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Topic: Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology) (Read 5701 times) |
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #30 on: 2007-05-16 21:14:45 » |
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I have replied to - and lost the replies to this twice. So let me belatedly try a third time while I wait for some downloads to complete.
I accept that you are largely accurate about the intended meaning of "rational belief" where belief is used in the majority of your selected quotes. This acceptance is based upon the purported speakers and the content. I have not, I think, suggested that belief is not used in this way, or cannot be used in this way, but have strongly suggested that use of it in this way dramatically strengthens the irrational argument that it is valid for many different people to hold many different beliefs and that all of them are valid in so far as they have believers. Which is why an alternative is, I think, desirable.
Just as you argue for Huxley's agnosticism which speaks to unbelief from methodological examination of evidence (but has come to mean something else entirely in the public eye), I argue for weyken for the conclusions drawn from methodological examination of evidence and state, now with much strengthened certainty from examining your excellent arguments, that "belief", qualified by "rational" does not sufficiently distinguish the massive difference from what the typical person comprehends from "belief" (unqualified), and from experience suggest that they probably would not comprehend a need to qualify it, if you explained it to them with great care, as persuasively and at even more length than you have tried to explain your beliefs about belief to me. That is a consequence of their being much further apart than us, and just as sure as you that their perspective is the best to employ (and in many ways, I would have to agree with them) and if they have the wit to recognise it, that your arguments strengthen their position (and in many ways I couldn't disagree with this assesment either). I suggest that their comprehension of belief is entirely elided from your great efforts to convince me that your interpretation of belief is both correct and sufficient.
Unfortunately, as your stated disregard of source and idiom leaves me unable to really discuss the meaning of words with you with any hope of a relevant outcome, perhaps we should agree to abandon this resulting-in-more-heat-than-light effort. Even without that (and I would next refer you to the authoritive source for English, the OED), as we come to the end of things to say, you asked, and answered
Quote:| Does awful still mean "full of awe"? Does tremendous still mean "dreadful and terrible"? Absolutely not. |
I disagree that your answer here covers any greater fraction of the world's population than did your responses - and clever non-responses - regarding belief. For a case in point, consider the words of the well known hymn beginning, "Oh Lord My God, When I in awesome wonder, consider all the works Thy hands have made." (for your own edification, consider searching for your examples in e.g. Hymns Ancient and Modern where there are multiple instances of both Awful: p 16, 29, 61, 66, 67, 80, 107, 129, 146, 162, 165 60, 68, 70, 82 and Dreadful p 33, 39, 47, 119. For "terrible" we need to visit the babble, e.g. here, where we can find tremendous in e.g. Revelation 16:18 "Then there came flashes of lightning, rumblings, peals of thunder and a severe earthquake. No earthquake like it has ever occurred since man has been on earth, so tremendous was the quake." (New English) indeed meaning "dreadful and terrible" and nothing else unless you count as significant, the earthquake being undocumented, unfounded, not supported by and in fact contradicted by, the evidence as well as most likely being completely untrue despite being believed by multitudes of Christians.
My arguments were not really about the benefit - or lack of benefit - about replacing belief for old disbelievers like yourself, so much as for the much more numerous population embedded in the choir-singing, old-school, kind of beliefs. Who are still confronted by, very much aware of, and schooled in the use of words like "awesome", "dreadful" and "terrible" - as well as "belief" (in the sense of unsupported by evidence and in the face of it) from their pews every Sunday of the year.
While perfectly sensible, rational people like yourself, a self-identified "memetic engineer", can continue not only to use precisely the same words as the irrational to mean something completely different to what is meant and understood by the irrational, where those words and the concepts behind them are not only at odds with each other, but are absolutely central to any discussion on the merits of rationality, any hopes of seeing rationality making headway against the irrational are, I fear, doomed to disappointment. Largely because we know that all that is needed for somebody to accept any concept, no matter how bizarre, as true, is for their environment to be permeated by a mass of sources they accept (or can be persuaded to accept) telling them it is true. Here we have the central concept of rational and irrational beliefs being equivalent being seemingly affirmed by the person arguing the very opposite. How more self-defeatist is it possible to be?
Very kind regards and thanks for clarifying my thinking on this issue (no sarcasm intended in this line or elsewhere in this post),
Hermit
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #31 on: 2007-05-17 12:25:48 » |
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Hermit,
I agree that using certain words in an argument that have lost the strength of their original meaning can lead to red herrings, and tangents and cyclic arguments that hinder an understanding between two parties with a different point of view.
