From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Sun Aug 11 2002 - 20:43:40 MDT
A Majority of One
by Daniel Pipes
New York Post
March 18, 2002
As America gets closer to initiating hostilities against Saddam
Hussein's foul regime in Iraq, the Middle East is sending out a
howl of protest, arguing that (as the Washington Post sums it up)
"the risks of an attack . . . far outweigh any threat he may pose."
This view is surprising, to put it mildly, ignoring as it does
Saddam's record of brutality toward his subjects and aggression
toward his neighbors, not to speak of his terrifying ambition to
acquire nuclear weapons. The outlook derives from several
factors:
· A sense of immunity: Most Middle Easterners "do not fear Iraq
at all," observes Radwan 'Abdullah, former dean of political
science at Jordan University. A 20-year-old vendor in Cairo has
the strange idea that the problem is "between America and Iraq,
and we [Egyptians] don't have anything to do with it."
· A fear of the unknown: The prospect of Iraq splitting up or
suffering total economic collapse worries its neighbors. Jordan's
King Abdullah anticipates that "striking Iraq represents a
catastrophe to Iraq and the region in general and threatens the
security and stability of the region." Turkey's prime minister,
Bülent Ecevit, fears an attack on Iraq on the narrow grounds that
this "will seriously affect" his country at a time when its economy
rests "on very sensitive balances."
· An alienation from America: Middle Easterners who want
Saddam gone distance themselves from Washington's policy lest
they, as The Wall Street Journal puts it, appear to be "U.S.
lackeys." This applies even to Kuwaitis.
· An admiration for Saddam. Radwan 'Abdullah notes: "Many
Arab countries do not fear Iraq at all. On the contrary, they want
Iraq stronger." They root for him defying the hated West.
Middle Easterners are not unique here. Much of the world, led by
the French, Russian and Chinese governments, concurs, leaving
only the British, Israelis and Iraq's opposition firmly supporting
American threats to finish off Saddam.
An anti-Saddam strategy, therefore, must accept that Washington
may basically have to go it alone. This is less than ideal, but it is
doable. And it prompts three observations.
First, such isolation is not new, for Washington routinely goes it
alone on a host of issues. It was the lone dissenter in a 118-1 vote
at the United Nations General Assembly in 1981 favoring a code
to restrict the promotion of infant-formula products. More
recently, the Bush administration single-handedly scuttled the
Kyoto climate treaty of 1997, which called for drastic reductions
in carbon dioxide emissions. The war against the Taliban last fall
was nearly a solo performance, too.
As a White House spokesman rightly explained in 1996: "We may
be in a minority of one, but we're going to stand by our position.
Sometimes you're the only country taking a particular view on an
issue but you stand by it because you have to stand by it."
Second, defeating Iraq should be militarily easy. Kenneth
Adelman, a former assistant to Donald Rumsfeld, predicts that a
war against Iraqis will be a "cakewalk," and offers four reasons:
"1) It was a cakewalk last time; 2) they've become much weaker;
3) we've become much stronger; and 4) now we're playing for
keeps."
Assuming Adelman is right, U.S. forces acting solo can take
control of Iraq without needing the U.N. seal of approval,
European troops, Saudi money or Turkish bases. The task would
be easier with a little help from friends, but it is not necessary.
Third, if Adelman is wrong and it's not an easy military victory,
then U.S. opinion becomes decisive. When a war goes badly, U.S.
public opinion can become fickle, affected by such factors as
casualties, complacency and a hostile world reaction. American
disaffection hamstrung the near-solo American military efforts in
Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia. In strategic terms, public opinion
is the U.S. center of gravity, its most vulnerable point.
American planners must therefore keep a close eye on U.S.
opinion. Anything that exceeds its bounds risks failure. The fate
of Iraq, whether it remains subject to Saddam's depredations or is
liberated, may depend as much on the mood of ordinary
Americans as it will on the capabilities of American troops.
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