of a logical disproof of one particular god does not depend upon the success of a logical disproof of another god.

The Prior Probability Objection: if the existence of an object has a low prior probability, can that fact alone be used to prove the nonexistence of the objection in question?
My friend and colleague Rich Daniel has objected to my position on entirely different grounds. Daniel agrees with me that negative existential propositions can be proved using one of the two methods I mentioned at the beginning of my paper. Yet, Daniel argues, I have missed a third method of proving a negative existential proposition:

For example, consider the hypothetical god X: Most of the time the universe (which X created) runs according to physical laws that X invented, but X gets to interfere exactly 3,141,592,654 times. Cosmic forces beyond X's control limit the number of miracles.

Now clearly there is nothing about the number 3,141,592,654 that makes it more probable than 0, or 1, or 2, or a very large number of other numbers. So even though X is unfalsifiable by Jeff's definition, the probability of X's existence is very low. At least one valid kind of argument is missing from his list.[24]

What are we to make of hypothetical god X? Before considering Daniel's proposed atheological argument, let's first run through the two types of arguments for the nonexistence of a god I described earlier. The concept seems coherent; I don't see how the idea of god X leads to self-contradictions. What about a God-vs.-world argument? If the existence of X entails that human beings should be able to observe at least one of the 3,141,592,654 miracles in their lifetime and no human so far has observed a miracle, then that fact would constitute evidence against X. But if the existence of X does not entail such public miracles, then the "looking and seeing" method cannot be used to prove the nonexistence of X. In that situation, I claim that there is no way to prove the nonexistence of X.

Let "Y" refer to the number of times god X gets to interfere with physical laws. According to Daniel, the probability that Y equal 3,141,592,654 is low. After all, what's so special about the number 3,141,592,654? The value of Y could have been any number. Whatever the value of Y, we have no reason to expect that value over any other possible value. Thus, if we assume that all possible values of Y are equally likely, the likelihood that Y would be equal to any particular value is extremely low indeed. Call this likelihood the "prior probability of Y".

But does the nonexistence of X follow from the low prior probability of Y? I can't think of any reason why it would. On the hypothesis that god X actually exists, we would expect exactly the state of affairs which Daniel describes. If god X actually existed, we would expect there to be nothing special about the number 3,141,592,654 -- the value of Y would be unlikely -- even though god X existed. The fact that an object has a low prior probability, by itself, neither entails nor makes probable the non-existence of that object.

Nonetheless, I do think Daniel is onto something. If a claim has a low prior probability, the standard of evidence we would normally require before accepting that claim is increased. For example, consider the following two claims:

(2) I drove to work today.

(3) I flew to work today by flapping my arms quickly.

I suspect that most people would not even think twice before believing (2). The notion of someone driving to work is an everyday occurrence; the idea that I might be such a person is not should not be in any way surprising (assuming I am employed, can afford my own vehicle, etc.). Therefore, most people would probably accept (2) at face value; they would not demand proof of (2) beyond my claim that (2) is true.

But what about (3)? As far as I can tell, (3) is a coherent statement. Yet there is nothing in human experience to suggest that I, much less any other human being, is capable of self-sustained flight through the air. Therefore, on the basis of prior probability alone, rational people would rightfully demand evidence (beyond my word) for the truth of (3) before they believed me. The initial improbability of a claim does not constitute evidence against the claim; rather, it increases the standard of evidence by which the claim could be shown to be true.

The Presumption of Nonexistence Objection: is there a presumption of nonexistence?
Some writers have suggested a methodological principle which works as follows: the burden of proof is always on the one who claims the existence of something and if that burden is not fulfilled then it is reasonable to claim that the thing in question does not exist. Is this methodology an additional "method" for proving the nonexistence of something?

I don't think so. In the first place, proponents of this methodology argue that despite the lack of evidence for the nonexistence of the thing in question, we should just assume the thing does not exist. This is not an argument for the nonexistence of the thing in question. One might even argue that this methodology violates the principle, "Proportion your beliefs to the evidence."

Second, those who argue for a presumption of nonexistence do so on the basis that negative existential claims cannot be proven. If, as I have argued in this essay, that assumption turns out to be false, then there is no reason to adopt such a methodology.