I'd have to ask though, why do you feel it is necessary to add a word and not use the words we have available? Dawkins, when responding to claims that he has faith in science and reason, made a statement that effectively said that such claims are confusing faith with confidence. If one feels that "belief" is not an efficient communicator, I think one can use "confidence" and maybe even "acceptance" and "understanding" in much the same way without invoking arguments revolving around semantical misunderstandings.
To take a couple of examples from what David Lucifer last posted:
I am confident that an orderly universe, one indifferent to human preoccupations, in which everything has an explanation even if we still have a long way to go before we find it, is a more beautiful, more wonderful place than a universe tricked out with capricious ad hoc magic.
Among those who contribute to this problem, I am sorry to say, is, my good friend Dick Rorty. Richard Rorty and I have been constructively disagreeing with each other for over a quarter of a century now. I am confident that each of us has taught the other a great deal in the reciprocal process of chipping away at our residual points of disagreement.
It is an awful stretcher to accept that a peacock's tail was thus formed; but, accepting it, I am confident that the same principle somewhat modified applied to man.
Surely Darwin would have agreed, if asked, that natural selection was another awful stretcher he was confident in.
et cetera et cetera
From the memetic perspective, it would be easier to achieve a nearer goal (convicing like minds to change their diction) which in turn would facilitate a more distant goal (communicating with opponents) if you were manipulating what people already know as oppopsed to introducing something entirely new.
post scriptum: I will say that in the second example -- "I am confident that each of us has taught..." -- the use of the word "belief" would be acceptable because it is not an epistomological statement.
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #32 on: 2007-05-17 18:16:38 » |
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[Hermit] Shiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiit. I lost another reply. Twice. Screams. It is so frustrating to write something already articulated. Especially when it was full of references. So you are going to get this without references, but they are there for the clueful to find. Another issue is that it is so easy to miss out on important thoughts - even foundational one's - because of imagining ( I almost said 'believing' here :-)) them to be included already. So while I've read this through several times in the hope of finding all the glitches, please draw my attention to anything you see as insufficiently founded. Also, please excuse my switching the order of your statements, but I found it easier to convey what I meant in a comprehensible and reasonably brief fashion this way.
[ObfuscatoryAlias] From the memetic perspective, it would be easier to achieve a nearer goal (convicing like minds to change their diction) which in turn would facilitate a more distant goal (communicating with opponents) if you were manipulating what people already know as oppopsed to introducing something entirely new.
[Hermit] This is perhaps true, I for one am disinclined to argue otherwise. Which is why I am arguing for a new word and its careful dissemination and use. You see, I can not only argue, but am sure I can sustain the argument, that the believers got there long, long before we were ever thought of, and the job of "convincing like minds" has long passed. At which point, if after reading and cogitating on the following, you conclude that I am correct, this assertion of yours must logically be seen as a strong reason to support my arguments.
[ObfuscatoryAlias] I'd have to ask though, why do you feel it is necessary to add a word and not use the words we have available? Dawkins, when responding to claims that he has faith in science and reason, made a statement that effectively said that such claims are confusing faith with confidence. If one feels that "belief" is not an efficient communicator, I think one can use "confidence" and maybe even "acceptance" and "understanding" in much the same way without invoking arguments revolving around semantical misunderstandings.
[Hermit] Perhaps I have studied too much. To me, having once been fluent in Latin, French, German and Dutch (all sources to Modern English), amongst other languages, and having studied Middle French and English, it seems clear that the well is poisoned so effectively that discussion of such philological issues is completely invalidated if, like Nietszche or Russell (and myself), you think that words have to unambiguously convey a concept common to speaker and listener to communicate "Meaning and Truth." Reading that, in association with the concept of provisionalism as introduced by Huxley and formalized by Popper, we still require a shared comprehension however provisional, in order to communicate anything of significance. For example, I wanted to run and hide when I saw you propose to substitute 'belief' (through OE, gele-afa, parallel to bij - N. with; geloof - N. faith, love, trust, worship, praise) with 'confidence' (con - L. with; fides - L. faith; trust and again via OE and G.). The meaning and underlying source for both words stemming from a Christian reworking of Platonic and neoPlatonic philosophy (with all the original epistemic flaws and a whole slew of introduced ones) is identical. Only the stem languages are different, not the ideas behind the words.
[Hermit] I think that if we take modern philosophical comprehension into account the situation becomes worse for those opposing my position rather than better. For example, Hume proposes that belief is purely an extension of habituation, using the example of a person observing a bouncing ball and then concluding that dropping a ball leads to bouncing (even though this is pure induction through observation rather than a functional deductive hypothesis). Hume proceeds from there to articulate that if something sounds reasonable to us (based on habit) then we will probably end up believing it (accept it as true despite the logical failure inherent in this acceptance) because of what he terms "vivacity of belief". From this, my understanding of Hume's position parallels my assertions here, that the believer's acceptance (vesting of “belief”) of bounce as a conclusion to drop ball is based neither on logic nor on sufficient evidence to compel acceptance, but rather in faith or trust (that one's conclusion is sufficient to treat as being true, despite the flawed process of deriving the conclusion).