Third, I agree with Theodore M. Drange who points out that this sort of methodology is not employed in science:

The main drawback to such a line of thought is that there is no good support for the methodological principle in question. It is not a principle observed in scientific research. For example, scientists do not deny the existence of, say, tachyons (faster-than-light particles) simply because no good evidence has been produced that they exist. And the same is true for other entities postulated in other hypotheses. Scientists do not reason to the nonexistence of the postulated entity merely from the current absence of positive evidence for its existence. The burden-of-proof principle is therefore not one employed in the sciences.[25]

As Drange writes, "Certainly things may exist even if there is currently no good evidence for their existence. In order for it to be reasonable to deny a thing's existence [on the basis of lack of evidence], there needs to be some reason to think that if it were to exist, then by now we would have found good evidence of that fact."[26] But that is my second method for proving the nonexistence of something. I therefore conclude there is no reason for a presumption of nonexistence to govern debates on whether a thing exists. In the absence of evidence for and against the existence of something, we should suspend judgment.

Conclusion
A sound argument for the nonexistence of a god is possible, if the concept of "God" in question is factually meaningful. I think this conclusion is one which even many theists should be willing to accept. After all, the mere possibility of a sound argument for the nonexistence of a god is logically compatible with theism; what theism requires is that there actually are no sound arguments for the nonexistence of God.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

* This is the third edition of this essay.

Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Jim Lippard, Mark Vuletic, Michael Martin, Theodore Drange, David McFadzean, Bill Schultz, and Rich Daniel for suggestions which improved this essay.

Notes
[1] Bertrand Russell, "What Is an Agnostic?" The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (ed. Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn, New York: Touchstone, 1961), p. 577.

[2] Only a couple of atheists have directly responded to this objection. See Mark Vuletic, "Is Atheism Logical?" (<http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/mark_vuletic/logical.html>, 1996) and Douglas M. Krueger, What Is Atheism? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1998).

I suppose that it might be objected that anyone who has published an argument for the nonexistence of a god has implicitly refuted the objection that such an argument is impossible. This is true, to the extent that such arguments are sound arguments. But the atheist response to the objection that "it is impossible to prove the nonexistence of God" need not depend on the soundness of such arguments. Even if all arguments for the nonexistence of gods failed, that would still not prove the impossibility of a sound argument for the nonexistence of a god.

[3] Methodological atheists, in contrast to metaphysical atheists, do not necessarily hold the positive belief that a particular god does not exist. A methodological atheist is simply a person who acts as if a god does not exist.

[4] On the former, see "Does the Atheist Bear a Burden of Proof? A Reply to Prof. Ralph McInerny" (<URL:http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_parsons/mcinerny.html>, 1997), and God and the Burden of Proof (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1989), both by Keith M. Parsons. As for the latter, atheist philosophers are contributing a growing number of books and articles on atheological arguments. See Jeffery Jay Lowder (ed.), "Arguments for Atheism", The Secular Web, http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nontheism/atheism/arguments.html.

[5] Mortimer Adler, Truth in Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1990), p. 36.

[6] Adler 1990, pp. 31-32.

[7] William Lane Craig in William Lane Craig and Frank Zindler, Atheism vs. Christianity: Where Does the Evidence Point?, cassette recording of a debate held on June 27, 1993 at Willow Creek Community Church, South Barrington, IL.

[8] To be precise, it is quite easy to prove that two-dimensional "square circles" cannot exist. In contrast, as Richard Swinburne points out, proving the coherence of any proposition is very difficult because there always remains the possibility that an actual contradiction has not yet been discovered. See Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (revised ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 38-49.

[9] Drange 1998, p. 22.

[10] Parsons 1989, p. 25.

[11] Drange 1988.

[12] Hank Hanegraaff, "The Folly of Denying God" Christian Research Newsletter (<URL:http://iclnet93.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/cri/cri-nwsl/crn0028a.txt>, 1990); Ron Rhodes, "Strategies for Dialoguing with Atheists" (<URL:http://home.earthlink.net/~ronrhodes/Atheism.html>, 1989); and Kenneth R. Samples, "Putting The Atheist on The Defensive" Christian Research Journal (<URL:http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/cri/cri-jrnl/crj0131a.txt>, 1992).