[Hermit] Reverting to hermeneutics, a believer familiar with one of the Judaic derived mind-poisons might (in their opinion justifiably) express confidence that their favorite translation of their babble is the literal inspired word of their god-thingies and argue - very rationally - that this means that Bishop Usher's calculations based on the pseudo-genealogies of their codices that the Earth was created at precisely 09h00 Dublin Time (non-local time had to wait for the coming of the railways), of October 26, 4004 BCE is precisely correct. Based on their axioms, nobody could assert that their confidence (accepted through faith) was misplaced, or their conclusion not a "rational" (a logically correct conclusion derived from and based in proximal axioms) "belief" (whatever that is taken to mean, I'm not going here again.). Which is, again, exactly my point. While the rational belief of the believer may be diametrically opposed to your's, mine, or Lucifer's, or whether it is identical in some or all of these instances is left completely open by this use of overloaded semantics. So long as this is the case, the unbeliever is unable to argue without reinforcing the Platonic epistemology (Truths (capital "t") + Beliefs (capital "b") => Knowledge) underlying the conclusions of the believer (if not precisely the exact formulation the believer might prefer) and so self-defeating. I suggest that the only people to whom this mare's nest of majestically loaded, religiously-derived phraseology is an advantage, are the believers.
[Hermit] It may be a flaw in my vocabulary, but careful research and much meditation on the issue leads me to conclude that there is no equivalent for "weyken", carrying as it does the requirement that the evolving methods of science (observation, perception, explanation, prediction, propter hoc, repeatability, supportability, communicability, verifiability, provisionalism) be used to justify an assertion of weyken, preferably explicitly, rather than terms which are at least confoundable, if not deliberately selected to be semantically loaded, by thinkers who were believers long before they were thinkers. If you can think of such a word I have missed, please let me know.
[Hermit] Meanwhile, as communicated earlier in this thread, weyken possesses the merit of establishing elucidatory opportunities where the methods of science and belief may be contrasted, hopefully to the benefit of the cause of reason. Certainly weyken has the virtue of eliminating ambiguity, even if that means that we must agree to disagree on whether ambiguity can be as helpful to rational people as it clearly is to the much larger armies of believers. The mere fact that their numbers are so much larger, and that unbelievers cannot have a discussion, let-alone agree on conclusions on this subject, without resorting to language steeped in centuries of sometimes explicit religious loading (e.g. "belief" in the hands of Webster*), should, in my opinion, convey somewhat of, at the minimum, a pause for thought.
Kind Regards
Hermit
*Noah Webster had an agenda. Here, in his own words, from the preface to Noah Webster's 1928 edition of "The American Dictionary of the English Language" is what it was
Quote:| "It satisfies my mind that I have done all that my health, my talents and my pecuniary means would enable me to accomplish. I present it to my fellow citizens, not with frigid indifference, but with my ardent wishes for their improvement and their happiness; and for the continued increase of the wealth, the learning, the moral and religious elevation of character, and the glory of my country." Noah Webster, New Haven, 1828. And from CTI, "The American Dictionary of the English Language" is based upon God's written word, for Noah Webster used the Bible as the foundation for his definitions. This standard reference tool will greatly assist students of all ages in their studies. From American History to literature, from science to the Word of God, this dictionary is a necessity. The 1828 dictionary reflects our nation's Christian heritage, and the Christian philosophy for life, government, and education. We present this magnificent work hoping that it will be a great blessing to all who seek to use it in their studies." |
[Cf http://www.churchofvirus.org/archive/0202/1238.html
Further discussion at http://www.churchofvirus.org/bbs/index.php?board=53;action=display;threadid=34034
Also of possible interest is Discussion-Lexicon-Belief-2003-09-03 Which show that not only have Lucifer and my positions not moved in any significant way, but that he suggested the idea of coining a new word (excerpted, corrected and abbreviated):
<Lucifer> Now we have a problem. I no longer agree with the wording
<Hermit> So, edit it. Fix it. Make yourself happy. But please avoid belief. That's the only problem.
<Lucifer> Then you won't agree with it. I'm willing to use a different word if you can provide one
<Hermit> I provided several
<Lucifer> No, I want something that means what I mean. You provided none yet. No, we can always make up a new word if it comes to that
<Hermit> A philosophy when it refers to a comprehensive interlocked internal representation of being towards self. A position when it refers towards taking a stance based on an assessment.