[13] Hanegraaff. Michael Martin, following the lead of Roland Puccetti, has developed an incoherence argument called "the argument from unrestricted existential statements" which attempts to demonstrate the incoherence of gods which purportedly have all factual knowledge. Martin argues that negative existential propositions are unknowable if they are completely unrestricted. See Martin, pp. 294-295.

[14] Rhodes 1989.

[15] I am grateful to Jim Lippard for this argument.

[16] According to the late Greg Bahnsen, "The claim of the presuppositionalist is there is no atheist in the world. There are people who profess atheism." See Bahnsen, Michael Martin Under the Microscope tape 1, (Nash, TX: Covenant Tape Ministry, n.d.), audiocassette. For a refutation of this argument, see Michael Martin, "Are There Really No Atheists?" (<URL:http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/no_atheists.html>, 1996).

[17] Dallas Willard, "Language, Being, God, & the Three Stages of Theistic Evidence" in J.P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1991), p. 198. Boldface mine.

[18] Theodore Drange 1998, p. 74.

[19] Martin 1990, p. 47.

[20] Russell 1961, p. 577.

[21] See Michael Martin, The Big Domino in the Sky and Other Atheistic Tales (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1996), pp. 48-49.

[22] Bertrand Russell, "Am I an Atheist or an Agnostic?" Bertrand Russell on God and Religion (ed. Al Seckel, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1986), p. 85. Italics are mine.

[23] If Russell feels that he can know such a thing without deductive proof, then he cannot consistently insist that the atheist must have a deductive proof in order to know that a specific god does not exist.

[24] Rich Daniel, "Other Ways to Disprove Specific Gods" (<URL:http://www.dnaco.net/~rwdaniel/other_disproofs.html>, 1998).

[25] Theodore M. Drange, "Nonbelief vs. Lack of Evidence: Two Atheological Arguments" (<URL:http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/anbvslea.html>, 1998).

[26] Drange 1998.


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"Is a Sound Argument for the Nonexistence of a God Even Possible?" is copyright © 1998 by Jeffery Jay Lowder.
The electronic version is copyright © 1998 Internet Infidels with the written permission of Jeffery Jay Lowder.


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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #8 on: 2006-12-08 14:50:30 »
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Hermit offers Blunderov a razor.

While arguments may be the proper domain of the well trained professional philosopher (far to few of whom are familiar with lambda (predicate) calculus, and thus competent to discuss the philosophy of science), I strongly recommend you stop thinking about arguments, it is premature to do so. This is precisely how we got into the current mess where some delusional states are revered instead of being treated appropriately. Start thinking about evidence. In the scientific method, any arguments require evidence (preferably are based on evidence and make predictions about evidence) or are simply not valid use of the scientific method. So think like a scientist, not a philosopher. Here is a good solid starting point. Based only on evidence answer the foillowing(with my answers italicized in parentheses):
  • Is the Universe an ethical place (Not really. Man tries and usually fails to impose his own ethics upon it.)
  • Is the Universe a fair place (Not that I have seen. Again, like ethics, man tries and usually fails to thrust fairness upon the disinterested Universe.)
  • Is the Universe a sentimental place (Not at all. Tooth, claw and wastefulness reign supreme)
  • Is the Universe a rational place ruled by laws (Very simple laws acting upon many objects, meaning that sometimes the rules appear opaque due to the chaos of interactions.)
  • Do we have any evidence that these laws have been broken (No - else they would not be laws)

Do we have any concrete reasons to imagine that there are god thingies (aside from hearsay)? (Not even slightly)

Now, still based only on evidence, what capabilities have god thingies demonstrated that man cannot? What benefits has man derived from god thingies? (You choose - I suggest there is no evidence for any god thingies, let alone god thingies with superman like capabilities offering mankind benefits.)

If you agree with the observations I made above and our answers are congruent, then you have to have concluded that the Universe is run by laws, and the laws don't speak to ethics or fairness and are not affected by sentiment. The Universe is, in the most brutal sense of the word, unfeeling.

God thingies, if there are god thingies, have to obey the laws of the Universe in all significant ways for two major reasons. Firstly logically the Universe could have no 'laws' if they were purely optional (internal inconsistency). Secondly, if the laws were being broken in any significant ways, there would be evidence of this which we would detect, and your answers above would be different. Therefore, even if there are god thingies hiding somewhere in the Universe, the god thingies clearly don't have the capacity, don't have the discernment, or don't have the desire to make the Universe a fairer, better or more ethical place. So unless you have found some evidence I don't know about yet for supermanlike capabilities, if there are god thingies, they are clearly constrained in effect just as we are. If there is no difference between any possible gods and ourselves, why should we acknowledge them as anything special?

You can safely discount personal testimony or feelings as the fruits of delusion, because if they were not, not only would they be common to, and thus validational of most madness, some drug or electromagnetic brain interactions, as well as most religions (including those the proponent dismisses as delusional - and there are bound to be some of those in all but the outer fringes of the new age touchie feelies whose feet in any case never touch earth - I find the blood drinking flesh eating monster god-thingies  best for them on the basis that if they are not engaging in human sacrifice those gods will be working against them), but can today be observed in action and even established through deliberate interference with effective brain functioning. Which is strong evidence that religious feelings are merely aberrations of normal brain function.

Now you have a structure for evaluation of god thingies. When somebody drags a rotting object into your presence and asserts that it is a god thingy or the fruits of a god thingy, don't argue. They possibly are better at argument and surely have more time to waste than you do (anyone who knows that this life is the only one we get knows that time is precious and irretrievable, not to be wasted). Ask for evidence sufficient to overcome the framework above. Anybody selling something else is selling snake oil. Treat them appropriately. When offered arguments, ask for evidence. Don't budge until you have some. This makes for good science and dooms theology to the history of the delusional - where it properly belongs. It also has the immense virtue of having very little logic to think about, and much less philosophy than usual to consider.

When a loopie-loonie tries to ask why you want to base your life philosophy on the scientific method, you can safely respond that the scientific method, for all its halting development and variable quality of application, is the only method in 7000 years of human history which we know has resulted in tangible benefits to mankind.

Kind Regards

Hermit
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With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #9 on: 2006-12-08 17:08:14 »
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Quote from: Hermit on 2006-12-08 14:50:30   

Hermit offers Blunderov a razor...

[Blunderov] I take your point. Thank you. No need to fight on their terrain. Makes life a lot less complicated.

I'm surprised to hear that not many professional philosophers are aux fait with calculus. I would have thought that it must be of interest to logicians, imperative even.

(A while back on the net I came across a formal logic (supposed) disproof of god which I cannot now relocate. The logic was way beyond me, but I recall that it involved a longish calculation which had as one of its variables the set of all possible universes. The logic, by a process which was sadly opaque to me, sort of whittled them all down to a universe which didn't have a god in it.)

I see that one David McFadzean is thanked in the acknowledgements...could it be?

Warm Regards.
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #10 on: 2006-12-08 22:38:19 »
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Quote from: David Lucifer on 2006-11-30 16:14:42   

I found your podcast "Atheist Faith" frustrating to say the least. I know you are a smart and knowledgable frood so I'm struggling to figure out why you are condemning the "new atheists".

Your guest Peter Christ is welcome to define "faith" however he likes but let's not pretend that hist definition has much to do with the faith that the new atheists are criticizing. Peter says he defines faith as when you believe in something that can't be proven to exist or don't believe in something that can't be proven to not exist. That's fine but in that case we all have faith because nothing can be proven to exist or not exist. Here I am assuming he meant "prove" as in 100% certainty which can never be achieved with empirical claims. On the other hand if he means proven beyond a reasonable doubt then he is incorrect to say "you can't prove a negative". Obviously that happens all the time in courtrooms where people prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "he didn't kill him" or "she didn't steal that". I can also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "New Zealand is not in the northern hemisphere" and (closer to the existence of God) "there is no element between carbon and nitrogen in the periodic table". The question is not what you can "prove", the real question is how much and what kind of evidence supports your claims.

Is it my imagination or was Dawkins accused of being a fascist? Yes, he wants others to believe as he does, but in the sense that he wants to educate people about science and share his joy and wonder of knowledge of the natural world. If he's a fascist than so is every great teacher and educator. So is Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi and even Jesus for working to enlighten those around them. Obviously I think you are way off base here. Nobody using just words to influence should be accused of fascism.