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #33 on: 2007-05-18 12:43:35 » |
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Quote from: Hermit on 2007-05-16 21:14:45
I disagree that your answer here covers any greater fraction of the world's population than did your responses - and clever non-responses - regarding belief. |
I think you are mistaken. Both "awesome" and "tremendous" have changed meaning. For modern english speakers they both mean exceedingly good, whereas originally they meant exceedingly bad. Quoting old hymn books doesn't help your case at all.
Quote:| While perfectly sensible, rational people like yourself, a self-identified "memetic engineer", can continue not only to use precisely the same words as the irrational to mean something completely different to what is meant and understood by the irrational, where those words and the concepts behind them are not only at odds with each other, but are absolutely central to any discussion on the merits of rationality, any hopes of seeing rationality making headway against the irrational are, I fear, doomed to disappointment. |
Evidently we still have a major point of disagreement. Contrary to what you say here, I claim that I use the word "belief" in the same way that the vast majority of people, both rational and irrational, use it.
Similar to the word "desire" it says nothing about whether the particular intentional stance is founded or unfounded, good or bad, rational or irrational, conscious or unconscious.
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #34 on: 2007-05-18 14:22:08 » |
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[Lucifer] I think you are mistaken. Both "awesome" and "tremendous" have changed meaning. For modern english speakers they both mean exceedingly good, whereas originally they meant exceedingly bad. Quoting old hymn books doesn't help your case at all.
[Hermit] Should I then understand that the bombing campaign which opened the destruction of Iraq entitled "Shock and Awe" was the sight, sound and feeling of America doing, "exceedingly good" things for Iraqi's?
[Hermit] And when we have a tremendous blaze which destroys tens of thousands of acres of wildlife, dozens of communities and hundreds of homes, this is an "exeedingly good" thing?
[Hermit] I don't think so! Neither, it seems, does dictionary.com; although your putative meaning for awful is shown as a "slang" usage; and for tremendous, as an alternative (dating from 1812 so teetering on the precise year generally taken to demark the Modern age, so while it probably isn't exactly what you were thinking of when you said "modern", I won't fault you for it.).
[Hermit] Here we have the central concept of rational and irrational beliefs being equivalent being seemingly affirmed by the person arguing the very opposite. How more self-defeatist is it possible to be?
[Lucifer] Evidently we still have a major point of disagreement. Contrary to what you say here, I claim that I use the word "belief" in the same way that the vast majority of people, both rational and irrational, use it.
[Hermit] Precisely.
[Lucifer] Similar to the word "desire" it says nothing about whether the particular intentional stance is founded or unfounded, good or bad, rational or irrational, conscious or unconscious.
[Hermit] Exactly so. "Here we have the central concept of rational and irrational beliefs being equivalent ."
Kind Regards
Hermit
PS, I quoted from Hymns Ancient and Modern both because that is still very much in use and because I don't know any other hymnals. The fact that you seem not to have realized that these hymns are still current, meaning that these hymns are still sung on a regular basis makes it even more clear that your arguments are really from ignorance - which in this case I suggest really is bliss - as close encounters with the brain damaged born again (and they all seem to suffer brain damage in the process of being "reborn") is really neither amusing nor educational. To confirm that I am not singing out of my hat, evaluate the dates ascribed to the "favorite hymns" shown here.
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With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #35 on: 2007-05-30 14:51:24 » |
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Quote from: Hermit on 2007-05-17 18:16:38
[Hermit] This is perhaps true, I for one am disinclined to argue otherwise. Which is why I am arguing for a new word and its careful dissemination and use. You see, I can not only argue, but am sure I can sustain the argument, that the believers got there long, long before we were ever thought of, and the job of "convincing like minds" has long passed. At which point, if after reading and cogitating on the following, you conclude that I am correct, this assertion of yours must logically be seen as a strong reason to support my arguments. |
By "convincing like minds" I meant, of course, as to the use of a new word. The purpose of creating this word is to assert to an opponent that what they believe and what you believe are not of equal value. I do believe that creating a new word would actually hinder that goal.