Perhaps there is something wrong with what theists believe. Wouldn't you agree something is wrong when the president of the USA announces that he invaded Iraq because Santa Claus told him to? Don't you think something is wrong when people all over the world are killing each other depending on whether they side with vampires or werewolves? Isn't something wrong when people with PhDs in the study of unicorns are invited to participate in ethical discussions because of their special insight? If you think the reality of the world in which we live differs in any essential way from my examples above please explain.

While nothing can be proven 100%, Athiesm, I believe, is as much of a religion as anything else. Agnosticism is one thing, but flat-out denying the existence of a higher power requires just as much faith as believing in one does.

You mention "proving" in court, but that's still not 100% proof -- that only means that the jurors have no other reasonable explanation for what happened. And depending on the jury, there's no telling how accurate that is -- look at the O.J. Simpson trial.

Say, my truck. Last time I saw my truck, it was parked with all my crap in it in a garage. I have no reasonable doubt that it's in the same position. It could have been moved, or stolen, or the garage could have burned down, or aliens could have decided they need a new truck to drive around their planet with, and not be there anymore. Since I was promised none of this would happen, I believe beyond a reasonable doubt that it's still there, just how I left it. But that still requires faith, because something crazy might have actually happened to it that I never saw coming.

One's religion is the same way. To them, a situation other than what they believe may be unreasonable, but it still takes plenty of faith.
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #11 on: 2006-12-09 02:29:45 »
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Dear Bass,

When you take your shoes off, you are barefoot, right?

When you don't ('a') vest belief in gods ('theism'), you are an atheist, right?

Would you regard "barefoot" as a class of footwear? If not, why would you regard atheism as a class of religion? How do you differentiate between classes of atheists? Atheists range from children before they are taught to believe (by stupid adults), through those people growing up in an atheist culture, who have only ever heard of gods in the context of foolish and harmful historical mass delusions (I am married to one), all the way to atheists like me, who know enough about them to weyken that the Judeo-Christian gods are nasty imaginary monsters, the utter antithesis of the way they are sold, fortunately completely impossible in this Universe. Unfortunately for your theory, I also agree that there could be something I might regard as a god thingy somewhere in a galaxy far-far-away, but note that I have not yet found one that meets this criteria and would argue that it would require very careful definition of such a thingie to get me to agree both to its possibility and to its godliness (probably mutually exclusive), and would hasten to observe that without positive evidence for such a thingie, it has to be regarded as altogether less likely than faeries at the bottom of the garden (which some gullible people think have been photographed. Some gullible people think).

What "faith" is that child investing? What "faith" am I investing?


Next, please note that atheism and agnosticism speak to completely different things.

As stated above, atheism speaks only to the non vesting of belief in gods, in other words, the assignment of an empty truth value to the reality of gods. For particular god thingies the certainty of whether they are possible or not could very well vary depending on the definition of the gods and their self-coherency and compatibility with the known nature of the Universe. From this comes the idea of weak and strong atheism.

Agnosticism, which is entirely compatible with weyken and the scientific method, and in fact, like weyken is explicitly dependent on the scientific method, does not speak so much to any conclusion (or non-conclusion) as it does to the method of attaining a conclusion (or not). In other words, agnosticism speaks to the ability (or rather inability) to ascertain knowledge about the attributes of a thing (not necessarily about gods).

Perhaps you are confused about the difference between strong and weak atheism which seems closer to what I understood you to have been attempting to articulate. Perhaps you should do some research. The link above might be helpful.


Now please tell me what qualities the "higher power" to which you referred, the "flat out denial" of whose "existence" requires "just as much faith as believing in one does". Please be as specific as possible. After all, I don't know anything about your "higher-power", or how I would recognize it. Yet.

But I'm sure you are going to tell me.

And then we are going to dissect whatever substance you serve up. If any. Which I beg to doubt.

Regards

Hermit
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #12 on: 2006-12-09 04:33:01 »
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Sometimes I think the idea of Santa Claus must have been invented by some very clever agnostic memetic engineer(s) to point out the fallacy religious arguments to laypeople.

Bass, you don't still believe in Santa, right? Does that mean you're part of some Asantaist religion? Of course not. Does it take just as much faith to not believe in Santa as it does to believe in him? Of course not. I'm sure you can see where this is going.
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #13 on: 2006-12-10 01:17:54 »
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Hermit you said.


Quote:
Would you regard "barefoot" as a class of footwear?

But there is no connection between the being ''barefoot'' example and being an atheist. An agnostic may be barefoot, but you are wearing the sandals of the faith that says ''I believe there exists no God''

You also said.


Quote:
Atheists range from children before they are taught to believe (by stupid adults), through those people growing up in an atheist culture, who have only ever heard of gods in the context of foolish and harmful historical mass delusions, all the way to atheists like me, who know enough about them to weyken that the Judeo-Christian gods are nasty imaginary monsters, the utter antithesis of the way they are sold, fortunately completely impossible in this Universe.

What do you mean, like masses and masses of ''stupid'' adults teaching religion to their children, while some peoples parents teach that there isn't any?

I don't understand.

Also Hermit are you suggesting that my parents for example are stupid here?

Just curious.

Also, do you hold that you have proven all these secrets on how a judeo-christian God is impossible in the Universe?

If so please share it.
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Re:Atheistic Faith?
« Reply #14 on: 2006-12-10 15:26:18 »
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[Hermit] We begin with the invalidity of assertion and development of foundational definitions

[Bass] But there is no connection between the being ''barefoot'' example and being an atheist. An agnostic may be barefoot, but you are wearing the sandals of the faith that says ''I believe there exists no God''

[Hermit] Having previously apologized for this, Bass again asserts that he can diagnose somebody else's internal state, and gratuitously shares his conclusions with us. He does not mention his qualifications for doing this, he does not share the data upon which he bases his conclusions, he does not even explain his methodology. Yet Bass asserts, over my protestations, that he thinks I believe, which is to accept something as true without sufficient evidence or in the face of the evidence.

[Hermit] Unfortunately for Bass none of his assertions seem to be valid.

[Hermit] On the one hand, Bass cannot know what is happening in my head beyond what I tell him. Bass certainly cannot know me better than I do. As I told him what I thought on this subject very, very carefully indeed, I am fairly certain that he has no sustainable grounds for his assertions about me.

[Hermit] To reiterate, I do my very best not to believe in anything. Not gods, not Santa Claus, not motor cars, not chairs, not people, not anything. When there is no evidence, I don't allow myself to establish a position. When there is evidence, I challenge it, evaluate it, if sustained, accept it and form conclusions. I never bother to manufacture or accept the idea of unnecessary visible creatures (e.g. Oompah Loompahs - if anyone hasn't seen Charley & the Chocolate factory with Jonny Depp, I recommend it), still less invisible creatures (the tooth fairy or Santa Claus), let alone all-powerful, all-knowing, invisible malevolent gods, to block off the exploration of the inexplicable. I'd rather enjoy the questions and the process of seeking answers.

[Hermit] I revel in my bare feet, so I do my very best not to poison my thinking by accepting fallacious ideas completely lacking in evidence. Ideas like phlogiston, aether, racial superiority, or even gods. Having failed to consider them on the proper grounds that they lack evidence, I don't need to vest any effort at all in disposing of them - and certainly not belief, which is, in my opinion, always harmful.

[Hermit] Perhaps this is conclusive enough to persuade Bass that he is not just overreaching, but also mistaken?

[Hermit] On the other hand, as Bass has been told before, and as he would have understand had he read the wikipedia article I recommended, atheism is simply not vesting belief in gods. In other words, Atheism is an internalized conclusion not to vest belief in gods, a conclusion which may be reached through many methods, some of which undoubtedly do not require belief or disbelief, just reason.