Quote:| [Hermit] Perhaps I have studied too much. To me, having once been fluent in Latin, French, German and Dutch (all sources to Modern English), amongst other languages, and having studied Middle French and English, it seems clear that the well is poisoned so effectively that discussion of such philological issues is completely invalidated if, like Nietszche or Russell (and myself), you think that words have to unambiguously convey a concept common to speaker and listener to communicate "Meaning and Truth." Reading that, in association with the concept of provisionalism as introduced by Huxley and formalized by Popper, we still require a shared comprehension however provisional, in order to communicate anything of significance. For example, I wanted to run and hide when I saw you propose to substitute 'belief' (through OE, gele-afa, parallel to bij - N. with; geloof - N. faith, love, trust, worship, praise) with 'confidence' (con - L. with; fides - L. faith; trust and again via OE and G.). The meaning and underlying source for both words stemming from a Christian reworking of Platonic and neoPlatonic philosophy (with all the original epistemic flaws and a whole slew of introduced ones) is identical. Only the stem languages are different, not the ideas behind the words. |
You are placing too much importance in the etymology here. Whatever the origin of the word, you must recognize that how certain words are interpreted in modern dialogue is predictable and that predictable interpretation has nothing to do with etymology. The goal of your new word is to communicate an idea which in turn has a goal of communicating an idea to an opponent. But in modern language that idea can be communicated through existing channels without being muddle by etymology. There is nothing wrong with expressing confidence in something because it still begs the question "why" and being that the problem with the word "belief" is that it no longer does beg that question, the purposes have been met.
Quote:[Hermit] I think that if we take modern philosophical comprehension into account the situation becomes worse for those opposing my position rather than better. For example, Hume proposes that belief is purely an extension of habituation, using the example of a person observing a bouncing ball and then concluding that dropping a ball leads to bouncing (even though this is pure induction through observation rather than a functional deductive hypothesis). Hume proceeds from there to articulate that if something sounds reasonable to us (based on habit) then we will probably end up believing it (accept it as true despite the logical failure inherent in this acceptance) because of what he terms "vivacity of belief". From this, my understanding of Hume's position parallels my assertions here, that the believer's acceptance (vesting of “belief”) of bounce as a conclusion to drop ball is based neither on logic nor on sufficient evidence to compel acceptance, but rather in faith or trust (that one's conclusion is sufficient to treat as being true, despite the flawed process of deriving the conclusion).
[Hermit] Reverting to hermeneutics, a believer familiar with one of the Judaic derived mind-poisons might (in their opinion justifiably) express confidence that their favorite translation of their babble is the literal inspired word of their god-thingies and argue - very rationally - that this means that Bishop Usher's calculations based on the pseudo-genealogies of their codices that the Earth was created at precisely 09h00 Dublin Time (non-local time had to wait for the coming of the railways), of October 26, 4004 BCE is precisely correct. Based on their axioms, nobody could assert that their confidence (accepted through faith) was misplaced, or their conclusion not a "rational" (a logically correct conclusion derived from and based in proximal axioms) "belief" (whatever that is taken to mean, I'm not going here again.). Which is, again, exactly my point. While the rational belief of the believer may be diametrically opposed to your's, mine, or Lucifer's, or whether it is identical in some or all of these instances is left completely open by this use of overloaded semantics. So long as this is the case, the unbeliever is unable to argue without reinforcing the Platonic epistemology (Truths (capital "t") + Beliefs (capital "b") => Knowledge) underlying the conclusions of the believer (if not precisely the exact formulation the believer might prefer) and so self-defeating. I suggest that the only people to whom this mare's nest of majestically loaded, religiously-derived phraseology is an advantage, are the believers.
[Hermit] It may be a flaw in my vocabulary, but careful research and much meditation on the issue leads me to conclude that there is no equivalent for "weyken", carrying as it does the requirement that the evolving methods of science (observation, perception, explanation, prediction, propter hoc, repeatability, supportability, communicability, verifiability, provisionalism) be used to justify an assertion of weyken, preferably explicitly, rather than terms which are at least confoundable, if not deliberately selected to be semantically loaded, by thinkers who were believers long before they were thinkers. If you can think of such a word I have missed, please let me know.
[Hermit] Meanwhile, as communicated earlier in this thread, weyken possesses the merit of establishing elucidatory opportunities where the methods of science and belief may be contrasted, hopefully to the benefit of the cause of reason. Certainly weyken has the virtue of eliminating ambiguity, even if that means that we must agree to disagree on whether ambiguity can be as helpful to rational people as it clearly is to the much larger armies of believers. The mere fact that their numbers are so much larger, and that unbelievers cannot have a discussion, let-alone agree on conclusions on this subject, without resorting to language steeped in centuries of sometimes explicit religious loading (e.g. "belief" in the hands of Webster*), should, in my opinion, convey somewhat of, at the minimum, a pause for thought.