[Hermit] Agnosticism is the process of using the scientific method to come to the conclusion that something is not supported. So, as you see, atheism and agnosticism speak to different things. Agnosticism can be applied to other things too, not necessarily gods. For example, for years I held an skeptical perspective towards the supposed Loch Ness Monster, on the basis that the evidence for it was weak and the arguments that a population of such creatures could be sustained by the limited biosphere of a fresh water Scottish lake were stretches. After the instrumentation and sonar search of the lake agnosticism towards the Loch Ness Monster lead to my concluding that the always weak evidence had been shown to be a fabrication and a result of "wishing to believe" on the part of the proponents of the supposed monsters. At which point it took no belief whatsoever to make the absolute statement that there are no physical "monsters" in Loch Ness. No belief because there was no credible evidence compelling or even suggesting acceptance of their reality. Not too little evidence, but no credible evidence. Given that there is even less evidence for gods than there was for the Loch Ness Monster, agnosticism if used to evaluate the idea of gods and lack of evidence for gods would lead a rational person to atheism. Atheism and agnosticism are not opposed, indeed, as I have repeatedly explained, atheism may be reached through agnosticism. An agnostic is somebody who uses the process of agnosticism. They may or may not be atheists. Gods are not spoken to by agnosticism.

[Hermit] If this is not sufficiently detailed and clear for Bass, then instead of responding with disconnected assertions, perhaps he could attempt to write an essay making an argument for what he understands about agnosticism and atheism, or at least, to make an attempt to explain why his blatantly deficient definitions, contradicting Huxley, should be accepted. Perhaps before writing anything, Bass should study e.g. http://www.dartmouth.edu/~writing/materials/student/ac_paper/logic.shtml and try to incorporate its advice.

<snip>

[Hermit] Now for the more the personal stuff:

[Bass] Also Hermit are you suggesting that my parents for example are stupid here?

[Hermit] Did your parents take a potentially rational atheist infant (you) and teach it to believe (accept as true without evidence or in the face of the evidence) things (irrational gods)? If they did that, I would suggest that they gravely harmed your potential to be rational, or at the very least, condemned you to a massive effort to unlearn what you were taught before you can hope to begin the process of learning to become rational. If they did this, I suggest that if deliberate that it was very nasty. If they did this and it was not deliberate, then it was very, very stupid indeed. If they did this, for whatever reasons, then it was extremely harmful.

[Hermit] But I wasn't there, I don't know what your parents taught you – or more helpfully didn't teach you. If they taught, or did not teach you, I don't how they did or didn't do it. So, clearly I was not speaking about you or about your parents, as I am not qualified to do so. Even with what you have intimated here, I'm still quite unable to answer your question. Indeed, I suggest you are asking me a question that is quite probably best answered by yourself. As I had nothing to do with your upbringing or lack of it, please don't blame me for the conclusions you reach if you find them not to your liking.  After all, your parents, your upbringing, your conclusions. Nothing to do with me.

<snip>

[Hermit] Finally, let's slay some gods.

[Bass] Also, do you hold that you have proven all these secrets on how a judeo-christian God is impossible in the Universe? If so please share it.

[Hermit] I have frequently addressed the impossibilities of monsters sharing the claimed attributes of the Christian's gods in our Universe. It is in our archives. Before I go there again (which would bore me), I asked you a question which you (forgive me if I think, "as usual") didn't bother to respond to, and snipped without acknowledging it. So before asking me to continue, why don't you make an attempt at responding. Let me repeat my question in case it slipped your attention:
    ...please tell me what qualities the "higher power" to which you referred, the "flat out denial" of whose "existence" requires "just as much faith as believing in one does". Please be as specific as possible. After all, I don't know anything about your "higher-power", or how I would recognize it. Yet.
    But I'm sure you are going to tell me.
    And then we are going to dissect whatever substance you serve up. If any. Which I beg to doubt.


Awaiting your reply

Hermit.

PS Bass, notice that there is a structure to this reply. I've tried to make it explicit. In each section, each time I respond to something you have said, I attempt to define the situation, make my assumptions explicit, lay out an argument, and draw a conclusion. Whenever possible, I introduce an example to place my conclusion in a context which ought to reduce the potential of confusion. When responding, rather than making blanket contradictory assertions, it would be helpful if you would denote whether it is the definitions, the assumptions, the arguments the conclusion or the examples that you disagree. If you disagree with an argument, think about and try to communicate exacly why you disagree with it.

PPS Bass, when I ask a question, I try to denote what I am asking for and why. I respect your time by making my questions explicit. Please attempt to do the same.
« Last Edit: 2006-12-11 12:38:08 by Hermit » Report to moderator   Logged

With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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