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I'll set aside the fact that I believe the words fact and theory (or the acceptance thereof) as they are used scientifically satisfy "observation, perception, explanation, prediction, propter hoc, repeatability, supportability, communicability, verifiability, provisionalism" because I know you would comment on the ambiguous interpretations of those as well, especially the latter. I will move on to say that I think you are placing far too much importance on the impact of a single statement summarizing an argument rather than the argument itself. The word "belief" is never used in the true, logical argument of a position but rather in an introductory or conclusory way. By creating a different word you are hoping to gain all ground without completely wording an argument. Unfortunately, an individual who ignores the true points of an argument and places his focus on the summarizing rhetoric with the hope of illogically manipulating words located therein are effectively damned and stupid and nothing can be gained from having discussions with such people.
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #36 on: 2007-05-30 15:30:21 » |
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Hermit, I found the following quote in the Anti-Meme thread in the Memetics section:
Quote:The way I see it is if something has memes it is impossible to remove those memes whilst leaving no memes (a memetic void). In my view memes can only be replaced/converted from other memes into other memes; assimilation would be a good word to describe this effect; so basically memes will always assimilate, but never actually annihilate, the information is simply converted via memetic interaction and thus assimilated. If I get lucky perhaps we could deem this the first law of memetics
I weyken that a more accurate terminology would be 'memetic inhibitors', rather then "anti-memes" when considering an example like that of what Lucifer used.
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It seems that it can lead to just as much of a lack of clarity. No? It will evolve and be interpreted. It didn't take long -- one memetic generation -- before it was, what I believe, used without accordance to your intentions.
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #37 on: 2007-05-30 15:57:54 » |
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[ObfuscatoryAlias] You are placing too much importance in the etymology here. Whatever the origin of the word, you must recognize that how certain words are interpreted in modern dialogue is predictable and that predictable interpretation has nothing to do with etymology. The goal of your new word is to communicate an idea which in turn has a goal of communicating an idea to an opponent. But in modern language that idea can be communicated through existing channels without being muddle by etymology. There is nothing wrong with expressing confidence in something because it still begs the question "why" and being that the problem with the word "belief" is that it no longer does beg that question, the purposes have been met.
[Hermit] I admit confusion, as I no longer know if we are speaking to weyken, where I have provided an explanation of the derivation, but where the etymology is clearly subordinate to the definition; or about belief, where I'm not arguing to or from etymology either, so much as saying that etymology leads to the meaning of belief prior to a deliberate process of transmutation initiated so far as I am aware by Webster; or even about confidence where I agree that the modern comprehension is not as faith tainted as that of belief, although as I showed, the source is identiccal and it behoves us to be cautious as there are always strong residual associations and often emotional shadowing, between a word and its source.
[Hermit] Further on belief, and raising an analogy, there are some things which cannot be qualified in any meaningful manner. Science for example is a study undertaken in conformance with the emergent scientific method. "Christian Science" or "Creation Science" or even "Magharishi's Vedic Science" (pale mauve shudder) is simply bogus use of the word, even if the believers do not understand why, because it does not conform to the method. This may not be useful in arguing with believers, but it makes communication between rational people more effective.
[Hermit] With belief it is the other way around. The default position is to trust with insufficient or contradictory evidence because that is how it is used. Some people may attempt to rationalize their use of the word belief by qualifying it. I think the need for qualification emphasises the weakness of this attempted differentiation.
[Hermit] I agree that confidence could often be used today, without the sidetrack into etymology, and even consider that think could be used in many instances, but neither word carries all of the implications or any of the weight of weyken. Personally I am at a loss to see how you got from what has been said so far to the conclusion (?) that having a word which is defined precisely as what a scientist means when she says, "I consider this likely" (another phrase that the believers leap upon to show that there is a chance of being wrong) could possibly be harmful to the cause of clarity in speech - and rationality. Perhaps you will expand on this thought to the potential benefit of all.
[Hermit] Aside from this minor caveat and request for clarification, I don't think I disagree with very much of what you wrote at all. Indeed to:
[ObfuscatoryAlias] Unfortunately, an individual who ignores the true points of an argument and places his focus on the summarizing rhetoric with the hope of illogically manipulating words located therein are effectively damned and stupid and nothing can be gained from having discussions with such people.
[Hermit] I can only say Amen :-)
Kind Regards
Hermit
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With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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Hermit
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #38 on: 2007-05-30 17:04:06 » |
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[ObfuscatoryAlias] It seems that it can lead to just as much of a lack of clarity. No? It will evolve and be interpreted. It didn't take long -- one memetic generation -- before it was, what I believe, used without accordance to your intentions.
[Hermit] No. While Fox may be merely borrowing the "cloak of rationality" in this use, he could equally well be working to definition. Refer http://www.churchofvirus.org/wiki/weyken. I can't tell. The scientific method is not a prerequisite, only a recommendation, and I don't know what evidence he considered. What I can tell is that he is attempting to differentiate himself as somebody who has carefully considered what it means when he internalizes data as supportable knowledge with a sustainable provisional truth value. His use of 'weyken' here suggests, to me at least, that he is prepared to back-up his position with evidence, a hypothesis, his methodology and his conclusions even if they are not currently fully articulated.
[Hermit] Had he said "I believe" I could not have made any of those assumptions without knowing him. Should an impostor attempt this usage, the first question should suffice to provide due notice of an attempted fraud.
[Hermit] While words change with time, with background and with perspective, a word which is tautly defined and intended to act as a standard in opposition to a widely held opinion tends to persevere, consider for example, the case of the mythical "Ned Ludd." Even words which don't have these advantages continue to carry the emotional flavor. You might find clever and attractive things fascinating, but you would not blink if I described a mouse as being fascinated into immobility by a serpent either; and some number of people in a group would laugh if I described a boxing match as fascinating. I have and they did, so I know (anecdotal but persuasive IMNSHO).
[Hermit] As the engineers, lawyers, farmers and scientists - along with not a few Virians - I have infected with this idea, and those they have infected in turn may be showing, even the desire to differentiate oneself from the sheep can suffice as a memetic pull. Which is fine by me as science and secular philosophy tries belatedly but earnestly to rescue the quest for meaning and truth from the sewers of religion, differentiation is important.
Kind Regards
Hermit
(Who wonders why Firefox keeps dying on a Fedora VI machine with the SL client being the only non-standard software installed on it).
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With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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Blunderov
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #39 on: 2007-05-30 17:09:37 » |
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[Blunderov] (I think Iolo also said before) I am in favour of the neologism if only for the agitprop. I weyken it has more virtue than merely that, but that would be sufficient anyway.
To elaborate; there has been a very long history of the entirely cynical equivocation of "faith" and "belief" by the religious establishment. New paradigms need new words. I celebrate every nail in the coffin of religion as a drop of unparching rain.
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David Lucifer
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #40 on: 2007-05-31 11:23:15 » |
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[Lucifer] I think you are mistaken. Both "awesome" and "tremendous" have changed meaning. For modern english speakers they both mean exceedingly good, whereas originally they meant exceedingly bad. Quoting old hymn books doesn't help your case at all.
[Hermit] Should I then understand that the bombing campaign which opened the destruction of Iraq entitled "Shock and Awe" was the sight, sound and feeling of America doing, "exceedingly good" things for Iraqi's?
[Hermit] And when we have a tremendous blaze which destroys tens of thousands of acres of wildlife, dozens of communities and hundreds of homes, this is an "exeedingly good" thing?
[Hermit] I don't think so! Neither, it seems, does dictionary.com; although your putative meaning for awful is shown as a "slang" usage; and for tremendous, as an alternative (dating from 1812 so teetering on the precise year generally taken to demark the Modern age, so while it probably isn't exactly what you were thinking of when you said "modern", I won't fault you for it.).
[Lucifer] Recall that we were talking about "awesome" not "awe".
Let me try one more time. Say you overhear two people coming out of a movie theater. One says "That was awesome!". The other one says, "yeah, that was tremendous!". Do you think they thought the movie was excellent or very bad?
In cany case you can't determine a word's current meaning by looking at its original meaning. Do you really think otherwise or do you need more counterexamples? If so, how many?
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David Lucifer
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #41 on: 2007-05-31 11:24:57 » |
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[Blunderov] (I think Iolo also said before) I am in favour of the neologism if only for the agitprop. I weyken it has more virtue than merely that, but that would be sufficient anyway.
To elaborate; there has been a very long history of the entirely cynical equivocation of "faith" and "belief" by the religious establishment. New paradigms need new words. I celebrate every nail in the coffin of religion as a drop of unparching rain.
[Lucifer] Like I said it is a fine neologism but it won't help. If it ever becomes popular Christians will just say that they weyken that God exists and Jesus saves. And then we are back to square one.
Also I don't doubt that fundamentalists mean faith when they proclaim "I believe!" in a church. But the exact same people do not mean faith when they say "I believe the bug is in the printer driver" at work, or when they say "I believe both robbers had guns" in a court of law or when they say "I believe Bobby took the last cookie" at home.
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #42 on: 2007-06-01 15:56:46 » |
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Hermit:
I wasn't trying to imply that there is something necessarily wrong with the word and that it would have negative effects. I was only saying that I don't think it will work. You want to separate "belief" from "weyken" but those who will be able to understand the true meaning of "weyken" have the capability of understanding the different types of "belief" as they relate to context and those who cannot mentally separate those usages of "belief" would misunderstand "weyken."
That said I think word of mouth is actually not the best way to infect language with the word. The best way would be to have a published work that seeks to achieve a goal and uses the neologism as a tool to do so. Just as it was done with "meme." If Dawkins walked around and said meme without it being in a published work, we probably wouldn't be using it today.
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #43 on: 2007-06-02 13:22:19 » |
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I'll try to finish one if I ever find the time.
The trouble believers would have is that their god delusions are not falsifiable supportable hypotheses explaining some observation, because their god thingies, long relegated to the gaps, are now masters of evasion. thus:Question 1: Define a difference there would be in the Universe that would prove that there are/are not god thingies?
Answer: Believer waves hands.
Question 2: What is the difference between an undetectable god thingie and no god thingie?
Answer: Believer waves hands. Working Hypothesis: God thingies are not sustainable through the scientific method and thus weyken does not apply.
Challenge: Generally speaking believers, even believers with scientific training, have to commit the fraud of eliding vast pieces of the scientific hypothetico-deductive method from their comprehension, or have to wear mental blinders preventing them from applying the scientific method to anything approaching their belief systems (the edges of which are difficult to define precisely enough to be able to use such people without having to recheck all of their results). While I have met believers of both types, including some who call themselves scientists, I distrust them on principle on their theology, and from experience of too many of them (including the really, really smart (but still delusional) ones) on their ability to do science thoroughly and effectively.
Implications and Additional Areas of Interest: Given Bush's massive mixing of religion and government - and Blair's efforts to finish off what Maggie left of the British education system - I am beginning to suspect that it might be worth setting up a test case where a scientific establishment refuses to hire staff if they profess to a belief in deities, astrology or "supernatural" events (however defined). It could be an awfully educational process. The point being that belief can undoubtedly be demonstrated to be incompatible with rationality. The question is how much messing with the jurior's minds would be permitted by the US courts, or with the judges and assessors in the EU court system. After all, both prohibit discrimination on the grounds of religion. Neither actually prohibits discrimination on the grounds of non-religion :-) And Bush has explicitly permitted churches to hire from within their ranks, while Blair has done the same with teachers, on the shaky grounds that some tasks "require" a member of a "particular" faith. If one could engineer a public acknowledgement in the form of a court judgement requiring unbelief on the grounds that it is a prerequisite to being rational it would be a mighty hammer to use against those who profess to believe that rationality and belief are compatible. So is this a viable scenario? Mo, are you paying attention?
Kind Regards
Hermit
PS Lucifer.
Awesome used as a synonym for "really good" is slang, still not an accepted language use, although it is possible that it may become so. Just as "that's bad" and "that's evil" also mean "really good." So how do we say "really bad"? And when it is deployed as slang to mean "really good", it still has the "flavor" of "awe" attached to it. So too with many words where the meaning has shifted. My favorite examples are "prestige" and "gay". "Gay" is sad, because there is no other word in English carrying the original meaning.
Now consider that if "belief" truly has no "flavor" to you, then does "a believer" carry no implications to you either?
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With or without religion, you would have good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, that takes religion. - Steven Weinberg, 1999
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Bass
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Re:Is agnosticism more "defendable" than atheism (epistemology)
« Reply #44 on: 2007-07-16 00:35:54 » |
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Perhaps I'm not understanding weyken, or the argument here right but whats the deal with faith?
Personally, I feel that "religion" (in the traditional sense of the word, i.e. organized religion) is the source of a lot of problems, but perhaps what could be really important in life is faith - though not necessarily in an unreasonable sense.
I don't feel it would matter what, specifically (depending on the person), but just that we had faith in something worthwhile. Without it our lives would seem to be bland, drab, and meaningless. I don't understand athiests for that reason here. How can you go about your life without believing in something? In life I find that I get along much better with Satanists than I do with athiests simply because the former actually believe in something and have a reason to live.
I'm all for "living in the now" and whatnot, but if you don't have a goal at the end of the line... what's the point?
The point I'm bouncing around is simply that the word religion itself tends to have too many negative connotations around it, at least to me. And briefly, what bothers me about organized religion is that a lot (not all, not even most, just a lot) of people blindly follow what they're told to believe without having the open mind to interpret it for themselves. But does that really mean we should disregard certain terms just because of this?
I don't choose to believe in something simply because there's a psychological need to do so, but rather because I feel there's far more to life than what we live on this little planet.
Just some thoughts I wanted to share and consider.
Regards
Bass
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